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ABSTRACT 
 
The question at issue in this dissertation is the epistemic role played 
by ecological generalizations and models. I investigate and analyze 
such properties of generalizations as lawlikeness, invariance, and 
stability, and I ask which of these properties are relevant in the 
context of scientific explanations. I will claim that there are 
generalizable and reliable causal explanations in ecology by 
generalizations, which are invariant and stable.  An invariant 
generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change – 
called an intervention – that changes the value of its variables. 
Whether a generalization remains invariant during its interventions is 
the criterion that determines whether it is explanatory. A 
generalization can be invariant and explanatory regardless of its 
lawlike status.  Stability deals with a generality that has to do with 
holding of a generalization in possible background conditions. The 
more stable a generalization, the less dependent it is on background 
conditions to remain true. Although it is invariance – rather than 
stability – of generalizations that furnishes us with explanatory 
generalizations, there is an important function that stability has in this 
context of explanations, namely, stability furnishes us with 
extrapolability and reliability of scientific explanations. I also discuss 
non-empirical investigations of models that I call robustness and 
sensitivity analyses. I call sensitivity analyses investigations in which 
one model is studied with regard to its stability conditions by making 
changes and variations to the values of the model‘s parameters. As a 
general definition of robustness analyses I propose investigations of 
variations in modeling assumptions of different models of the same 
phenomenon in which the focus is on whether they produce similar 
or convergent results or not. Robustness and sensitivity analyses are 
powerful tools for studying the conditions and assumptions where 
models break down – and they are especially powerful in pointing out 
reasons as to why they do this. They show which conditions or 
assumptions the results of models depend on.  
Key words:  ecology, generalizations, invariance, lawlikeness, 
philosophy of science, robustness, explanation, models, stability 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The question at issue in this dissertation is the epistemic role played 
by ecological generalizations and models. I investigate and analyze 
such properties of generalizations as lawlikeness, invariance, and 
stability, and I ask which of these properties are relevant in the 
context of scientific explanations. I will claim that there are 
generalizable and reliable causal explanations in ecology by non-
lawlike and ―contingent‖ generalizations, which are invariant and 
stable.  I also discuss non-empirical investigations of models that I call 
robustness and sensitivity analyses. Robustness and sensitivity analyses 
are claimed to be powerful tools for studying the conditions and 
assumptions where models break down – and they are especially 
powerful in pointing out reasons as to why they do this. They show 
which conditions or assumptions the results of models depend on. 
The dissertation contains six chapters, outlined below.   
For some time there have been debates among philosophers of 
biology and biologists about whether the biological sciences have 
laws of their own. Recently, the debate surfaced among ecologists. 
Traditionally, laws have been defined by philosophers as true and 
lawlike regularities expressed in the sciences as generalizations. Most 
ecologists participating in the debate have not defined laws. 
Nevertheless, there are some definitions in the ecological literature.  
In chapter 1, I review these definitions along with ecologists‘ 
reasons or justifications for finding the debate interesting. I argue that 
ecologists‘ definitions of laws and their justifications for the laws 
debate are insufficient. A practically relevant, historically influential, 
and strong justification for this debate is then suggested, namely, the 
idea that laws are necessary for scientific explanations. The idea of 
the so-called covering law account of scientific explanation is that 
phenomena are explained when they are shown to happen in 
accordance with the laws, and therefore these laws should be 
mentioned in explaining the phenomena. In this sense laws are 
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essential, indispensable, or necessary to scientific explanations.1 Thus, 
two central issues have been treated carelessly in the ecological 
literature on the laws debate: accounts of ecological laws and 
justifications for them. This is unfortunate, since such negligence 
effectively prevents a resolution of the debate.  
In fact, there do not seem to be many, if any, laws in ecology – 
or in biology in general, and there are even many arguments 
purporting to show the absence of biological laws. In chapter 2, I 
analyze nine such arguments, which take advantage of various 
putative distinctive features of biological generalizations or 
phenomena, such as their reference to particulars, their conceptual 
imprecision, their exceptions, history, uniqueness, complexity, 
openness, multiple realizability, and contingency, which are held to be 
responsible for the absence of biological laws. I will claim that most 
of the arguments against biological laws are inappropriate or 
inconclusive for different reasons. Yet I also claim that there are two 
arguments that present important challenges to the existence of 
biological laws, namely, the argument according to which biological 
generalizations are riddled with exceptions, which is called their weak 
contingency, and the argument that biological generalizations lack the 
stability of laws, which is called their strong contingency. If my analysis is 
correct, then it follows that there are no biological laws owing to 
these contingencies. Accordingly, we have non-lawlike biological 
generalizations riddled with exceptions that hold only on limited 
spatio-temporal domains. Thus, there appear to be no biological 
generalizations that have the properties traditionally associated with 
laws.  
                                                 
1 The covering law account provides a strong justification for the laws 
debate. I do not claim that this justification is good; in fact, there are serious 
problems with it. My claim is that, given the apparent paucity of ecological 
laws, it is difficult to understand why ecologists should be engaged in the 
laws debate if no strong and practically relevant justification for the role of 
laws is given to begin with. Chapter 2 shows how this justification turns into 
a problem, because there appear to be no distinctively ecological (or 
biological) laws.  
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
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In chapter 3, I analyze (non-traditional) accounts of laws that 
tolerate exceptions. The accounts hold that biological generalizations 
could be lawlike despite their weak contingency or exceptions, 
because these generalizations are pragmatically or paradigmatically 
similar to laws, inference tickets, probabilistic laws, or ceteris paribus 
laws. I argue that the accounts that tolerate exceptions are not 
sufficient to salvage the lawlike status of biological generalizations, 
owing to various difficulties in the accounts. Another topic in chapter 
3 is the distinction between two kinds of exceptions.  
A widely held belief – one that I do not criticize – is that if an 
exception to a generalization can be explained, then it is not a 
disconfirming or falsifying genuine exception, but rather a harmless 
apparent exception. Another common belief is that the explanations 
for exceptions to generalizations come typically or exclusively from 
the lower levels of mechanisms and/or are stated in the vocabulary of 
the lower-level sciences. I argue that ecologists use concepts, causes, 
and mechanisms of the same level to explain away the exceptions to 
ecological generalizations. In other words, ecological generalizations 
can be corrected and made more precise, and their exceptions 
evidently can be explained within their own conceptual domain.  
How are scientific explanations possible in ecology, given that 
there do not appear to be many, if any, ecological (or biological) laws? 
To answer this question in chapter 4, I present and defend an 
account of scientific explanation in which generalizations are 
explanatory if they are invariant. An invariant generalization continues 
to hold or be valid under a special change – called an intervention – 
that changes the value of its variables. According to this 
interventionist account of scientific explanation, causes are 
difference-makers that can be intervened upon to manipulate or 
control their effects. A generalization can be invariant and 
explanatory regardless of its lawlike status. There is no requirement 
that invariant generalizations should contain only purely qualitative 
predicate terms, be universal, maximally or highly stable, or belong to 
a systematic web of other generalizations, as many philosophers have 
suggested about laws 
The interventionist account is a counterfactual account of 
scientific explanation that shows what would happen to variables of 
Jani Raerinne 
 
 
12 
generalizations during interventions: how the value (or probability 
distribution) of Y would change during intervention in the value of 
variable X. What is needed for explanations are active counterfactuals 
in the form, ―if the value of the variable X of a generalization Yi = 
f(Xi) were changed by an intervention from x1 to x2, then the value of 
the variable Y would be changed from y1 to y2 in accordance with the 
relation Yi = f(Xi).‖ The ―stability‖ of a generalization under 
interventions in its variables is what matters in explanations. The 
ability to remain true under active – rather than passive – 
counterfactuals distinguishes explanatory generalizations from non-
explanatory ones. Explanations describe and exhibit how the 
phenomena described in explananda systematically depend upon the 
changes of explanantia. Invariant generalizations with their support of 
active counterfactuals provide answers to ―what-if-things-had-been-
different‖ questions that provide us with understanding and 
explanatory information about how the explanandum would have 
changed had we changed the initial or boundary conditions of an 
invariant generalization to ―such-and-such.‖  
I apply the interventionist account to ecological generalizations 
to show that invariance under interventions as a criterion of 
explanatory relevance yields interesting interpretations of the 
explanatory status of many ecological generalizations, such as 
allometries, scaling laws, and the species–area rule (see appendix). 
Ecologists should find this interesting, because some of them rely 
only on (unreliable and implicit) intuitions, when deciding by what 
criteria the explanatory status of ecological generalizations should be 
evaluated. Chapter 4 also reaches the conclusion that the debate 
about ecological laws is a red herring, not because lawlikeness as a 
concept is elusive or does not apply to biological generalizations, but 
because the justification for the debate can be questioned. 
In chapter 5, I analyze such properties of generalizations as 
scope and stability. Although stability and scope seem to deal with 
the generality of generalizations, I argue that they are different. Scope 
deals with a generality that has to do with the actual distribution or range 
of (dis)similar systems to which a generalization applies or has 
applied. Stability deals with a generality that has to do with holding of 
a generalization in possible background conditions. For example, both of 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
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Mendel’s rules or laws (see appendix) have (nearly) all sexually 
reproducing taxa as their scope. Conditions, such as the evolution of 
mitosis and meiosis on which Mendel‘s rules depend for their validity, 
are the background conditions in the stability sense. Biological 
generalizations typically generalize about different taxa, features, 
entities, and so on in different times and/or places. Scope captures 
the idea that biological generalizations are distributed in their 
applicability to different taxa, places, epochs, and so on. Many 
biological generalizations evidently have narrow or limited scope, 
whereas laws are often understood to have unlimited scope. The 
same goes for stability: laws are typically thought of as maximally 
stable generalizations. The important point is that a generalization 
with a narrow scope could have a high degree of stability within this 
scope. The converse could also be true: a generalization that has a 
broad scope could have a low degree of stability within its scope. 
In contrast to what previous authors have said, I suggest that 
stability is not a monolithic property of generalizations, but that there 
are several different, yet related concepts or meanings for stability. I 
then use this as a reason to criticize the idea that stability should be 
identified with lawlikeness. Likewise, I argue that stability differs from 
invariance. There are stable generalizations that are non-invariant, 
such as the many examples of correlations between joint effects of a 
common cause, which can be highly stable in the sense that they hold 
in many different background conditions. Nevertheless, these 
examples are non-invariant as generalizations.  
In chapter 5, I also discuss the different functions of stability 
and scope in the context of ―generalizing‖ scientific explanations. 
Stability is an important property of generalizations insofar as their 
extrapolability and reliability are concerned, because stable 
generalizations furnish us with support of passive counterfactuals that 
have the form ―had this-or-that background condition been different, 
a generalization would still have held.‖  Let us call the stability 
domain of a generalization the range or extent of background 
conditions or interferences over which it supports passive 
counterfactuals. In general, the larger the stability domain of a 
generalization, the more passive counterfactuals it supports, and 
accordingly, the more extrapolable and reliable the generalization is, 
Jani Raerinne 
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because it holds in many – and/or in more important – different 
possible background conditions rather than holding owing to  some 
actual or incidental background conditions. In this sense stable 
generalizations function as many philosophers believe only laws 
function. Scope has a different, yet related function: it unifies and 
systematizes (causal) knowledge. Although it could be claimed that 
unification is not what makes explanations explanatory, unification 
can nevertheless be viewed as a serendipitous feature of causal 
explanations. Unification, for instance, permits economical ways of 
presenting explanations.  
Consequently, I argue that we have ecological generalizations 
that are generalizable or extrapolable in explanations and that unify or 
systematize our knowledge. Invariant and stable generalizations with 
varying scopes function in the manner described above despite the 
fact that they need not be lawlike generalizations and despite the fact 
that they are weakly and strongly contingent as generalizations.  
While the earlier chapters deal with generalizations, chapter 6 
takes up scientific models and their non-empirical investigations.  
Recent philosophical discussion centers on Richard Levins‘ 
ideas of scientific modeling in biology and robustness analysis, which 
date back to the 1960s. Chapter 6 contributes to this discussion by 
providing a sense of robustness analysis – which I call sufficient 
parameter robustness – that has so far been neglected in the literature. 
Another sense of robustness analysis – which is called derivational 
robustness – has been the focus of previous authors. Moreover, a 
third non-empirical form of investigation of models – which I call 
sensitivity analysis – is distinguished from the two robustness analyses. 
I call sensitivity analyses investigations in which one model is studied 
with regard to its stability conditions by making changes and 
variations to the values of the model‘s parameters. As a general 
definition of robustness analyses, I propose investigations of 
variations in modeling assumptions of different models of the same 
phenomenon in which the focus is on whether the models produce 
similar or convergent results. 
Robustness and sensitivity analyses are powerful tools for 
analyzing which conditions or assumptions the results of models 
depend on. They also have different functions. The purpose of 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
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sensitivity analyses is to show something about the stability 
conditions of a model. The purpose of derivational robustness 
analysis is to investigate whether the results of similar models depend 
on certain modeling assumptions about the models. The purpose of 
sufficient parameter robustness analysis is to serve as a defense of 
abstract, unifying, and simple models. Although robustness and 
sensitivity analyses are non-empirical investigations of models, they 
could help in testing and confirming models, since they have the 
potential to show which stability conditions and/or modeling 
assumptions the results of models depend on. In this sense, 
robustness and sensitivity analyses allow one to move toward truer or 
realistic ecological models and theories. 
In the special sciences the strategy to use a diverse set of simple, 
robust, and abstract models to study complex phenomena is 
widespread. Ecological theories can be seen as collections of such 
models. Theories of competition, niche, diversity, and abundance of 
species and populations form a more or less coupled set of simple 
and abstract theoretical ecological models that are developed and 
elaborated when new models for phenomena get proposed and when 
the models and their results are studied via robustness and sensitivity 
analyses.  
In these pages I sometimes speak of regularities and 
generalizations as interchangeable. Strictly speaking, this is inaccurate, 
since generalizations are statements or expressions of regularities that 
are (claimed to be) objective uniformities in nature.  
In the appendix, a list of ecological and paleobiological 
generalizations and models to which I refer to in the text are briefly 
described along with some references. These generalizations and 
models are arranged in alphabetical order according to the portion of 
their terms in bold.  
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1 
 
ECOLOGICAL LAWS 
 
 
1.1 The Ecological Laws Debate 
 
Recently, ecologists have begun to raise the question of whether there 
are distinctive ecological laws (see Loehle 1990; Peters 1991; Lawton 
1999; Murray 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004; Turchin 2001; Bednekoff 2003; 
Berryman 2003; Colyvan & Ginzburg 2003; O‘Hara 2005; Owen-
Smith 2005).  Yet the question is not a recent one.  Many views, 
examples, and arguments for and against the existence of biological 
laws have been presented in the philosophical and biological literature 
since the 1950s. For instance, Bernhard Rensch (1959, 1960) believed 
that evolution is governed by laws. He enumerated some fifty of ―the 
most important‖ evolutionary laws. Some of his examples were 
regression equations, for example, concerning the ontogenetic 
development of different body parts and organs in different taxa. Still 
other examples were evolutionary and ecological rules, such as the 
rules proposed by Allen, Bergmann, Cope, Dollo, Gloger, and 
Williston (see appendix), as well as other evolutionary, 
developmental, and genetic rules, such as the rule of natural 
selection, generalizations concerning the tempo and the intensity of 
natural selection, Mendel’s rules, and so on.  
In the literature on the laws debate, the trend – at least among 
biologists – has been to present examples of generalizations as laws. 
Ecologists have made no exceptions to this trend (cf. section 2.3). 
Yet such a trend perhaps reverses the more fruitful order of things: 
rather than presenting generalizations as examples of laws, one 
should first give accounts or definitions of laws, otherwise it is difficult to 
compare and/or evaluate the generalizations with regard to their 
lawlike status.  
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
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Although the laws debate has recently become popular in 
ecology, there seems to be few shared reasons or justifications among 
ecologists as to why they should engage in this debate. Moreover, the 
debate over the existence of laws is perhaps not that interesting when 
taken as an abstract question, at least for scientists who are tackling 
―practical‖ scientific issues and problems – in contrast to more 
―philosophical‖ ones. In other words, some role has to be singled out 
as the central role for laws in the present context. Without this, the 
debate has no interesting or relevant justification.  
Thus, I suggest that two important issues prior to the ecological 
laws debate have been treated carelessly: the definitions of laws and 
the justifications for them. This is unfortunate, since such negligence 
effectively prevents a resolution of the debate. 
I proceed as follows. The next section distinguishes laws from 
―accidentally true‖ generalizations, where I argue that the central 
property of laws is their lawlikeness rather than their truth. Section 
1.3 presents some traditional accounts of laws defining lawlikeness 
more accurately. In section 1.4, I offer a critical review of the 
accounts of laws that have been given by ecologists. A common 
misconception is that ecologists identify the truth with lawlikeness. 
Another difficulty is that their accounts fail to commit themselves to 
any particular view or account of laws. Section 1.5 reviews the 
justifications of ecologists in the laws debate, which I found 
inadequate or secondary in importance. In section 1.6, I suggest that 
there is one practically important, influential, and strong justification 
for the laws debate, namely, the idea that laws are necessary for 
scientific explanations. The idea of the so-called covering law account 
of scientific explanation is that phenomena are explained when they 
are shown to happen in accordance with the laws, and therefore these 
laws should be mentioned in explaining the phenomena. In this sense 
laws are essential, indispensable, or necessary to scientific 
explanations.  Section 1.7 briefly discussed the main problems of the 
covering law account. Section 1.8 concludes.  
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1.2 Laws versus Accidentally True Generalizations 
 
According to a general traditional philosophical account, laws are 
lawlike and true regularities or uniformities expressed as generalizations in the 
sciences.  
A regularity is often in this context represented by a statement 
in a universal form, as in ―All Fs are Gs,‖ which can be represented in 
formal and conditional form as x(FxGx), where x is a universal 
quantifier (read ―For all x‖), F and G are predicate terms, and  is a 
logical connective for ―if, then.‖ Generalizations in this form express 
the idea of uniformity: ―For all x, if a thing x is an F, then x is also a 
G.‖ In other words, all objects with the property F also have the 
property G. For example, ―All ravens (F predicate) are black (G 
predicate).‖ Since laws are universal, they brook no exceptions: all Fs 
are Gs in every place and in every time. If all Fs are not Gs, then the 
generalization is falsified or disconfirmed.2 
Laws are not only universally and conditionally expressed true 
generalizations, because this syntactic or formal requirement is a 
necessary condition of laws, not a sufficient one. In other words, 
there are true, but non-lawlike generalizations that can be expressed 
as statements in the above form. Let us call these accidentally true 
generalizations in contrast to lawlike and true generalizations, that is, 
laws.  
Lawlikeness is the distinctive and proprietary property of laws. 
Note that the truth and the lawlikeness of a generalization are not the 
same things. Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (1948: 153) put 
this as follows:    
Apart from being true, a law will have to satisfy a number of 
additional conditions. These can be studied independently of 
the factual requirement of truth, for they refer, as it were, to all 
logically possible laws, no matter whether factually true or 
false. Adopting a convenient term proposed by Goodman…, 
we will say that a sentence is lawlike if it has all the 
                                                 
2 In this chapter I discuss accounts of laws according to which these are – or 
from which follow – universal and exceptionless regularities. Other accounts 
of laws are dealt with subsequently. 
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characteristics of a general law, with the possible exception of 
truth. 
 
So laws are expressed as true generalizations, but not every true 
generalization is a law. The central issue of any account of laws is to 
give a clear demarcation between lawlike generalizations and 
accidentally true generalizations.  
Consider two true, conditional, and formally universal 
generalizations. The first is, ―all persisting lumps of pure gold have a 
mass less than 1,000 kg,‖ which I presume is true, but is not a law. 
Contrast this with a putative law: ―all persisting lumps of pure 
uranium-235 have a mass less than 1,000 kg.‖ It is a coincidence that 
nobody has amassed gold into a lump weighing over 1,000 kg, 
although nothing precludes that such an event should not be true. 
Yet physical laws, namely, the laws of nuclear chain-reactions, bar of 
existing a lump of uranium isotope 235 with a mass of 1,000 kg, 
because this is much greater than the critical mass of the isotope, 
which is around 50 kg, depending on the shape and density of the 
lump. So the uranium-235 generalization seems to be true because of 
nomic necessity, that is, a law, whereas the gold generalization is true 
only by an accident.   
Lawlikeness is not only the distinctive property of laws; it is 
also the property that is thought to give laws their support in 
counterfactuals or subjunctives. Counterfactuals are contrary-to-fact 
conditional statements of a form, ―if this a were an F, then a would 
have been a G.‖ Laws underwrite counterfactuals: if it is a law that all 
ravens are black, then ―if this Blue-Headed Pionus had been a raven, 
it would have been black‖ is true or underwritten by that law.   
Counterfactual support of laws tells how laws govern not just 
what actually happens, but what would have happened under certain 
background conditions had they happened. In other words, laws do 
not just describe what happens in the world, but they also ―dictate‖ 
or tell what would happen had the conditions been such-and-such or 
this-and-that. That laws support counterfactuals is what gives laws 
explanatory and predictive power, modal force, and necessity – or 
least it illuminates how they get these qualities. Accidentally true 
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generalizations do not have the above abilities. At most, they tell or 
describe what actually happens or happened.  
Although laws are typically defined as lawlike and true 
generalizations, lawlikeness is a surrogate for a concept that needs to 
be defined. In the next section I present some traditional accounts of 
laws that furnish us with definitions of lawlikeness.  
 
 
1.3 The Regularity and Universal Accounts of Laws 
 
According to the so-called regularity account, laws are true 
regularities + lawlikeness.  According to the ―naïve‖ regularity 
account, lawlike and accidentally true generalizations can be 
distinguished, because the former contains essentially universal 
predicate terms (also called purely qualitative predicate terms or 
natural kind terms). In other words, lawlike generalizations make no 
essential reference to any particular, that is, to individual place, time, 
spatio-temporal location,  proper name, object, or event (see Hempel 
& Oppenheim 1948: 152-157, Nagel 1961: 47-78, and Hempel 1965: 
264-270, 291-293). In effect, every accidentally true generalization 
includes – at least implicitly – some spatial reference  (as in ―this 
generalization holds true only on the earth‖), temporal reference (as 
in ―this generalization ceased to hold after the Eocene, but was true 
before it‖), includes some other restriction, or refers essentially to 
some particular individual, proper name, thing, place, or object in 
predicate terms. Acceptable predicate terms for laws concern such 
things as mass, predator, prey, competition, electric charge, 
acceleration, cold climates, money, metal, and body size. 
The above criterion is intended to apply to fundamental laws, 
whereas derivative laws are permitted to contain predicate terms 
referring to particulars. Although Kepler‘s laws of planetary motions 
and Galileo‘s law of free falling refer to particulars, such as the moon, 
the earth, and the sun, they could count as derivative laws according 
to the above definition of the naïve regularity account. Newton‘s laws 
of motion and gravitation are the fundamental laws from which both 
Kepler‘s and Galileo‘s laws are derived from.  
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The naïve regularity account seems nicely to capture the idea 
of laws being general and universal uniformities. However, the 
account is in trouble. In fact the definition of lawlikeness based on 
differences in predicate terms does not distinguish between the gold 
and uranium generalizations given above. According to this naïve 
account both generalizations evidently represent (fundamental) laws 
because they are true and contain no forbidden predicate terms of the 
kind given above. This suggests that the naïve regularity account fails 
to provide an account of lawlikeness, since it fails to distinguish 
between laws and non-laws.  
There are other accounts of lawlikeness given by other 
regularity theorists. For instance, a more ―sophisticated‖ version of 
the regularity account – the so-called Mill–Ramsey–Lewis account 
(see Lewis 1973: 72-77) – holds that laws are axioms or theorems in 
the best(s) deductive system(s) of the knowledge of the world. Laws 
are generalizations belonging to the deductive system of propositions 
all of whose members are true, where such a system achieves the best 
balance between strength (or information content) and simplicity.  
On this account, lawlikeness is not something a generalization 
possesses in isolation, but something that it possesses as a member of 
a system of other generalizations. The Mill–Ramsey–Lewis account 
has a better chance of incorporating the difference between the gold 
and uranium generalizations than does the naive account: It could be 
argued that the gold generalization does not belong to any deductive 
systematization of knowledge that balances simplicity and strength. 
The uranium generalization could belong to such a system that 
includes, say, quantum physics, nuclear physics, and other such areas 
of physics. This difference makes the latter a law and the former not.  
Do biological theories and their generalizations have the 
theoretical structure required by the Mill–Ramsey–Lewis account? I 
would argue that they do not. The problem is especially pronounced 
in ecology, where evidently there is only one theoretical structure of 
the above kind, namely, the competition theory. Unfortunately, it is 
not even clear that the competition theory has the required structure. 
Rather, it is a structure whose generalizations have loose, 
unsystematic, vertical, and horizontal connections, that is, a theory 
whose structure resembles real webs rather than the fantasy of a 
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logician (cf. also Schaffner 1980). Moreover, there is concern that 
systematic connections have nothing to do with lawlikeness, but there 
could be isolated laws (see also Psillos 2002: 148-149 for a similar 
criticism). Thus, it could be argued that systematization or adding 
strength or simplicity to a theoretical system is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for lawlikeness. Systematization of laws seems to be a 
contingent fact that should not be confused with the criterion of 
lawlikeness. The Mill–Ramsey–Lewis account has faced still other 
problems questioning its status as a coherent account of laws, which I 
shall not discuss (see, for instance, Armstrong 1983: 66-73, van 
Fraassen 1989: 40-64, Carroll 1994: 44-55, Psillos 2002: 148-158).  
Still other regularity theorists refer to the evidential status of a 
law, to epistemic things, roles, attitudes, or even to pragmatic, 
subjective, and psychological things as distinctive of laws (cf. 
Braithwaite 1927, Goodman 1954, Spohn 2002). These are not dealt 
with here, since I am looking for objective criteria. As suggestions, 
they seem to be too relativistic. Some of them moreover confuse the 
roles or justifications for laws with the criterion of lawlikeness.  
There is another account, which is neither a regularity account 
nor an empiricist account, but a necessitarian account. According to 
the regularity account, laws are special uniformities or regularities that 
describe the world accurately and truthfully throughout time and 
space. Lawlike generalizations or regularities are not in any strict 
sense necessary. Necessitarians, however, insist on the contrary.  
According to one popular necessitarian account – the so-called 
universal account –, laws are nomic necessity relations holding between 
universals (see Dretske 1977, Tooley 1977, Armstrong 1983). Necessity 
here is not logical, but physical, nomical, or even metaphysical. In 
other words, universals necessitate other universals in laws: if it is a 
lawlike regularity or generalization that ―All Fs are Gs,‖ then universal 
F (e.g., ―being uranium of isotope 235‖) necessitates universal G (e.g., 
―being a lump not exceeding the critical mass of about 50 kg‖). The 
account also has it that laws entail exceptionless and universal 
regularities, but that laws themselves are not regularities. Accidentally 
true generalizations do not follow from relations between universals, 
but are just expressions of mere regularities.  
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Universals are thought to be unifying, general, and explanatory 
properties, such as having mass, being a proton, or a predator, which 
can have many spatiotemporal instances and which are connected via 
nomic relations, namely, laws.  
The universal account of laws, I assume, would distinguish 
between the gold and uranium generalizations by simply claiming that 
as a matter of fact there is no necessity relation between the 
properties ―being a lump of gold‖ and ―being less in mass than 1,000 
kg,‖ whereas in the case of the uranium generalization, there is such a 
relation (which has been shown or found empirically). Nevertheless, 
one wants something more illuminating than such a fiat from a 
definition of lawlikeness. The problem is that there are no noticeable 
differences between the gold and uranium generalizations, but both 
seemingly refer to universals. Or at least I am not able to see any 
difference between them in this respect. So the universal account has 
to offer a better account of what distinguishes between universals and 
things that are not universals that figure in non-laws, because this 
grounds the distinction between laws and non-laws (see also Psillos 
2002: 171-172 for a similar criticism).  
The lesson to be drawn from the above short survey of 
different accounts  of laws is that lawlikeness is elusive as a concept. 
In fact, at present there is no satisfactory account of laws, although 
the subject has kept philosophers busy for decades. However, the 
point of this section was not to defend any specific account of laws, 
but to show that there are different accounts of laws in the literature.  
The regularity account is often treated as the received account 
of laws. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the (naïve) 
regularity account of laws got the definition of laws right. I adopt the 
regularity account of laws for the following reasons. Although there 
are difficulties with the different versions of the regularity account 
(see, for instance, Armstrong 1983: 11-73 and Psillos 2002: 137-158), 
other accounts have their own, at least equally serious, difficulties. 
Moreover, the universality account discussed above has difficulties in 
dealing with probabilistic laws (van Fraassen 1987), whereas the 
regularity account does not. An account that allows for probabilistic 
laws could salvage the lawlike status of generalizations that are riddled 
with exceptions, whereas an account that has difficulties in dealing 
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with such laws is more likely to run into problems with 
generalizations riddled with exceptions. This speaks for the regularity 
account, owing to the fact that biological generalizations are riddled 
with exceptions (see section 2.3). Moreover, that I adopt the 
regularity account here has no important consequences given that I 
focus first and foremost in this book on the epistemic function of 
laws rather than on different accounts of them. The fact is that 
different accounts of laws view their function similarly, namely, that 
laws furnish us with reliable and generalizable explanations. My 
criticism in the next section of the accounts of laws given by 
ecologists is likewise not affected by the issue of what is the correct 
account of laws. In other words, I argue that the problem with the 
accounts of laws by ecologists is not that the authors adopt the wrong 
account of laws, but  that ecologists‘ accounts are not accounts of 
laws to begin with, because they are too non-committal and/or they 
identify truth with lawlikeness. In other words, I adopt the regularity 
account of laws at least partly for convenience rather than because it 
is the correct account. 
 
 
1.4 Ecologists on Laws 
 
In lieu of defining laws, most ecologists just present generalizations as 
examples of laws without giving much attention to laws‘ defining 
features. Fortunately, there are a few accounts of laws in the 
ecological literature.   
Although the necessatarian and regularity accounts differ, what 
is common to both is either that laws are exceptionless and universal 
regularities or that from laws follow such regularities. As it happens, 
this is something that evidently all ecologists reject in their accounts. 
This is not the crucial problem of their accounts, since there are 
accounts of laws that tolerate exceptions (see chapter 3).3 A common 
misconception in ecologists‘ accounts of laws is that they identify 
                                                 
3 On the other hand, traditional biological literature on laws admits that laws 
are universal and then laments that biological generalizations lack this 
feature (see Mayr 1956; see also Murray 2000, 2001, 2004). 
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truth with lawlikeness. At the same time their accounts are 
conflations of unrelated ideas or accounts of laws and/or too non-
committal to be successful as accounts of laws.   
For example, John N. Lawton (1999: 177) writes:   
Of course there are general laws in ecology. However, our 
science has rather few universal laws. My dictionary gives several 
different definitions of the word law. The most appropriate is: 
―Generalized formulation based on a series of events or 
processes observed to recur regularly under certain conditions; 
a widely observable tendency‖.  Notice that there is nothing in 
this definition to say that a law has to be universally true; only 
that laws are usually true.   
 
As an account, the above manages to be a conflation of unrelated 
ideas or accounts of laws. On the one hand, the account suggests that 
laws are tendencies (the second part of the account). On the other 
hand, it suggests that laws are regularities (the first part of the 
account), which is a different thing. Moreover, Lawton‘s account 
evidently misidentifies lawlikeness with truth, as the last sentence of 
the quoted passage suggests.  
A. A. Berryman (2003: 695) trusts also partly in a dictionary 
definition of laws:  
Webster‘s New World Dictionary defines... a law of nature as ―a 
sequence of events… that has been observed to occur with 
unvarying uniformity under the same set of conditions‖, or ―an 
exact formulation of the principle operating‖ in an observed 
regularity… It is important to realize that laws usually have 
conditional constraints, in the sense that they are obeyed under 
a certain set of conditions. Thus, laws should not be expected to 
hold under all possible circumstances, something that is not 
always appreciated…   
 
Berryman suggests that laws are regular – and perhaps even 
regularities – under ―certain conditions,‖ but are not necessary regular 
outside of those conditions. The problem is that this account is so 
non-committal that it tells next to nothing about what laws are.  In 
other words, Berryman‘s account is consistent with very different 
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accounts of laws, for instance, with laws being regularities that hold 
―ceteris paribus.‖ His account is also consistent with an account that 
laws are not about regularities at all, but about dispositions or 
tendencies of things that need not manifest in (observed) regularities 
if the conditions for manifestation are not present. Furthermore, 
qualifying laws with protective clauses, such as that the laws hold only 
under certain conditions, leads to semantic, epistemic, and empirical 
problems in accounts of laws that are unresolved (see section 3.5).  
The philosopher of science, Marc Lange (2005a: 395), has 
criticized Berryman‘s and Lawton‘s accounts on the grounds that 
both make any true generalization a law, whether it is lawlike or not. 
Lange also seems to propose that Berryman and Lawton think of 
laws as being regularities. Lange‘s points seem apt, because at least 
Lawton and perhaps even Berryman seem mistakenly to equate 
lawlikeness with the truth. Consequently, their accounts fail to 
demarcate between accidentally true generalizations and laws; for 
instance, Berryman‘s and Lawton‘s accounts evidently wrongly treat 
the gold and uranium generalizations presented above as the same, 
namely, as laws. At the same time Lange‘s points seem wrong. I do 
not find anything substantial in the above passages to propose that 
laws are regularities. Quite the contrary. Lawton‘s and Berryman‘s 
accounts are non-committal on what laws are. As accounts, they are 
useless, since they fail to provide meaningful criteria for lawlikeness.  
R. B. O‘Hara (2005: 391) has likewise come up with a 
definition of laws:   
They [i.e., philosophers] typically declare that a statement 
needs to overcome two hurdles before it can be considered a 
Law... Firstly, it has to have a natural necessity – i.e. it has to be 
true because of the way the world is. This means that it has to 
have some empirical content: a mathematical theorem is not a 
Law of Nature because it is true by virtue of logic. Secondly, 
the law has to be essential scientifically, i.e. it has to be used.  
 
I would disagree with both of O‘Hara‘s ―hurdles.‖ The first seems to 
confuse lawlikeness with truth. Or possibly it refers to some 
unanalyzed notion of necessity making up lawlikeness. However, it is 
not the first hurdle I am worried about.  
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It is the second hurdle, which has problematic consequences 
owing to its relativistic and unorthodox characterization of 
lawlikeness. O‘Hara is evidently suggesting that the lawlike status of, 
say, Gause’s rule (see appendix) or Kepler‘s laws depends on the 
scientific use. However, it is not clear that the use of laws has 
anything to do with their lawlikeness. Moreover, O‘Hara does not 
give any clue about what he means by using laws. Does he mean that 
laws are used to manipulate or control nature? Or does using laws 
mean successful (theoretical) application? O‘Hara‘s ideas about 
lawlikeness – if taken literally – also lead to unacceptable relativistic, 
contingent, or unstable ideas about what laws are. For instance, 
suppose that Kepler‘s laws were ―used‖ in their heyday. 
Consequently, O‘Hara‘s characterization of laws imply that Kepler‘s 
laws were physical or astronomical laws at the time, but not anymore, 
because they are not used in theoretical physics today if more than an 
approximation is needed. Alternatively, it implies that nowadays 
Kepler‘s laws are laws of engineering, instead of laws of physics or 
astronomy, since they are used (more) in those disciplines.  
If O‘Hara‘s conditions are not individually sufficient for laws, 
could they be both individually necessary and jointly sufficient? The 
answer to this is in the negative. There appear to be generalizations 
for controlling, manipulating, predicting, and explaining phenomena. 
These are stable and invariant generalizations that need not be lawlike 
generalizations (see chapters 4 and 5).  
 
 
1.5 Ecologists on the Justifications for the Laws Debate 
 
Although the laws debate has recently become popular in ecology, 
there seems to be few shared reasons or justifications among 
ecologists as to why they should engage in this debate. To my 
knowledge, the present section is the first explicit attempt to examine 
the justifications of ecologists for the laws debate as well.   
 For some ecologists, the debate seems to be only about 
terminology or is of little consequence (see Bednekoff 2003 and 
Colyvan & Ginzburg 2003: 651, 652). My view is that there has to be 
some justification for carrying on this debate. Otherwise, it is difficult 
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to understand why ecologists argue for or against laws given that it is 
not clear that there are ecological laws, at least if these are understood 
as universal and exceptionless regularities (see also chapter 2).  
Some think that once we have identified a small body of 
general laws, it becomes possible to formulate an axiomatic and 
deductively systematized scientific theory, which is consider a 
significant project and important for explanations (see Berryman 
2003: 695, 696, 700). It is not clear exactly why this would be an 
important reason or justification for the laws debate, at least where 
practical matters of ecology and ecologists are concerned. Also – as 
was argued above – whether this project can implemented in ecology 
can be questioned. Some ecologists refer to related, but more obscure 
ideas, such as the notion that  laws bring forth ecology‘s ―coherence,‖ 
―consistency,‖ ―theoretical connections,‖ or ―resemblance‖ to 
physical and/or other biological sciences (see Turchin 2001: 18-19, 
24, Colyvan & Ginzburg 2003: 649, Owen-Smith 2005: 611).  
Others highlight the importance of conservation and 
management problems and their solutions when it comes to 
ecological laws (see Lawton 1999 and Owen-Smith 2005). This 
justification is problematic on two scores. First, it needs to be 
clarified how and why laws – rather than something else – help with 
these problems (see, for instance, Shrader-Frechette & McCoy 1994), 
and, second, it needs to be shown that ecological laws help, because 
there are doubts about whether ecology can contribute solutions to 
these problems (cf. Sagoff 1985).  
For some, the justification is connected with the scientific 
status of ecology and/or the demarcation between the sciences and 
pseudo-sciences (see Murray 1999, 2001 and Colyvan & Ginzburg 
2003: 649). Another, more interesting justification is that biology is 
not just an application of physics or chemistry, but is an autonomous 
explanatory endeavor with scientifically respectable, empirically 
testable, and explanatory laws of its own. This justification has been 
put forward mostly by philosophers (see Smart 1963: 50-63, Rosenberg 
1985: 126, and Lange 2005a: 400-402). Although it is an important 
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justification, ecologists do not usually and explicitly refer to it in 
papers.4  
Robert Henry Peters (1991) and Bertram G. Murray (1999, 
2000, 2001, 2004) have highlighted the importance of predictive and 
rigorously tested ecology in the context of the ecological laws debate. 
What differentiates these authors from other ecologists is that they 
articulate their justification for the debate by explicitly referring to an 
account of scientific explanation (see the next section). As I will argue 
below, there is an important and (historically) influential justification 
for the laws debate in ecology having to do with the role of laws in 
scientific explanations, a justification also stressed by Peters (ibid.) and 
Murray (ibid.).  
The justifications of some other ecologists alluded to above are 
often of secondary importance in the sense that by explicating what 
scientific explanations consist of and what is needed to have these, 
these latter justifications are analyzed or even eliminated. For 
instance, with the right account of scientific explanation, we should 
be able to obtain answers to the questions of what is the value of 
unification in explanations, how are autonomous biological 
explanations possible, how do scientific explanations differ from 
non-scientific or pseudo-scientific explanations, how is it possible to 
control and manipulate nature, and so on. 
 
 
1.6 The Covering Law Account of Scientific Explanation 
 
According to the so-called covering law account of scientific 
explanation, a phenomenon is explained by showing that some law 
covers it as a special case. In a word, the phenomenon is explained by 
                                                 
4 It is true that nearly every participant in the ecological laws debate reminds 
us that ecology should supply accurate predictions. For instance, John H. 
Lawton (1999: 178, 179) recognizes that laws and generalizations are useful 
and important for understanding nature and that these also matter for 
predictions. Unfortunately, hardly any of them – with the  two exceptions to 
be mentioned below – say anything more substantial about this or about the 
role of laws in the context. 
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subsuming it under laws. These ideas apply not only to explanations 
of particular phenomena or events, but also to explanations of 
generalizations and laws: the latter are explained or subsumed by 
other more general laws.  
The idea of covering law account is that phenomena are 
explained when they are shown to happen in accordance with the 
laws, and therefore these laws should be mentioned in explaining the 
phenomena. In this sense laws are essential, indispensable, or 
necessary to scientific explanations.  Carl G. Hempel‘s (1965; see also 
Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) account of scientific explanation is 
the received or at least the most famous version of covering law 
accounts.  
With the term the explanandum (pl. explananda) I am referring to 
the object of explanation, whether the object is a law, a generalization, a 
particular phenomenon, or something else. With the term explanans 
(pl. explanantia) I am referring to the thing that does the explaining. The 
explanandum and the explanans are general terms describing the things 
that explanations consist of: an explanation is an explanandum + an 
explanans.  
To Hempel, explanations are arguments in which the 
conclusion follows either deductively or inductively from the 
premises. Since explanations are arguments, explanantia work as 
premises for explananda, which are the conclusions of the arguments. 
The explanans consists of two kinds of sentences: one contains 
statements of laws and the other describes antecedent (or boundary) 
conditions. The explanandum is a sentence describing the 
phenomenon to be explained.  
Antecedent conditions are the particular and contextual 
explanatory conditions needed to be taken into account in order for 
the law to be applied to a situation.  Consider Newton‘s law of 
gravity. The law states that the gravitational force between two bodies 
with masses m1 and m2, separated by a distance, r, is F = gm1m2/r2, 
where g is the gravitational constant. An explanation citing this law 
specifies as the antecedent conditions that the masses of two bodies 
are ―such-and-such‖ and that their distance is ―this-or-that.‖ 
Antecedent conditions thus concern auxiliary information that is 
context-specific in nature and is represented in singular statements, 
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such as ―this specific body has a mass of 1,230 kg.‖ These conditions 
should not include irrelevant explanatory details, such as the two 
bodies are ―yellow in color‖ and that one of them is ―a statue of Gary 
Gygax.‖ 
For Hempel, the explanandum is explained and made intelligible 
by showing that it was to be expected given the explanans: one could 
infer from the premises (the explanans) that the explanandum follows 
deductively or that the explanans gives a high probability to the 
occurrence of the explanandum. Explanations function to remove any 
initial surprise and replace it with nomic expectations about the 
explanandum.  
 Hempel (1965: 334-347, 376-393) distinguished three specific 
accounts of scientific explanation, namely, the deductive-nomological 
account (the DN account, for short), the deductive-statistical account 
(the DS account), and the inductive-statistical account (the IS 
account). The idea of an explanation or argument of a DN account 
kind is to show that an explanandum follows deductively from laws 
and antecedent conditions adduced in its explanans. The conclusion 
follows deductively from the premise, because the laws in a DN 
explanation are universal and allow no exceptions. The DS account is 
a special case of the DN account. In a DS explanation, a statistical or 
probabilistic regularity or law is deduced from another law, which is 
broader in scope. Thus, both DN and DS explanations are deductive 
arguments. The IS is an account for statistical or inductive 
explanations of particular phenomena. In an IS explanation, laws that 
are doing the explaining of an explanandum are not universal, but 
statistical or probabilistic.  
The DN account has the following logical form as an 
argument:  
L1, L2, …, Lk 
C1, C2, …, Cj 
---------------- 
E 
 
The sentence ―C1, C2, …, Cj‖ refers to antecedent conditions. The 
sentence ―L1, L2, …, Lk‖ describes law(s) needed to explain the 
explanandum sentence, ―E.‖  
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As an example, imagine that the statement ―all ravens are 
black‖ is a universal law having the form x(FxGx).  Suppose that 
we find that a particular thing, a, is a raven (a is an F, where the 
predicate term F is represented in its instantiated form, Fa). If this a is 
a raven, then we can deductively explain that a is also black (a is also a 
G, Ga) in an argument that has the logical form of a DN account: 
x(FxGx)  
Fa 
---------------- 
Ga 
 
The IS account has the following logical form as an argument:   
L1, L2, …, Lk 
C1, C2, …, Cj 
---------------- 
---------------- [r] 
E 
 
The double line indicates that we have an inductive argument in 
which the conclusion follows from the premises with a probability, 
[r]. IS explanations differ from deductive arguments of the DN and 
DS kind in that their explanantia contain at least one statistical or 
probabilistic law, Pr(Gx/Fx) = r, from which the conclusion follows 
with a high probability rather than with a deductive certainty.  
Hempel (1965: 301-302, 381-390) maintained that IS 
explanations should make their explananda highly probable. This is 
natural, given that Hempel endeavored to give an account with his IS 
that furnishes good or valid inductive arguments that predict their 
explananda to be ―expected.‖ The high probability requirement is a 
natural analog to the deductive certainty of the DN and DS account 
arguments as well.  
Hempel (1965: 234, 249, 364-376, 406-410) believed in the 
symmetry thesis of explanations and predictions. According to this 
thesis, scientific explanations and predictions have the same logical 
form. Consequently, every legitimate scientific explanation is a 
potential scientific prediction; the reverse is likewise true. The thing 
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that separates the two is a contingent difference in presentation. We 
have an explanation when the explanandum is known in advance. We 
have a prediction when the explanandum is unknown in advance.  
The reason I have dwelled on Hempel‘s account is that it 
suggests an important justification for the ecological laws debate, 
namely, that the proprietary function of laws is to furnish us with 
scientific explanations. According to the covering law account, laws 
are an essential or indispensable part of explanantia. Thus, there is one 
(historically) influential justification for the laws debate, which is also 
strong enough, given the apparent paucity of ecological laws, to 
justify such a debate. This justification has practical relevance for 
ecologists as well.  
 
 
1.7 Problems with the Covering Law Account 
 
The problems with Hempel‘s covering law account have been known 
for decades and are discussed here (for a more detailed presentation 
of these problems,  see Salmon 1984: 28-32, 1989: 46-60, 68-80; 
Kitcher 1989: 411-414; Ruben 1990: 181-208; Psillos 2002: 215-262; 
and Woodward 2003a: 152-186). However, Hempel‘s account has 
been retained owing to the lack of an adequate rival. 
The main problems with Hempel’s inductive-statistical (IS) account: 
Hempel admitted that the high probability requirement is an arbitrary 
condition of adequacy for IS explanations, since a definite numerical 
probability value cannot be assigned as to when the explanans confers 
a high enough probability to its explanandum. Rather than giving up 
this requirement, Hempel evidently retained it as a general and non-
definite condition of adequacy for IS explanations. Moreover, as a 
condition, the high probability requirement seems to be 
counterintuitive.  In other words, it is evidently possible to explain 
and understand phenomena with low probabilities. Consider the 
development of paresis – a condition that is associated with muscle 
weakness and paralysis – from untreated syphilis. Let us suppose that 
the latter is the (only) cause of the former. It then seems to follow 
that the latter is the cause that explains the presence of the former as 
well, although the presence of untreated syphilis makes the 
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development of paresis unlikely. According to some estimates, only 
about 25 % of syphilitics develop paresis. Thus, we seem to have a 
satisfactory explanation for the development of paresis despite the 
fact that it does not satisfy the high probability requirement.  
Here Hempel faced a dilemma. The high probability 
requirement should perhaps be dispensed with, but if the requirement 
is discarded, then Hempel‘s central idea of scientific explanations in 
the case of IS explanations goes with it, namely, the idea that the 
function of scientific explanations is to remove the initial surprise and 
replace it with nomic expectations about the explanandum.  
The IS account is also plagued by the ambiguity of inductive-
statistical explanations (see Hempel 1965: 53-67, 394-403), which is a 
special problem of distinguishing between explanatory relevant and 
irrelevant information that also plagues Hempel‘s deductive accounts. 
Valid deductive arguments of the DN and DS kind are monotonic: if 
a conclusion of a deductive argument follows from a set of true 
premises, then the same conclusion follows from a set of premises to 
which other (irrelevant) premises are added. This is not true of 
inductive arguments. Inductive arguments can lead to contrary and 
even contradictory conclusions from different, but true sets of 
premises. As an example, consider a patient who is suffering from a 
bacterial infection. If the patient is administered penicillin, then it is 
likely that she will recover from the infection. Moreover, the recovery 
of the patient is explainable given the probabilistic law that ―people 
who are suffering from a bacterial infection and are given penicillin 
are quite likely to recover from that infection.‖ However, if the 
explanans is changed to include the premise that ―the patient‘s 
infection is the result of a stock of bacteria resistant to the penicillin 
administrated,‖ then it becomes likely that the patient will not recover 
from the infection and may even die of it.  
Let F denote a potentially statistically relevant assembly of 
facts for the explanandum G. The IS account required that Pr(Gx/Fx) 
= r should be high in r value if the law in question is to function as an 
explanans. In the expression Pr(Gx/Fx), G is the attribute class and F 
the reference class. The ambiguity of IS explanations has to do with 
how to partition the reference class so that the probability it gives to 
the attribute class and to the explanandum is homogenous and thus 
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unvarying between partitions. If the probability value, r, that a 
reference class assigns to the attribute class varies between different 
partitions of F (with a partition F1 we have a probability r1 that G 
happens and with F2 we have a different probability r2 for G), then 
we have the situation depicted above with Hempel‘s ambiguity of IS, 
whereby even contradictory conclusions can be achieved by using 
different partitions of the reference class in the premises. 
Hempel never satisfactorily resolved the problem of the 
ambiguity of IS explanations. Rather, he simply restated the problem 
in his ―requirement of maximal specificity,‖ according to which we 
should not include explanatory irrelevant information in the premises 
of IS explanations. In other words, Hempel‘s solution was not to 
search for objective homogenous partitions of reference classes in IS 
explanations, but to relativize IS explanations to the epistemic 
contexts, in which they are given. This ―solution‖ has the possible 
effect that there are no objective and true IS explanations at all in 
contrast to DN and IS explanations (cf. Hempel 1965: 402-430 and 
Salmon 1984: 48-55). 
The main problems with Hempel’s deductive-nomological (DN) account: 
We can explain why the length of a shadow of a flagpole is what it is 
by deducing the information from the height of the flagpole, the 
elevation of the sun, the laws of the propagation of light, and by 
using elementary trigonometry. This is a satisfactory deductive-
nomological (DN) explanation. The problem is that, according to the 
account, one can also explain why the height of the flagpole is what it 
is by deducing this from information that concerns the length of its 
shadow along with the elevation of the sun, the laws of the 
propagation of light, and so on. This explanation satisfies Hempel‘s 
requirements for a DN explanation, but it is an explanation in which 
the asymmetry of a causal explanation is denied: here the effects 
explain their causes rather than vice versa. The problem can be 
generalized to other cases. This suggests that the DN account fails to 
be sensitive to the asymmetric nature of (causal) explanations.  
It is also possible to devise DN (and IS) explanations in which 
there is a covering law that includes irrelevant explanatory 
information. Consider such putative examples of covering laws as ―all 
salt dissolves into hexed water‖ and ―all males who regularly take oral 
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contraceptives fail to get pregnant.‖ The problem is that lawlike 
generalizations with irrelevant explanatory information appear to 
furnish us with valid DN explanations according to Hempel‘s 
account. Consider a husband who has regularly taken his wife‘s birth 
control pills. Using the law ―all males who regularly take oral 
contraceptives fail to get pregnant‖ it can be explained and deduced 
that the husband does not get – or is not – pregnant. This is a 
satisfactory DN explanation that is a poor explanation. Trivially, it 
does not make any difference to their non-pregnancy whether or not 
men take birth control pills. Similarly, a covering law that ―all salt 
dissolves into hexed water‖ can be used in a DN explanation to 
explain the dissolving of a lump of a salt into water, but again the fact 
that water is hexed is irrelevant to whether the salt dissolves.  
Another way of expressing the force and content of the above 
problems is to paraphrase them as claims that Hempel‘s covering 
laws – or the generalizations‘ lawlikeness – do not give us the right 
relation of explanatory relevance. The central task of any account of 
scientific explanation is to describe what the relation of explanatory 
relevance is. Failing to do this amounts to an account that should be 
relinquished or seriously revised.  
The DN account is typically used in the context of 
explanations of singular phenomena or events, but it was meant to 
cover explanations of regularities and laws as well. However, Hempel 
and Oppenheim (1948) have already noted that there is a problem 
when the DN account it used to explain a law with another one. The 
problem is that a law can be deduced from a conjunction of that law 
with another law that is irrelevant:  
The precise rational reconstruction of explanation as applied to 
general regularities presents peculiar problems for which we 
can offer no solution at present. The core of the difficulty can 
be indicated briefly by reference to an example: Kepler‘s laws, 
K, may be conjoined with Boyle‘s law, B, to a stronger law K.B; 
but derivation of K from the latter would not be considered as 
an explanation of the regularities stated in Kepler‘s law; rather, 
it would be viewed as representing, in effect, a pointless 
―explanation‖ of Kepler‘s laws by themselves. The derivation 
of Kepler‘s laws from Newton‘s laws of motion and of 
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gravitation, on the other hand, would be recognized as a 
genuine explanation in terms of more comprehensive 
regularities, or so-called higher-level laws. The problem 
therefore arises of setting up clear-cut criteria for the 
distinction of levels of explanation or for a comparison of 
generalized sentences as to their comprehensiveness. The 
establishment of adequate criteria for this purpose is as yet an 
open problem. (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948: 159.) 
 
This suggests that the scope of the covering law account should 
perhaps be restricted to explanations of singular phenomena or 
events rather than to laws.  
The problems with Hempel’s symmetry thesis: We can successfully 
predict the occurrence of storms by reading a barometer. Let us 
suppose that there is a deductive (or inductive) law that connects the 
correlation of factors ―the occurrence of storms‖ and ―readings on a 
barometer‖ that will hold in many different background conditions. 
In this case, the above prediction of occurrence of storms seems to 
amount to a DN (or IS) prediction. Given Hempel‘s symmetry thesis 
of explanation and prediction, we are forced to claim that the 
occurrence of storms can be similarly explained. This is false. The two 
correlating factors are joint effects of a common cause – namely, 
changes in the atmospheric pressure – that explain the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of storms and which is the cause of the joint effects 
correlating. The paresis case suggests that the reverse is not true: 
supposing that untreated syphilis is the cause and the explanation of 
paresis, it is nevertheless not possible to predict the occurrence of 
paresis from the presence of untreated syphilis, since few who suffer 
from untreated syphilis develop paresis.  
The problems of Hempel‘s covering law account of failing to 
distinguishing between explanatory irrelevant and relevant 
information and being insensitive to asymmetries in explanations  
seem to result from to the fact that Hempel denied a central place to 
causation in scientific explanations of singular phenomena (see 
Hempel 1965: 233,  250, 300-301, 347-354).  
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1.8 Conclusions 
 
I have argued that the laws debate in ecology needs some 
justification. The justification alluded to above, namely, the covering 
law account, gave the laws debate in ecology a strong justification. I 
do not claim that this justification for the debate is good. My claim is 
rather that given the apparent paucity of ecological laws it is difficult 
to understand why ecologists should be engaged in the laws debate if 
no strong justification for the role of laws is given. And the given 
justification was not only sufficiently strong in contrast to those 
justifications usually alluded to by ecologists (cf. section 1.5), but also 
has practical relevance and importance for ecologists. The next 
chapter shows how this justification for the laws debate turns into a 
problem in ecology. This is because the appearance seems to be that 
no distinctively ecological (or biological) laws exist.  
Some think that the laws debate in biology is an illusion 
created by the adoption of the syntactic view of scientific theories.5 
Rather than adopting this view, these same people claim that a 
semantic view of scientific theories should be embraced. In the 
semantic view, theories are not viewed as collections of laws, but as 
collections of idealized, abstract models that have no empirical 
interpretation on their own, but for which empirical content is given 
independently via ―theoretical hypotheses.‖According to this view, 
laws describe models – in a sense, laws can be treated as definitions 
of models. Laws are thus tools for constructing models and laws are 
true of or in models. There is another version of the semantic view, 
but what has just been said suffices for the present purposes. In the 
context of the biological laws debates, proponents of the semantic 
                                                 
5 According to the syntactic view, a scientific theory can be represented as a 
deductively organized, axiomatic, and hierarchical collection of a small body 
of laws (axioms or fundamental laws) working together to explain a large 
number of other less general laws (theorems or derived laws), regularities, 
and phenomena. This view originated from studies focusing on physics and 
its theoretical structure (see Nagel 1961: 79-105 and Hempel 1965: 177-185, 
338-343). Nevertheless, the view found friends among philosophers of 
biology and biologists (see Williams 1970, 1973b, 1981; Ruse 1973).  
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view often stress that there is no need for laws as traditionally 
defined, and that this speaks for their view, since appearances suggest 
that there are no biological laws (cf. Beatty 1980, 1981, 1987; Lloyd 
1988; Teller 2001; Giere 2004; but see Sloep & van der Steen 1987a, 
1987b, and Ereshefsky 1991, who disagree).  
As a solution to the laws debate, the above appears to be of 
secondary importance, given that my focus here is on the epistemic 
roles of laws. By itself, the semantic view of theories does not 
illuminate how and by what means scientists furnish us with scientific 
explanations. Although I wish to remain neutral on the issue of the 
correct view of theories, many of my ideas are in accordance with the 
semantic view.  
There are two influential alternative accounts to Hempel‘s 
covering law account in the literature. The causal-mechanical account 
of Wesley C. Salmon (1984, 1989, 1994, 1997) and the unification 
account of Philip Kitcher (1989) are critical responses to Hempel‘s 
account. Both are likewise non-covering law accounts according to 
which laws are not indispensable to scientific explanations.  
Salmon‘s ideas about explanations first call for performing 
statistical analyses to make the explanandum sharper and then 
searching for the mechanisms for its explanans; which evidently 
describes correctly the practice of many ecologists as well.  However, 
Salmon‘s account is not valid, because, among other things, it does 
not have the resources to discriminate between explanatory irrelevant 
and relevant information (Hitchcock 1995). James Woodward (2003a: 
353-354) and Carl F. Craver (2007: 72-86) have expressed concerns 
about the applicability of Salmon‘s account to the biological sciences 
that have to do, among other things, with absences, omissions, and 
preventions that are sometimes treated as relevant explanatory things 
or causes in the biological sciences, but which as processes do not 
―transmit marks/conserved quantities‖ or ―interact‖ as Salmon 
required from his explanatory causal processes and mechanisms. 
There are also difficulties in applying Salmon‘s account to complex 
and/or macroscopic explanations (see Woodward 2003a: 354-356).  
There are equally serious problems with Kitcher‘s account (see, 
for instance, Barnes 1992, Psillos 2002: 276-279, Woodward 2003a: 
361-367, and Craver 2007: 43-47). Moreover, Kitcher‘s account 
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appears inapplicable to ecology, since ecological explanations are 
typically causal, mechanical, not unified, and work from the bottom 
to up (cf. chapters 4 and 5). Many ecological mechanisms evidently 
also operate in probabilistic or statistical ways, a fact that is difficult 
to reconcile with Kitcher‘s ―deductive chauvinism.‖  
Consequently, both of the non-covering law accounts should 
be given up in the context of ecology. This suggests that a covering 
law account should be adopted instead.  
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2 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST BIOLOGICAL LAWS6 
 
 
2.1 Distinctively Biological Laws 
 
Since the 1950s, if not earlier, there have been debates concerning 
both the existence of biological laws and the nature of biological 
generalizations. At first, philosophers took physics as the model for 
the sciences. The idea was that if there were universal and 
exceptionless laws in physics, then this set the standard for laws in 
biology (see Williams 1970, 1973b, 1981; Ruse 1973). The problem 
was, and to a certain extent still is, that there are few if any biological 
generalizations that are true for every time and in every place.  
There are many arguments in the literature believed to show 
the absence of biological laws. These arguments take advantage of 
various putative distinctive features of biological generalizations or 
phenomena – so the arguments usually go – that the physical sciences 
and their generalizations lack, where these features are held to be 
responsible for the absence of laws in biology. In this chapter I 
analyze the following nine arguments of the above kind:  
Argument 1): Biological generalizations are about species and/or 
they make reference to particulars; 
Argument 2): Biological generalizations are conceptually 
imprecise; 
Argument 3): Biological generalizations are riddled with 
exceptions; 
Argument 4): Biological phenomena are historical; 
Argument 5): Biological phenomena are unique; 
                                                 
6 A version of this chapter was presented at the Philosophy of Science 
Group/Trends and Tensions in Intellectual Integration seminar 18 February 
2008 at the University of Helsinki. 
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Argument 6): Biological phenomena are complex; 
Argument 7): Biological phenomena are open; 
Argument 8): Biological properties are multiply realizable; and 
Argument 9): Biological generalizations are contingent. 
 
Some of these arguments are marshaled to dispute the existence of 
universal and exceptionless biological laws, such as arguments 3 and 7, 
whereas most of the arguments are used to explain the absence of 
biological laws in general, such as arguments 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9. 
Sometimes the arguments are presented for the purpose of 
establishing that are no biological laws at all. Alternatively, we could 
understand these arguments as intended to establish that biology is a 
science deficient in laws.  
In any event, the issue is not whether biology is a science that 
applies the laws of other sciences. Rather, the issue is whether there 
are distinctive or proprietary biological laws that are used by biologists in 
their domain to represent the laws of their subject matter. 
―Distinctively biological‖ could be understood to mean that such 
laws essentially make use of biological terminology and/or essentially 
refer to biological causal mechanisms, entities, things, and so on in 
addition to using logical, mathematical, and other subject-matter 
neutral terms. What has just been said is not intended to be a 
definition of the distinctively biological. Defining what this means is a 
delicate and elusive issue to which I offer no solution (see, however, 
Elgin 2006: 124-126, 130-132; see also Davidson 1970: 82-85 for 
related difficulties in defining what distinctively mental means). 
I will argue that many of the above claims, such as arguments 
2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, are inappropriate or inconclusive for different 
reasons. Furthermore, some of the arguments, such as 1 and 5, have 
been successfully countered in the literature by other authors. 
Nonetheless, I maintain that some of the arguments, namely, 3 and 9, 
pose important challenges to the existence of biological laws. Thus, I 
claim that there are perhaps no biological laws, owing to the 
exception-ridden nature of biological generalizations and their 
―contingency.‖  
Several philosophers have discussed the issue of biological 
laws (see Smart 1963: 50-63; Ruse 1970, 1973: 24-31; Hull 1974: 71-
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100; Olding 1978; Rosenberg 1985, 1989; Ghiselin 1989; Steen & 
Kamminga 1991; Beatty 1995; Carrier 1995; Lange 1995, 2005a; 
Brandon 1997; Mitchell 1997, 2002; Sober 1997; Cooper 1998; 
Waters 1998; Weber 1999; Woodward 2001; Elgin 2003, 2006; 
Mikkelson 2003; Hamilton 2007).  A shared feature among these 
philosophers is that their examples of biological generalizations are 
taken from evolutionary biology and (population) genetics. 
Exceptions to this trend are Gregory Cooper, Marcel Weber, Gregory 
M. Mikkelson, and Marc Lange, who at least occasionally, use ecology 
as their target of discussion as I do.  
It might be argued that the narrow focus on evolutionary 
biology and (population) genetics of the above philosophers is biased 
insofar as the lawlikeness of biological generalizations is concerned. 
For instance, it might be argued that ecology is ―more‖ lawlike than 
evolutionary biology. Alternatively, it might be argued that the scale 
of investigation is to be blamed for the appearance of lawlessness in 
biology, and, for instance, macro-ecology could furnish us with laws.  
In the following pages, I present generalizations from different scales 
of ecology and from paleobiology to suggest that the above bias does 
not matter. Evolutionary biology, genetics, (macro-)ecology, and 
paleobiology seem to lack laws. This is the main reason why I write 
here as if I were interested in the lawlikeness of biological 
generalizations in general rather than in ecology and its 
generalizations. 
 
  
2.2 Reference to Particulars and Conceptual Imprecision 
 
Argument 1): Biological generalizations are about species and/or they 
make reference to particulars.  
J. J. C. Smart (1963: 50-63) was perhaps the first philosophers 
to use such examples as ―albionotic mice always breed true,‖7 ―all 
crows are black,‖ and  ―all robins‘ eggs are greenish-blue‖ to argue 
that biology has no laws, because biological generalizations refer to 
particular species. Consequently, Smart maintained that biology as a 
                                                 
7 True breeding means that like parents produce only like offspring. 
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science is similar to engineering in that biologists are forced to 
borrow laws from other sciences when giving explanations and 
making predictions. Another, more general version of the argument 
claims that biological generalizations make in-eliminable references to 
all kinds of particulars (in addition to particular species), such as the 
earth and its history, the history of life on this planet, or phylogeny, 
some specific time or place, and so on. Again, Smart (1963: 50-63) 
was perhaps the first person to represent the latter version of the 
argument. 
It is easy to see why the above should be damaging to the 
lawlike status of biological generalizations. The naive regularity 
account of laws (explained in section 1.3) held that the predicate 
terms of lawlike generalizations make no in-eliminable references to 
any particular. Instead, laws apply to all time and space, to all 
individuals, and they are expressible by general predicate terms. 
Indeed, it almost a universal demand of different law accounts that 
laws make no in-eliminable references to particulars (see, for instance, 
the discussion of quasi-universals in Armstrong 1983: 80, 100-101).  
The problem with the above examples of generalizations – if 
they are interpreted to represent biological laws – is that they refer to 
species names, that is, to taxa, such as Mus musculus and Corvus corax, 
which appear to be examples of particulars. Particular species exist in 
specific spatio-temporal locations, they have a unique (phylogenetic) 
history, and so on. Moreover, if species as a taxa are individuals rather 
than classes ―from a logical point of view,‖ then the argument is 
apparently vindicated, because species do not refer to natural kinds or 
classes, but to things that function as proper names (see Ghiselin 
1974, 1987a, 1987b; Hull 1974: 52-53, 1976: 256-260, 1978, 1987; 
Mayr 1976, 1987a, 1987b; Rosenberg 1985: 204-212, 1987; Williams 
1987; Sober 1993: 146-159). 
There are many difficulties with the above argument, however. 
For instance, it does not yet establish that generalizations concerning 
―particulars‖ cannot be derivative laws. The requirement that laws 
make no in-eliminable reference to particulars was meant to apply to 
fundamental laws. Besides, although the above considerations could 
establish that biological laws should not refer to particular species or 
taxa, provided that species are individuals, they do not show that 
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there cannot be laws about species as a category. Moreover, biological 
generalizations typically refer to species as a category rather than as a 
taxon (see Hull 1976: 189, 1978: 640; Ghiselin 1987a: 129; van der 
Steen & Kamminga 1991: 453-456 for similar arguments). An 
example is Mayr’s rule (see appendix), which refers to species as a 
category rather than as a taxon (cf. also the founder rule). In 
addition, the category of species does not refer to particulars. This is 
true even of the category of evolutionary species (see Ruse 1973: 138-
139). The argument is silent on higher categories and taxa as well, 
which are the topic of many generalizations, especially in 
paleobiology that deals with genera, orders, and the like.8  
Nor is it true that biological generalizations are necessarily or 
typically about ―taxonomic things‖ or particulars. Ecological rules, 
such as Allen’s, Bergmann’s, clutch size, Gloger’s, hair, and litter 
size rules (see appendix) are about property gradients in space. That is, 
they concern the variation of biological traits in space. Evolutionary 
rules, such as the rules of Cope, Dacque, Dollo, Island, 
miniaturization, and unspecialized are about property gradients in 
time. That is, they concern the variation of biological traits in time. 
Particular taxa are not in-eliminable parts of ecological or 
evolutionary rules, since they refer to property gradients that taxa 
exhibit in space or time. In fact, neither of the rules refers to species 
to begin with, but ecological rules refer to subspecies (or clines) and 
evolutionary rules refer to taxa above the species.  
It might be suggested that the above rules nevertheless refer to 
specific spatial locations or temporal periods and thus to 
―particulars.‖ For instance, ecological rules sometimes refer to 
latitudes. However, when generalizations, such as Bergmann‘s, 
Allen‘s, Gloger‘s, and the latitudinal diversity gradient, refer to 
latitudes, this is a surrogate for a property with which latitudes 
correlate. In the case of Bergmann‘s rule, the traditional interpretation 
is that latitudes correlate with ―the mean temperature‖ during the 
coldest month(s), which appears to be a perfectly legitimate predicate 
                                                 
8 Although I am sympathetic to the species-as-individuals‘ thesis, I shall not 
discuss what the status of taxa above species is, e.g., Mammalia. Some of 
them appear as classes (see Ghiselin 1987a: 128-129). 
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term for lawlike generalizations. These properties are then 
understood as the causes for the property gradients (body size, 
diversity, length or size of protruding body parts, coloration, and so 
on) mentioned in ecological rules. What has been said about 
ecological rules applies to evolutionary rules, which refer to time.  
As a conclusion, I suggest that the above argument fails to 
provide conclusive reasons against the existence of biological laws. 
Biological generalizations do not refer in-eliminably to particular 
species. When they refer to species, they refer to species as a 
category. Besides, many biological generalizations do not refer to 
―species‖ at all, but to other taxa and categories.9 Moreover, 
biological generalizations are typically about biological traits and 
properties that taxa or categories exhibit in space or time.10  
 
Argument 2): Biological generalizations are conceptually imprecise. 
                                                 
9 Of course, there are generalizations concerning particular species. 
However, no one takes them seriously as examples of laws, with the 
exception of Marc Lange (1995), who has argued that generalizations 
concerning particular species could be biological laws despite the fact that 
they refer to particulars. Lange‘s idea stands and falls with this account of 
laws, which will be discussed later (see sections 3.3 and 5.5). Trivially, 
generalizations concerning particular species can be advantageous. For 
instance, if one is going to gather mushrooms, it is useful to know that some 
fungi species, such as Amanita virosa, are deadly poisonous, or that Coprinus 
atramentarius has unfortunate side-effects if it is consumed with alcohol. 
However, the fact is that as explanantia, generalizations concerning particular 
species are shallow. Although these are not illuminating as explanantia, 
generalizations concerning particular species are interesting as explananda. 
10 See also Gregory M. Mikkelson (2003), who claims that ecological 
generalizations do not refer to particular species, specific taxa, or what he 
calls to ―historical kinds.‖ Instead they refer to and explain historical kinds 
with ―functional kinds‖ and ―structural kinds‖ of which historical kinds are 
instances. Examples of predicate terms of functional and structural kinds are 
predators, prey, competitors, resources, endothermic animals, clutch sizes, 
heterozygotes, autotrophics, and so on instead of Arthropoda, Amanita 
virosa, and so on, which are examples of historical kinds or taxa. Thus, 
Mikkelson concludes, as a science, ecology is more nomothetic-oriented 
than idiographic- or historically-oriented.  
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Although conceptual imprecision may not appear to have 
much to do with the existence of laws, there are at least two ways to 
reconstruct the argument. First, it is frequently held that laws should 
have a definite empirical meaning or truth value, if for no other 
reason than to make testing and (dis)confirming putative lawlike 
generalizations possible. This property might be lacking if the 
predicate terms of a generalization are imprecise. Second, one can 
construct the demand of conceptual precision as a criterion of 
lawlikeness. According to the naïve regularity account of laws, the 
predicate terms of lawlike generalizations give necessary and 
sufficient conditions for their application and/or refer to natural 
kinds. If the predicate terms of a generalization are imprecise, then 
these properties might be lacking, and thus the generalization is no 
law.  
There are many biological concepts that could be charged with 
being imprecise.11 There are different kinds of conceptual imprecision 
for which these concepts could be blamed as well. For instance, a 
concept could be charged with being a tautology, circular, incoherent, 
vague or ambiguous, non-committal, and so on. Since there are many 
concepts to be blamed and different kinds of conceptual imprecision, 
I shall concentrate on the most characteristic reproach directed at 
                                                 
11 For instance, the following biological concepts have been charged with 
being imprecise or incomplete: adaptation (Lewontin 1978, Gould & Vrba 
1982, West-Eberhard 1992); biotope, habitat, and niche (Udvardy 1959, 
Schoener 1989); colonization, emigration, immigration, and the invasion of a 
species (Simberloff 1969, Shrader-Frechette 2001); community (Taylor 1992, 
Shrader-Frechette & McCoy 1993: 12-31, McCoy & Shrader-Frechette 
1994); competition (Birch 1957, Cole 1960, Shrader-Frechette 1990a, Peters 
1991: 256-273, McIntosh 1992); fitness (cf., for instance, Hull 1974: 65, 66-
69; Peters 1976, 1978, 1991: 60-73; Ferguson 1976; Caplan 1977; Castrodeza 
1977; Brandon 1978; Mills & Beatty 1979; Rosenberg 1982; Byerly 1983; 
Sober 1984: 61-85; Shrader-Frechette 1990; Murray 2000: 403-405); the 
species as a category (Ruse 1973: 126-139, 1988: 51-62; Rosenberg 1985: 
191-203; Sober 1993: 153-159); and stability (Peters 1991: 92-96,  McCoy & 
Shrader-Frechette 1992, Shrader-Frechette 1993: 32-60, Grimm & Wissel 
1997, Mikkelson 1997, Odenbaugh 2001). The references given above refer 
to papers of which some are replies to charges of conceptual imprecision. 
Jani Raerinne 
 
 
48 
biological concepts, namely, the charge that a concept is a conflation of 
different meanings. This accusation is typically made about such 
ecological concepts as stability and community (see Peters 1991: 81-
82, 92-96; McCoy and Shrader-Frechette 1992, 1994; Shrader-
Frechette and McCoy 1993: 11-67, 114-119).12  
Conflation concepts are imprecise, goes the criticism, because 
different vague and/or unrelated meanings are grouped or lumped under 
one concept. For instance, Alexander Rosenberg (1985: 191-203) 
complained that the species category is problematic, since there is no 
one universally valid and applicable meaning for the concept, but at 
least three or four different meanings, namely, the biological, the 
ecological, the evolutionary, and the morphological species concepts. 
Therefore, Rosenberg reasoned, the species is not a natural kind.  
The problem with the conflation charges is that they are 
usually made in haste. From the fact that there are different meanings 
of one concept, it does not automatically follow that the concept is 
imprecise, incomplete, or somehow tainted. Elliot Sober (1993: 158) 
has put the point excellently in the context of species category:  
Indeed, the idea that there is a single species concept that 
should be used in all biological contexts is not something that 
we should assume dogmatically. Perhaps some form of 
pluralism is correct…. Pluralism should not be confused with 
conventionalism, according to which our choice of the species 
concept we adopt to describe a given biological situation is 
arbitrary. Pluralists maintain that we should use species 
concept X in some situations but concept Y in others. 
                                                 
12 In addition to ‗stability‘ and ‗community,‘ these authors blame many 
ecological concepts for conflation. However, strictly speaking, only Shrader-
Frechette and McCoy (ibid.) make the specific and straightforward charge 
that conceptual imprecision is a reason for the absence of ecological laws. 
The other authors make charges that are more ambiguous insofar as the 
implications for the existence of ecological laws are concerned, although 
they clearly imply that conceptual imprecision has negative implications for 
(the existence of) biological laws. This is characteristic of conceptual 
imprecision charges in general, which makes it difficult to evaluate them as 
arguments.  
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
 
 
49 
Conventionalists hold that whether we use concept X or Y in a 
given situation is arbitrary.   
 
Although as I argue later on there are different meanings for stability 
in ecology, it does not automatically follow that stability as a concept 
is imprecise (cf. sections 2.6 and 5.3). Closer inspection of stability 
reveals that we have different, yet related concepts that have definite 
meanings, which are regretfully sometimes covered imprecisely by 
one concept.13 The case with stability would be different and 
problematic if the different meanings had nothing in common and/or 
they were vague in meaning.  
As a conclusion, I suggest that the conceptual imprecision 
argument is not convincing, at least in the form in which it is usually 
presented. Charges of imprecision have often confused the plurality 
of different, precise meanings of related concepts with situations in 
which a concept has a vague and/or unrelated meaning(s). The 
general moral is that the argument of conceptual imprecision is no 
silver bullet for shooting down the existence of biological laws: There 
are many kinds of imprecision for which a concept could be blamed. 
The implications of different kinds of conceptual imprecision for the 
existence of (biological) laws are usually open questions as well. For 
instance, it has remained unclear exactly what the implications are of 
the tautology charge of fitness for the lawlike status of the rule of 
natural selection; this charge is inappropriate for other reasons as 
well (see Sober 1984: 61-85 on both points). Finally, it is not an 
established fact that biology has a special status for conceptual 
imprecision in comparison to other sciences, simply because 
comparative studies of this kind are missing.  This suggests that the 
conceptual imprecision charges do not give sufficient reason to deny 
the existence of biological laws. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Jay Odenbaugh (2001) has given a similar answer to the conflation charges 
against stability by Shrader-Frechette, McCoy, and others.  
Jani Raerinne 
 
 
50 
2.3 Exceptions 
 
Argument 3): Biological generalizations are riddled with exceptions. 
Along with the claim that biological generalizations make 
reference to particulars, J. J. C. Smart (1963: 50-63) added that it 
might be possible to express biological generalizations in a way that 
they make no such references by redefining their predicate terms. 
But, he continued, this would run into another problem, since when 
the predicate terms are thus redefined, it is likely that there would be 
exceptions to the generalizations. For example, if we define the 
North American robin (Turdus migratorius) as a species having ―such-
and-such‖ properties and we manage to do this without making any 
reference to its phylogeny, distribution, and so on, it is likely, so the 
argument goes, that if there is life on other planets, then there are 
exceptions to the generalization that ―all life forms with such-and-
such properties have greenish-blue eggs.‖ In fact, it is possible that 
there are exceptions to the generalization on this planet, too, since 
there is variation within the species. The same considerations apply to 
genetic rules. Although it is possible to express Mendel’s rule of 
segregation (see appendix) so that it makes no reference to ―local‖ 
predicate terms of the forbidden kind, it is possible that life on other 
planets would be exceptions. Besides, there are exceptions, on this 
planet, to both of Mendel‘s rules, namely, meiotic drive, non-
disjunction, and linkage. 
According to Smart the reason why there are exceptions to 
biological generalizations, is that biological systems are complex and 
non-homogeneous in contrast to physical and chemical ones:  
My conclusion so far is that if the propositions of biology are 
made universal in scope, then such laws are very likely not 
universally true. If they are not falsified by some queer species 
or phenomenon on earth they are very likely falsified elsewhere 
in the universe. The laws of physics, by contrast, seem to be 
truly universal. Why is there this difference? Part of the answer 
seems to be this. The physicist, and to a lesser degree the 
chemist, talks about things which are relatively simple or else 
homogenous. (Smart 1963: 54-55.) 
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I shall not dwell further on Smart‘s arguments. There are already 
analyses and criticisms of these arguments by Michael E. Ruse (1970, 
1973: 24-31) and C. Kenneth Waters (1998). In addition to Smart‘s 
complexity and non-homogeneity (see argument 6), there are other 
and more plausible reasons why biological generalizations are riddled 
with exceptions, which refer to their openness (argument 7), 
contingency (argument 9), natural selection, the arms races between 
and within species, biological variation, and so on. 
I take it to be an established fact that there are exceptions to 
many – if not to all – evolutionary and genetic generalizations, as 
previous (philosophical) studies have shown. In addition to Mendel‘s 
rules, other examples of exception-ridden biological generalizations in 
the philosophical literature are the central dogma of molecular 
genetics, the rule of natural selection, the biogenetic rule, and 
examples of the ―all crows are black‖ variety. For instance, given that 
fitness of an organism is not the same as its actual survival and/or 
reproduction success, but a propensity to survive and/or reproduce 
(Mills & Beatty 1979), it follows that there are exceptions to the rule 
of natural selection. Organisms fail to reproduce and die as a result of 
accidental causes and environmental factors that have nothing to do 
with their fitness or natural selection. What about other biological 
disciplines? 
Consider ecological generalizations, for instance, Gause’s rule. 
It is surprising that only one philosopher, namely, Marcel Weber 
(1999), has taken up Gause‘s rule as an example of a biological law, 
even though Gause‘s rule is well-known as an ecological 
generalization. However, as an example of a universal and 
exceptionless law, Gause‘s rule disappoints. There are many 
exceptions to it (see, for example, Lack 1945, 1946; Utida 1953; Ross 
1957, 1958; Savage 1958; Cole 1960; Hutchinson 1961; Slobodkin 
1964; Paine 1966; Leslie et al. 1968, Paine & Vadas 1969; Ayala 1972; 
Wiens 1977; Armstrong & McGehee 1980).14 That there are 
exceptions to Gause‘s rule is also the reason why Weber (1999) 
                                                 
14 The exceptions to Gause‘s rule are discussed in detail later (see section 3.6 
and chapter 6). 
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claims that Gause‘s rule is a ceteris paribus law rather than a universal 
and exceptionless one.  
The ecologist Daniel S. Simberloff (1974) suggested that the 
species–area rule  is a general law of ecology. John N. Lawton 
(1996, 1999), another ecologist, defended the rule as an example of a 
macro-ecological law that is more or less universal and less 
contingent than generalizations of traditional levels or scales of 
ecology. However, there are also exceptions to the species–area rule 
(see, for instance, Cook 1974 and Gilbert 1980). Consequently, the 
philosopher of science Marc Lange (2005a) has suggested that the 
species–area rule is a ceteris paribus law that tolerates exceptions. 
John N. Lawton (1999) sees the diversity–stability rule as 
comparable to the species–area rule. However, there are striking 
exceptions to this rule too, such as the stable monocultures of plants. 
Other macro-ecological generalizations mentioned by Lawton include 
the interspecific pattern of abundance and distribution, the body-size 
frequency distribution of a taxon, the canonical distribution of the 
abundances of species, the latitudinal diversity gradient, the hollow 
curve, and the relations between range size and body size (see 
appendix). The moral of the story should be clear: the examples just 
mentioned are riddled with exceptions.  
There are examples of putative laws from paleobiology, such 
as Dollo’s rule, which is often referred to as the most reliable of 
evolutionary rules. Since there are many exceptions to this rule as 
well, discussion has centered on whether the exceptions represent 
genuine or apparent exceptions (see, for example, Gregory 1936, Muller 
1939, and Lee & Shine 1998; see also chapter 3). There are other 
candidates for paleobiological laws, such as Cope’s rule, the island 
rule, the miniaturization rule, the relation between specialization 
and diversity, the rule of the unspecialized, Van Valen’s rule of 
extinction, and Williston’s rule (see appendix). In practice, 
paleobiologists agree on the lesson described above: the 
generalizations just mentioned do not represent universal and 
exceptionless laws, but rough trends in and of evolution.   
There are philosophers and biologists who refer to allometries 
and scaling laws, such as the energy equivalence rule, Kleiber’s 
rule, and the thinning rule, as biological laws (see Rensch 1960, 
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Peters 1983, Mitchell 2000, Marquet 2000, Marquet et al. 2005, Elgin 
2006). It suffices to say, first, that allometries and scaling laws are 
statistical trends in data, which have exceptions to them. This 
criticism might not strike as deep for those who believe that 
biological laws are probabilistic. However, there are other reasons to 
suggest that allometries and scaling laws do not represent lawlike 
generalizations (see sections 2.6, 3.4, and 4.4). 
Do the examples of generalizations from ecology and 
paleobiology represent a different picture of the lawlikeness of 
biology than those traditional examples from the philosophy of 
biology literature that are drawn from evolutionary biology and 
(population) genetics? Evidently, the answer is no. There appears to 
be no universally true and exceptionless biological generalization. 
Moreover, biological generalizations apparently have an open-ended 
set of exceptions that defy systematic or simple treatment or 
characterization, which suggests that they have the appearance of 
ceteris paribus laws (see section 3.5). Thus, the argument of exceptions 
appears to be correct and true of biological generalizations in general. 
The above conclusion is not a hasty induction from a few cases, but 
the result of a search for an example in the biological literature: there 
are hundreds of generalizations that I have examined in this regard, 
but none has the appearance of a universal and exceptionless 
regularity.   
 
 
2.4 History, Uniqueness, Complexity, and Openness 
 
Argument 4): Biological phenomena are historical. 
Although the idea is widespread among many (evolutionary) 
biologists that there cannot be laws about historical phenomena, 
there is a surprising paucity of explicit arguments for it. George 
Gaylord Simpson (1963) is perhaps the best example of an author 
who upheld this idea in the context of paleobiology. Another 
example is Stephen Jay Gould (1970: 208-210, 1980: 112-116). 
Simpson, for instance, did not deny that paleobiology uses and is 
governed by physical and chemical laws, only that owing to the 
historicity of paleobiological phenomena, there cannot be distinctive 
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paleobiological laws. Unfortunately, his reasons for why the historical 
nature of paleobiological phenomena precludes there being laws 
about such phenomena are not well-articulated. The same goes for 
Gould.  
Traditional replies to the history argument point out that history 
is not a dichotomy, but a continuum (see Nagel 1961: 547-551, Siever 
1968: 74-76, Sober 1993: 14-18). Accordingly, all sciences are more or 
less historical and thus there are no qualitative differences between 
biology and physics, for instance, in this respect, although there could 
be quantitative differences. Moreover, what has just been said applies 
both between the sciences and within a single science. For example, 
in physics, there are disciplines that are more historical than others. 
Consider cosmology in contrast to particle physics: the former 
appears to be more historical than the latter. Nevertheless, in the 
former, laws are used together with historical data that concern the 
laws‘ boundary and initial conditions. In addition, there are physical 
phenomena – e.g., hysteresis – that are both historical and law-
governed in the sense that their behavior is dependent on their past 
states, which appear to contradict the supposition that there cannot 
be laws concerning historical phenomena (see Hempel & Oppenheim 
1948: 142 and Ruse 1973: 212).  
One reason why scientist and some philosophers claim that 
evolutionary phenomena are historical – or so another traditional 
answer to the history argument goes – is that people confuse 
phylogeny with the theory or mechanism of evolution, whereby the 
former is a historical phenomenon that is explained by the latter, 
which is non-historical in nature (see Hempel 1965: 370 and Ruse 
1973: 211-212). The scope of the history argument is likewise limited. 
There are scores of non-historical generalizations in biology, such as 
the diversity–stability and species–area rules (see appendix). 
These traditional replies to the history argument drain the 
argument of much of its plausibility. Unfortunately, these replies miss 
an important issue insofar as the use of ―history‖ in the arguments is 
concerned, namely, that history is not just a continuum, but a 
problematic conflation concept as well. In the history arguments, it is not 
history per se that authors argue is responsible for the absence of laws 
about historical phenomena. Rather, many other things are claimed to 
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be responsible for the absence of laws, things that do not have much 
in common with history, but which nevertheless are mistakenly used 
as if they were synonymous with it. By history is sometimes meant 
the idea that phenomena are unique (argument 5), complex 
(argument 6), contingent (argument 9), or that phenomena refer to 
particulars (argument 1). In the history arguments by Simpson (ibid.) 
and Gould (ibid.), history is evidently used interchangeably with the 
things just mentioned. In fact, in many replies to the arguments from 
history, uniqueness, and complexity, these above things get confused 
with one another (cf. McIntyre 1997 and Steen & Kamminga 1991: 
459-462). I consider it trivial that historical phenomena are not 
necessarily unique, complex, contingent, or refer to particulars. There 
is nothing in historical phenomena that makes them unique or vice 
versa. History denotes something about the tense of the occurrence 
of a phenomenon, namely, that it appeared in the past, whereas 
uniqueness refers to its frequency, namely, that it will not recur. I also 
consider it trivial that complexity and historicity are not necessarily 
connected. Moreover, historical phenomena need not be (strongly) 
contingent. Imagine a law that has all of its instantiations in the past. 
The instantiations have happened out of necessity, i.e., they are not 
contingent, because they are governed by the law in question. 
As a conclusion, I suggest that the history argument fails. The 
argument has no independent force to establish much about the 
nomological character of the biological sciences, owing to the fact 
that history is a problematic conflation concept in the arguments. 
Traditional replies have provided many other reasons to doubt the 
argument as well.  
 
Argument 5): Biological phenomena are unique. 
Biological and especially evolutionary phenomena are said to 
be unique. Uniqueness has many meanings (see Ruse 1973: 90-91). 
However, the only sensible and independent meaning in the given 
context is that unique phenomena ―cannot recur.‖ There cannot be 
laws about unique phenomena, the argument goes, because 
regularities and generalizations presuppose repetion and recurrence of 
phenomena, which uniqueness precludes.  
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A uniqueness argument for biological phenomena is presented 
by Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Earl D. McCoy (1993: 116-119), 
namely, that the uniqueness of ecological phenomena is one reason 
why there are no general, empirical (and deterministic) ecological 
laws; or,  as another, more moderate version of the argument goes, 
why the discovery and perhaps the existence of such laws is unlikely.  
Already David L. Hull (1974: 97-100) showed why the 
uniqueness argument fails by pointing out that ―events are not unique 
in and of themselves but only under certain descriptions.‖  Consider a 
specific place, for instance, a bird feeder in the nature conservation 
area of Viikki (Helsinki, Finland) and a specific time, for instance, the 
13th of January 2008 at 8 a.m. Suppose that the temperature on this 
morning is minus 27 degrees Celsius. In that place and time, there are 
two birds from different species of finches – Fringilla montifringilla and 
Loxia curvirostra –  competing for the seeds of Helianthus annuus. The 
bird from the former species has its tibia and fibula broken, thanks to 
an encounter with a squirrel last night. Consequently, it hops slowly 
around on one leg and watches the individual of the bird from the 
other species consume the last seeds of Helianthus annuus in the bird 
feeder.  
The above is a unique and singular description of the situation. 
But it is not the only description. Nor is the above the description we 
use in explanations of and generalizations about situations such as 
this. Alternatively, the situation can be describes as one in which two 
dietary specialist species (i.e., granivorous species) of a guild are 
engaged in interspecific exploitative competition for a common 
resource that is both in short in supply and critical for their survival 
in cold climates. This is not a unique description, but a generalizable 
phenomenon concerning species and guilds.  
 
Argument 6): Biological phenomena are complex. 
Various authors think of complexity as a major reason for the 
special nomological status of the biological sciences (see, for instance, 
Simpson 1963: 26-27, Smart 1963: 55-56, Shrader-Frechette & 
McCoy 1993: 119, Mayr 1996: 102). Arguments of complexity are 
likewise common in the social sciences (cf. Scriven 1956).  
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There are several different problems with the complexity 
argument.  First, complexity is a problematic conflation concept. For 
instance, within a system, one can differentiate between two kinds of 
complexity. Structural complexity denotes something about the 
composition of a system. Process complexity denotes something 
about the dynamics of a system. The two are not necessarily 
connected. There are structurally (or formally) simple biological 
systems (or models) that can display complex dynamics, e.g., chaos 
(see May 1974, 1976). There are also many other meanings of 
complexity besides these two. By complexity could be meant that 
there are many different sufficient and/or necessary causes for 
biological phenomena. Complexity could refer to contingency (see 
argument 9). Complexity could denote that biological systems, traits, 
or phenomena are variable or non-homogenous. Complexity could 
refer to the thesis that in biology ―everything is connected to 
everything else‖ (see argument 7). And by no means do these 
possibilities exhaust all the meanings of complexity.  
Moreover and second, many of the different meanings 
unrelated. Third, it is obvious that many of these meanings are 
continua, as was the case with ―history.‖ Fourth, complexity is not an 
intrinsic property of phenomena, but depends on the way we describe 
the phenomena (see McIntyre 1993). If, as a result of scientific 
investigation, the way we describe phenomena changes, then 
phenomena that originally appeared complex might later on appear 
simpler; there are many such instances in biology (see Orzack 2005: 
481-482).  
Fifth, if a phenomenon appears complex or irregular at one 
level, then it may display considerable simplicity and regularity at 
some other level, for instance,  at a higher level (see Brown 1995: 10-
20, 226; Lawton 1996, 1999; Marquet et al. 2005).  Sixth, we do not 
want the complexity of our laws to match the complexity of their 
targets. Laws and generalizations are not about all the characteristics 
of a thing, but rather about the characteristics a thing has in common 
with other similar relevant things. We thus generalize about and 
explain the kinds of things, even if the kinds in biology are not, strictly 
speaking, natural kinds (cf. Waters 1998: 9-13). Seventh, we are not 
told how complex the phenomena should be in order for there to be 
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no laws about them. And eighth, comparative studies of complexity 
(or complexities) between biology and other sciences are lacking. 
Moreover, it is plausible that physical phenomena are as ―complex‖ 
as biological ones. 
As a conclusion, I suggest that the complexity argument is 
inconclusive at best. The argument has no independent force, since 
complexity is a conflation of different meanings and arguments. 
Many of the individual meanings of complexity are both continua and 
non-intrinsic properties of systems. Nor it is an established fact that 
biological phenomena are more ―complex‖ than, for instance, 
physical ones. 
 
Argument: 7): Biological phenomena are open (or interactionally 
complex). 
The idea that the biological sciences deal with open 
phenomena is shared by many practioners in the field. The idea is 
likewise common in the social sciences. This openness is then 
contrasted with the physical and chemical sciences that deal with 
(more) ―closed‖ phenomena.  
Although the idea is commonly held that the openness of 
biological phenomena is responsible for the absence of biological 
laws, there are few explicit arguments for this. Fortunately, there is 
one argument from the openness of phenomena to the absence of 
strict or universal laws, by Nancy Cartwright (1983: 44-73).15 Cartwright 
developed the argument with the physical sciences in mind, but the 
argument is more usefully applied to the biological sciences. 
Sometimes this argument is constructed as the complexity argument 
(as in Elgin 2006: 123-124). Since there are different meanings of 
complexity (see argument 6), I construct the argument from openness 
as independent of complexity. If one insists that it should be 
constructed as the complexity argument, then I suggest the use of a 
more precise term for the complexity involved, such as the interactional 
complexity (a term adapted from Wimsatt 1974).    
                                                 
15 Ray Pietroski and Georges Rey (1995: 89-94) have presented a similar 
argument. 
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The idea behind the argument is straightforward. Because 
biological phenomena are open, which means that there are many 
different outside factors coming from other phenomena that affect and 
interfere with the phenomenon we are investigating, generalizations 
and putative laws about the phenomenon in question are riddled with 
exceptions and do not hold, either universally or generally. This is 
because the other factors from other (not necessarily biological) 
phenomena interfere with the phenomenon we are investigating, and 
thus we get generalizations that hold only when the interfering factors 
are ceteris paribus. The presence of ―noise‖ is a common theme in the 
sciences, but here we have something over and above this theme. The 
multiplicity of interfering factors from other phenomena is thought 
to be so great in number and/or so considerable in effect that these 
interfering factors do not just represent noise to generalizations, but 
show that generalizations‘ applicability is severely limited and/or that 
they are riddled with exceptions.  
I have no doubt that biological phenomena are open in the 
way depicted – or that in biology ―everything is connected with 
everything else.‖ Both interspecific and intraspecific competitive 
systems in ecology, for instance, are affected by all kinds of external 
factors, which may affect the result of competition, e.g., through all 
kinds of accidents in an abiotic environment. In addition, ecological 
systems do not consist only of guilds species but also are parts of 
ecological communities and are therefore affected by trophic 
interactions both from ―above‖ and from ―below.‖ Biological 
communities do not exist in isolation, but are also affected by all 
kinds of external factors and so on. Evidently, the conclusion of this 
argument is correct as well. In fact, we have here one plausible reason 
why argument 3 (―exceptions‖) should be true of biological 
generalizations.  
But is openness a peculiar property only of biological (or 
social) phenomena?  Consider an object falling toward the surface of 
the earth that is supposed to have a constant acceleration rate (9,81 
m/s2), owing to gravity. Gravity, however, is not the only force that 
might affect its acceleration. There are other physical forces, for 
example, air resistance and wind, that might cause deviations from 
the constant acceleration rate. Of course and importantly, there is 
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already a ceteris paribus clause attached to Galileo‘s law of free fall, 
which states that an object has the above constant acceleration rate 
owing to gravity for all masses that are freely falling toward the earth’s 
surface, that is, in the presence of a large enough mass, comparable to 
earth‘s, and in the absence of other physical forces other than gravity. 
Thus, it appears that physical phenomena are open as well and 
affected by all kinds of forces and causes outside their robust 
boundaries (see also Joseph 1980, Cartwright 1983, Carrier 1995, 
Pietroski & Rey 1995). This suggests that openness is not a sufficient 
condition to explain why there are no biological laws, provided that 
there are physical laws. It is a separate issue as to whether openness 
has implications for the existence of (strict) laws in general in the 
sciences.  
Yet it is not openness of phenomena that is the real problem. 
Nor it is the reason said to be responsible for the absence of laws in 
biology. Instead, the claim is that in biology – and in other non-
physical sciences – generalizations are ―heteronomic,‖ whereas in the 
physical sciences they are ―homonomic.‖ Harold Kincaid observes 
the same thing in the context of the social sciences. The following is 
taken from a passage in which he notes that physical phenomena are 
as open as social ones:  
Perhaps the crucial issue concerns not the open or closed 
nature of actual systems but rather a theory‘s ability to handle 
those outside factors. A closed theory is complete: It can 
describe and explain in its own terms all the forces acting in its 
domain. So, the argument runs, forces affecting open physical 
systems can be fully handled within physics itself. In the social 
sciences, however, outside factors are not social in nature – 
and thus cannot be handled by social theory. Consequently, 
alleged social laws are bound to be incomplete and thus not 
laws. (Kincaid 1990: 60.)  
 
The claim and the real argument behind the openness argument is 
that the biological sciences cannot deal systematically with exceptions 
and application conditions of their ―laws‖ with their own, distinctive, 
and proprietary terminology. Rather they need to be complemented 
by other sciences, especially those involving lower level phenomena, 
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in order to deal with their exceptions. Thus, even if there were a 
biological generalization that could be made exceptionless and whose 
conditions of applicability could be specified, it would not be 
distinctively biological, owing to the heteronomic character of biological 
generalizations. Rather, it would be a chemical or physical law, if it 
were a (strict) law in the first place.  
I argue later on that the idea that systematic corrections to 
generalizations come from explanations that are ―vertical‖ in 
character in the non-physical sciences, that is, from lower levels, can 
be questioned (section 3.6). There are ―horizontal‖ explanations of 
exceptions in ecology that make ecology look homonomic in 
generalizations. In community and population ecology, ecologists 
explain away exceptions of generalizations by using community or 
population ecological concepts or causes of the same level rather than 
concepts or causes of a lower level. This suggests that the latter 
version of the argument fails as well at least in the context of ecology.   
 
 
2.5 Multiple Realizations16 
 
Bergmann’s rule is a geographical or latitudinal gradient in body size 
according to which the members of a species of endothermic animals 
are larger in their body size in colder regions or at higher latitudes 
than members of the same species in warmer regions or at lower 
latitudes. The traditional explanation for Bergmann‘s rule is that the 
larger body size of an endothermic animal is an adaptation for ―heat 
dissipation‖ in cold climates (see Kendeigh 1969 and McNab 1971). 
Lesser heat dissipation results from the fact that the ratio of ―surface 
area to volume‖ is smaller in animals with larger body size than in 
animals with smaller body size, the reason is that when body size 
becomes larger, its surface area increases as the square of the mass, 
whereas its volume increases as the cubic of the mass. This allows 
larger-sized endothermic animals to conserve their metabolized heat 
                                                 
16 Alexander Rosenberg‘s argument presented and evaluated here is 
examined more deeply in a manuscript entitled ―Multiple Realizability and 
Biological Laws,‖ which I am co-authoring with Markus I. Eronen.   
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more effectively, because it is dissipated through the surface area in 
cold environments. Accordingly, if the temperature of an 
environment (during the cold season) is a critical factor for an 
organism‘s survival, then natural selection should generally and even 
universally favor and select for different body sizes – and this is seen 
in the pattern of Bergmann‘s rule, in which the members of a species 
of endothermic animals in cold climates have bigger body sizes than 
their relatives in warmer climates.  
There are, however, other means to reduce the dissipation of 
heat in cold climates. For instance, thicker and heavier fur or plumage 
might have effects similar to heat dissipation as the increase in body 
size (see, for instance, Scholander 1955, 1956; Irving 1959). These, 
however, enhance an animal‘s insulation without affecting its surface 
area to volume ratio or body size. This shows that there are 
functionally equivalent, but physically different means to achieve the 
same level of fitness in cold climates. Thus, ―dissipation of heat‖ is a 
multiply realizable property.  
Alexander Rosenberg has presented an argument from 
multiple realizability of biological properties to there being  no 
biological laws – at least in the ―middle range‖ of biology (see 
Rosenberg 1985: 59-65, 1989: 247-255, 2001a: 205-209, 2001b: 138-
140, 2001c: 737-738, 2001d: 138-140).17  
Rosenberg (1989, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c) reminds us that natural 
selection is a process that selects for effects. Moreover, Rosenberg 
                                                 
17 Based on this argument, Rosenberg also makes different claims about the 
status of biology. On the one hand, Rosenberg (1985: 219-225, 1989) 
maintains that instrumentalism is true of the ―middle range‖ of biology or 
that biology is capable of producing only ―case-studies‖ because there are no 
covering biological laws. On the other hand, Rosenberg acknowledges that 
there are biological covering laws at very high and low levels of biological 
organization (cf. the theory of evolution by natural selection and 
biochemistry), because their properties are not as multiply realizable as are 
the middle range ones, and biological explanations are explanatory owing to 
these laws. Here, I am dealing with the general argument that there are no 
laws concerning multiply realizable properties, not the idea that there are 
differences between levels of biological organization as to how multiple 
realizable their properties are or how lawlike are their generalizations. 
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adds that processes which select for effects cannot discriminate 
between different realizations that have identical and perhaps even 
similar effects. In other words, if we have different realizations for a 
biological property with identical and perhaps even similar biological 
effects on fitness – as could be the case in the above example of the 
―dissipation of heat‖ –, then natural selection cannot discriminate 
between different realizations. This apparently results in a ―diverse‖ 
supervenience base characteristic of functional kinds or biological 
properties, since, instead of selecting between different realizations 
with similar or identical effects, selection might preserve them all. 
This idea of selection is one of the central premises of Rosenberg‘s 
argument against biological laws, although not the one that is the 
main target of my criticism. In fact, as I argue below, Rosenberg 
needs other – more dubious or contentious – assumptions about the 
nature of natural selection, laws of nature, and multiple realizability in 
addition to the above premise in order to argue from the multiple 
realizability of biological properties to there being no biological laws.  
There is no exact formulation of Rosenberg‘s argument from 
the multiple realizability of biological properties to the absence of 
biological laws. However, here is the best or the most succinct 
characterization of his argument (Rosenberg 2001c: 738, footnote 2; 
see also Rosenberg 1985: 59-65, 1989: 247-255, 2001a: 205-209, 
2001b: 138-140, and 2001d: 138-140 for similar passages and ideas): 
To see why there can be no strict laws in biology, consider the 
form of a generalization about all Fs, where F is a functional 
term, like gene, or wing, or belief, or clock, or prison, or 
money, or subsistence farming. The generalization will take the 
form (x)[FxGx], a law about Fs and Gs. Gx will itself be 
either a structural predicate or a functional one. Either it will 
pick out Gs by some physical attribute common to them, or 
Gx will pick out Gs by descriptions of one of the causes or 
effects that everything in the extension of Gx possesses. But 
there is no physical feature common to all items in the 
extension of Fx: Fx is a physically heterogeneous class since its 
members have been selected for their effects. So G cannot be a 
structural predicate. Of course some structural feature may be 
shared by all of the members of F, but it will not be a 
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biologically interesting one. Rather it will be a property shared 
with many other things — like mass, or electric resistance. 
These properties will have little or no explanatory role with 
respect to the behavior of members of the extension of Fx. 
For example, the generalization that ‗all mammals are 
composed of confined quarks‘ does relate a structural property 
(quark confinement) to a functional one (mammality), and is 
exceptionlessly true. But it is not a law of biological interest. 
The existence of a functional property different from F that all 
items in the extension of the functional predicate Fx share is 
highly improbable. If Fx is functional kind, then owing to the 
blindness of selection to structure, the members of the 
extension of Fx are physically diverse. As such, any two Fs 
have non-identical (and usually quite different) sets of effects. 
Without a further effect common to all Fs, selection for effects 
cannot produce another selected effect; it cannot uniformly 
select all members of F for some further adaption. Thus, there 
is no further function kind which all Fs share in common. 
Whether functional or structural, there will be no predicate Gs 
that is linked in a strict law to Fx.  
 
From these points it supposedly follows that there are no laws 
involving multiply realizable biological properties. Let us consider a 
biological generalization that takes the formx(FxGx), where F 
stands for a biological (functional) property. Let us suppose that, 
given that natural selection selects for effects, it follows that F is 
multiply realizable; for instance, (Px1 v ... v Pxn) are realizations of F, 
where n is possibly large in number. Predicate G could stand for a 
structural or functional biological property. Rosenberg‘s argument 
then proceeds as follows: There cannot be a law linking F to another 
structural or physical property G, since the realizers of F are structurally or 
physically heterogeneous. In other words, there is nothing structurally or 
physically common or similar in the realizers of F which could then 
be linked via a biological law to a structural predicate G in the form 
of a generalization, such as all Fs are Gs. Of course, there are some 
things in common between different realizations of F. For instance, 
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the realizations are all composed of atoms, have masses, obey 
physical laws, and so on. However, the point of Rosenberg‘s 
argument is that there is nothing in common between them that is 
biologically interesting and/or explanatorily relevant and that could be 
expressed in a biological generalization linking F and G. (In the 
discussion that follows, I shall call such realizations of biological 
properties ―diverse and heterogeneous.‖) Furthermore, there cannot 
be a law if G is a functional property, since it is not possible – or at 
least, it is highly improbable – that there is a functional property different 
from F that is shared by all the realizers of F which could be linked via 
a law to realizations of G. Hence, if F is a biological (functional) 
property that is diversely or heterogeneously multiply realizable, then 
there cannot be laws of the kind x(FxGx), since there are no 
―links‖ between F and G that can be expressed in the form of a 
lawlike generalization due to multiple realizability of F.  
One problem with the argument concerns its scope. In a 
tradition going back to logical positivism, philosophers took physics 
as the model for the sciences. The idea was that if there were 
universal and exceptionless laws in physics, then this should set the 
standard for laws in biology. Rosenberg might have originally 
constructed the argument with this account of laws in mind. At any 
rate, the argument evidently goes against such an account. For 
instance, it is not uniformly or invariably true that ―all genes are 
composed of DNA,‖ because some genes are composed of RNA. 
DNA and RNA are both composed of nucleic acids, but not identical 
nucleic acids, since DNA contains thymine, which is replaced in 
RNA by uracil. Furthermore, it is possible that alien life-forms (if 
they exist) have found alternative ways to transmit and code genetic 
information, whereby their realizations of ―genes‖ are not composed 
of nucleic acids at all, but of something else.  
The above considerations suggest that the argument from 
multiple realizability to there being no universal and exceptionless 
biological laws is true. Rosenberg might have thought that the 
argument applies to other accounts of laws as well. This is reflected in the 
fact that although Rosenberg sometimes presents the argument 
against the existence of strict biological laws (as in the passages 
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quoted above), his intention is to apply the argument against all kinds 
of biological laws, whether strict or not (see especially Rosenberg 
2001c).18  
However, philosophers of biology and biologists today do not 
think of biological laws in terms of universal and exceptionless 
regularities. Moreover, there are several accounts of laws that tolerate 
exceptions (see chapter 3). Crucially, these accounts fit the biological 
sciences better than the accounts that take laws to be universal and 
exceptionless regularities. Furthermore, it is an open question of 
―how much‖ multiple realizability is needed to establish that 
exception-tolerating accounts of laws are troubled by Rosenberg‘s 
argument.  
As discussed above, a central premise in Rosenberg‘s argument 
states that the realization bases of biological properties are diverse 
and heterogeneous. However, the relation between multiple 
realizability and natural selection is more complex than Rosenberg 
assumes. Specifically, the idea that biological properties are diversely 
and heterogeneously realized does not follow solely from Rosenberg‘s 
premise alluded to above, namely, the idea that selection selects for 
effects. The claim that the realization bases of biological properties 
are diverse and heterogeneous depends on several context-specific, 
empirical, and contingent assumptions about evolution, the form and 
mode of natural selection, the evolving populations in question, their 
selective environments, and so on. The problem is that these are 
assumptions that Rosenberg has not argued for, and in fact they are 
assumptions that cannot be argued for on a general basis.  
The famous Red Queen rule or ―law,‖ for instance, could be 
used as a model of evolution from which it might follow that there 
are different realizations for biological properties. The Red Queen 
rule codifies the idea that the evolutionary progress of species (or 
taxa) is relative and temporary, owing to fact that biotic and abiotic 
selective environments of species are constantly changing and 
deteriorating. A classical example is the arms races between (and 
                                                 
18 By non-strict laws I mean laws that include ceteris paribus clauses, such as 
that laws hold only when ―some of their (unknown) interfering background 
factors remain the same and/or absent.‖ 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
 
 
67 
within) species (cf. Dawkins & Krebs 1979).  These arms races 
evidently provide one basic reason for Rosenberg to hold that there 
are no biological laws – that is, they seem to be one reason why he 
believes that biological properties have diverse and heterogeneous 
realization bases (see Rosenberg 2001c: 737-742 and 2009: 61-63).  
For instance, an adaptation in predators, such as the evolution 
of a better catch or hunting apparatus, is felt by the prey as a selection 
pressure, which could lead to the evolution of (better) 
camouflage/mimicry, ―quicker feet,‖ changes in foraging behavior, 
and other changes in the prey. These changes in turn are felt by the 
predators as a selection pressure to change their traits, behavior, and 
so on. Thus, ―catching the prey‖ appears to be a multiply realizable 
property, and selection that selects for functions could lead to a 
situation in which there are functionally equivalent and perhaps even 
identical, but structurally dissimilar trait-variants of the property in 
question in a predator population (or species), which are preserved 
and proliferated by selection owing to the arms race between species. 
This could lead to a diverse and heterogeneous realization base for 
the higher-level property in question, provided perhaps that selection 
within the species is frequency-dependent. The same goes for the 
higher-level property of prey, ―predator avoidance,‖ which apparently 
is a multiply realizable biological property as well.    
The Red Queen rule is not a universally valid model of 
evolution, however. Moreover, in order for the rule to have above 
kinds of implications for the realization bases of biological properties, 
other contingent assumptions about natural selection, the evolving 
populations in question, and so on, have to be presumed to hold. For 
instance, the effective population sizes of prey and predator 
populations matter in a given context. In small populations, such as 
island populations, fluctuations of population size reduce genetic 
variability and effect homozygosis for their loci.  Ceteris paribus, 
populations with many homozygous loci are capable of expressing 
less variable phenotypes and trait variants than populations with 
many heterozygous loci, owing to their lesser genotypic potential or 
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variability.19 This could be taken to suggest that populations with 
many homozygous loci are not diverse and heterogeneous regarding 
the realization bases of biological properties.  
The argument evidently also presumes that selection for the 
traits in question is frequency-dependent. Although frequency-
dependent selection is often considered the major evolutionary 
mechanism for polymorphisms of species and populations, it is also 
evident that it is not the only mode of selection that exists and its 
importance as an evolutionary mechanism varies with respect to 
different taxa, traits, selective environments, and the like. Consider, 
for instance, what would happen if the selection within the species in 
the above example were frequency-independent.20 This would suggest 
that there might be no arms races within and perhaps even between 
species in the prey or predator populations with regard to the 
biological properties mentioned, namely, catching the prey and 
predator avoidance, since there could exist an optimal adaptation for 
the populations with regard to their adaptive challenges, such as 
evolution of the ―very quick feet‖ or a mechanically-optimal catching 
apparatus. This in turn implies that the realization bases for the 
biological properties may not be diverse or heterogeneous, since one 
or a few biological properties and their realizations could be selected 
by frequency-independent (stabilizing or directional) selection. 
The idea of the points just outlined is that without these kinds 
of empirical and contingent assumptions about evolving populations 
or species, their selective environments, the modes and forms of 
natural selection (such as frequency-independent or frequency-
                                                 
19 A locus on a chromosome is said to be homozygous when its alleles are 
identical with one another. A locus with non-identical alleles is called 
heterozygous. If a locus is heterozygous, then this implies  – in the case of a 
diploid cell –  that it could express one of three kinds of genotypes, such as 
AA, Aa, or aa, whereas a homozygous locus is capable of expressing only 
one of two kinds, AA or aa. 
20 In a frequency-independent selection, the selection favors some trait(s) 
over other(s), regardless of what their frequencies are in the population. In a 
frequency-dependent selection, it is typically the trait(s) that is infrequent 
that has an advantage over the more frequent one(s).  
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dependent selection, stabilizing, directional, and disruptive selection), 
effective population sizes, auto- and syn-ecology of the species in 
question, and so on, it cannot be claimed  or presumed (even given 
the Red Queen rule) that selection for effects in Rosenberg‘s sense 
leads to diverse and heterogeneous realization bases for biological 
properties. Equally problematic in this context is that the 
assumptions concern empirical and case-specific facts, which 
evidently cannot be argued for generally, but which have to be established 
on a case-by-case basis.  
Besides, there are evolutionary factors or ―forces,‖ such as 
generative entrenchment, that work to counter the considerations to 
which Rosenberg alludes. Generative entrenchment means that there 
are traits that effectively are impossible to modify because other 
things depend upon their current form (cf. Wimsatt 2007: 133-145).  
For instance, although evolution has had a long time to ―proliferate‖ 
different realizations for biological properties, there nevertheless 
exists only one way of coding genetic information that is widely 
shared among terrestrial organisms – the code based on nucleic acids. 
In other words, the ubiquity of this kind of genetic code is an 
accident whose evolution could easily have been ―derailed‖ in the 
past. Nevertheless, this code has become so entrenched as to be 
nearly impossible to change because so many other things depend on 
it. In other words, it represents a frozen accident. Consequently, it is 
no surprise that there are striking exceptions to Rosenberg‘s 
contention that biological realization bases are diverse and 
heterogeneous, such as the ubiquity of our genetic code. Interestingly, 
there are many paleontologists who are amazed by the fact that the 
possible morphological space is so ―unexplored‖ in both extinct and 
extant taxa. One possible reason for this is that generative 
entrenchment (or developmental constraints in general) is more 
pervasive as an evolutionary factor than we have so far 
acknowledged.  
The point here is not to list and question all the assumptions, 
conditions, and rules concerning natural selection that could lead to 
realization bases of biological properties that are diverse and 
heterogeneous.  Rather, the point is that the claim that the realization 
bases of biological properties are diverse and heterogeneous is based 
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on substantial contextual, contingent, and empirical assumptions 
about natural selection. Whether these assumptions hold has to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. The relation between natural 
selection and multiple realizability is complex, and it is not a general 
or conceptual truth that natural selection (for effects) leads to 
radically diverse and heterogeneous realizations of biological 
properties.  
At the same time, there is an explanation of why the argument 
from multiple realizations appears to be so persuasive, namely, the 
argument is based on a concept that rests on unreliable intuitions 
about multiple realizations of previous philosophers. In contrast to 
the ambiguous uses of and intuitions about multiple realization, 
recent analyses of the concept undermine the plausibility of 
Rosenberg‘s argument (see Bechtel & Mundale 1999, Batterman 
2000, and Shapiro 2000). The common theme in these papers is that 
when the cases of multiple realizations are scrutinized, it seems that 
the realizations of higher-level properties cannot be as heterogeneous 
as many have supposed. Differences that exist between realizations 
turn out to be largely unimportant, and/or explanatory important 
things are shared by realizations. Thus, it appears that in a closer 
analysis of multiple realizability, Rosenberg‘s claim that the realizers 
of biological properties are diverse or heterogeneous seems unlikely 
to be true.   
Consider the corkscrew example presented by Lawrence A. 
Shapiro (2000). In order to count as different realizers of the 
―corkscrew,‖ the realizations must differ in ways that are relevant to 
their function as corkscrews, that is, in ways that affect how the corks 
are pulled out. Functionally and mechanically equivalent corkscrews 
of different colors, although different, are similar realizations of the 
corkscrew. If we were to count cases such as this as multiple 
realizability, then the claims about multiple realizability would 
become trivial. Therefore, it is not the case that any variation among or 
difference in the realizers of a property automatically or 
unconditionally implies multiple realizability.  
In the corkscrew example, there are in fact different ways of 
realizing a ―corkscrew‖: there are waiters‘ corkscrews, two-lever 
corkscrews, and so on. They differ in the causal mechanism that gives 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
 
 
71 
the corksrew the capacity to remove corks. Yet many biological 
properties that have been considered prime examples of multiple 
realizability evidently fail to be multiply realizable in this analysis 
(Shapiro 2000). For instance, the octopus eye and the mammalian eye 
differ in molecular structure: the lenses are composed of different 
kinds of proteins and the retinas utilize different visual pigments. 
Hence, this seems to be an instance of multiple realization. However, 
despite these differences, both the octopus eye and the mammalian 
eye have the same basic mechanism for producing vision. In both 
cases, light is refracted by the cornea and the lens so that a focused 
and inverted image falls on the retina, where the image is tranformed 
into electrical signals that are transmitted to the brain via the optic 
nerve. Therefore, these instances should perhaps not be counted as 
different realizations of the ―eye.‖ If paradigmatic cases like this turn 
out not to be cases of multiple realization, then Rosenberg‘s 
assumption that the realization bases of biological properties are 
diverse and heterogeneous seems implausible. 
Reconsider, for instance, heat dissipation. The claim in the 
context of Rosenberg‘s argument is that there should be different 
means for reducing heat dissipation in cold climates. As a matter of 
fact, this is not true. First, there are not so many different realizers or 
ways of reducing heat dissipation in cold climates. Yes, there is the 
idea that a larger body size results in smaller ―surface area to volume 
ratio‖ and the idea that modifications of animals‘ fur or plumage 
results in better insulation. But there do not appear to be many other 
kinds of realizers for the dissipation of heat. Thus, ―dissipation of 
heat‖ evidently is not diverse and heterogeneous in realizers insofar 
as different mechanisms for heat dissipation are concerned. Second, 
the idea that larger body size results in smaller ―surface area to 
volume ratio‖ is not, strictly speaking, something that affects an 
animal‘s heat dissipation, for it does not have any effect on 
dissipation per se21 in contrast to changes in insulation that do affect an 
                                                 
21 Rather the idea is that since the ratio of ―surface area to volume‖ is 
smaller in animals with larger body size than in animals with smaller body 
size, it follows that a relatively smaller amount of metabolized heat is dissipated 
through the surface area of larger-sized animals than smaller-sized ones. 
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animal‘s dissipation of heat. The same goes for such ―realizers‖ to 
reduce heat dissipation as changes in an animal‘s behavior, dwelling 
underground, modifications in blood circulation, and so on, which as 
adaptations may affect the fitness of an organism in cold climates, but 
which, strictly speaking, do not affect an animal‘s heat dissipation. 
Consequently, there appears to be only one or a few general 
mechanisms for heat dissipation, namely, the mechanism that affects 
insulation. 
As a conclusion, I suggest that Rosenberg‗s argument is at best 
inconclusive and at worst false insofar as its implications for the 
existence of biological laws are concerned. My analysis of the 
argument reveals that the argument rests on dubious assumptions 
concerning the nature of natural selection, laws of nature, and 
multiple realizability. And finally, even if there were no biological 
laws, there might still be biological explanations, contra Rosenberg (see 
chapter 4). Thus, the argument does not provide substantial reasons 
for doubting the existence of biological laws or explanations. 
 
 
2.6 Evolutionary Contingency 
 
Argument 9): Biological generalizations are contingent: 
 Contingency is an argument that accuses biological 
generalizations of being ―accidental‖ rather than necessary in the 
sense that laws are supposed to be. Although many have had ideas 
similar to the above (see, for instance, Smart 1963: 50-63, Schaffner 
1980: 88-90,  and Rosenberg 1985: 130-135), the best explication of 
this argument is John Beatty‘s (1995; see also his 1981: 405-409) 
evolutionary contingency thesis.22  
                                                 
22 Apparently, Beatty developed his thesis as an elaboration of Stephen J. 
Gould‘s ideas of contingency, which Gould has presented in several papers 
and books (see, for instance, Gould 1989). Since Gould‘s ideas are less 
systematic and more vague than Beatty‘s, I will concentrate on Beatty. In a 
recent article, Beatty (2006) tried to systematize Gould‘s ideas of 
contingency. Regretfully I found this attempt to be unenlightening about 
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Beatty (1995: 46-47) formulated his thesis as follows:  
All generalizations about the living world:  
a) are just mathematical, physical, or chemical 
generalizations (or deductive consequences of 
mathematical, physical, or chemical generalizations plus 
initial conditions), 
or 
b) are distinctively biological, in which case they 
describe contingent outcomes of evolution.  
 
The first part of this claim is meant to acknowledge that there 
are generalizations about the living world whose truth values 
are not a matter of evolutionary history. Evolution has not and 
will not result in any forms of life that are not subject to the 
laws of probability, or to Newton‘s laws of motion. Nor will 
evolution result in any carbon based forms of life that are not 
subject to the principles of organic chemistry. But while these 
sorts of principles are true of the living world, we do not call 
them ―biological‖ principles…   
 
The evolutionary contingency thesis tries to establish that biological 
generalizations are random or accidental products of history and/or 
other background conditions that lack nomic necessity. The idea is 
that, say, had there not been mitosis or had there been some 
equivalently fit or fitter alternative, it is likely that meiosis would not 
have evolved (Cleveland 1947), and thus Mendel’s rules (see 
appendix) would not have evolved on this planet. In fact, there are 
non-Mendelian mechanisms of inheritance even on our planet (Crow 
1979). If the environment changes so that these become as fit as or 
fitter than Mendelian ones, then they might become as omnipresent 
as Mendelian mechanisms are at present. Moreover, had Mendelian 
rules not evolved or had the conditions changed so that they no 
longer hold, then the Hardy–Weinberg (see appendix) rule might 
not hold, because it seems to be a consequence of Mendelian rules. In 
                                                                                                    
either Gould‘s or Beatty‘s ideas of contingency (see also Turner 2010 and 
Powell 2010). 
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a word, biological generalizations are accidental consequences of still 
other accidental consequences.  
To Beatty (1995: 53-58), there are two kinds of contingency to 
which his evolutionary contingency thesis refers. He called these 
weak and strong contingencies.   
By strong contingency Beatty means first and foremost that 
biological generalizations lack the necessity associated with laws. 
Even if biological generalizations were true, there might be and quite 
likely will be other times, background conditions, or places in the 
universe or this planet where these fail to hold. Thus, biological 
generalizations are at most accidentally true generalizations that hold 
because of certain background conditions. Accidentally true 
generalizations moreover do not support counterfactuals (or 
subjunctives) as laws are thought to do. For instance, the 
generalization ―all persisting lumps of pure uranium-235 have a mass 
less than 1,000 kilograms‖ appears necessary in contrast and in 
comparison to a seemingly contingent generalization ―all persisting 
lumps of pure gold have a mass less than 1,000 kilograms.‖ This is 
because the former generalization is dependent on few pervasive 
background conditions in order to hold true, whereas the latter is 
dependent on many different and shallow conditions. 
Given strong contingency, secondly and differently, evolution 
can lead to different outcomes from similar starting points given the 
same or similar selection pressures. In other words, evolution is easily 
―derailed‖ by small changes in its initial conditions. Thus, even from 
the same selection pressures, similar or identical adaptations need not, 
and probably do not, follow, even given similar organisms in similar 
environments. As I will argue below, this latter sense of strong 
contingency (i.e., lack of trajectory stability) is not differentiated well 
enough by Beatty (or others) from his previous sense of strong 
contingency.  
Beatty gives reasons why biological generalizations are strongly 
contingent. First, natural selection often selects from a set of trait 
variants that are similar in fitness, but differ in realization. Second, 
there are other evolutionary forces besides selection, such as genetic 
drift, mutations and so on, that affect evolution and its consequences.  
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Weak contingency evidently means simply that there are actual 
exceptions to biological generalizations. This is a common criticism 
of biological generalizations (see the argument 3). Many of us 
moreover think of weak contingency or exceptions as the central 
problem in the context of biological generalizations‘ lawlikeness (as in 
Smart 1963: 56 and Ruse 1970). This is unfortunate as will be argued 
below, because it is strong contingency that we should be worried 
about in this context, not its weak counterpart.  
There are many replies to the evolutionary contingency thesis. 
What most of these replies share is the claim that Beatty has confused 
situations in which generalizations fail to apply with situations in 
which the generalizations are false. When biological generalizations 
are properly stated, they are shown to be 1) (universally) true versus 
Beatty‘s weak contingency and/or 2) necessary versus Beatty‘s strong 
contingency.  
An ordinary reply to weak contingency is that biological laws 
are ceteris paribus laws that are not, contrary to appearances, riddled 
with genuine exceptions (cf. Carrier 1995 and Weber 1999). A ceteris 
paribus law holds only under conditions specified in its ceteris paribus 
clause. A ceteris paribus clause is a protective, hedging, or qualifying 
proviso – such as that the law holds only ―when some other 
(unknown) factors remain absent and/or the same‖ – that prescribes 
the domain of a law outside of which the law does not necessarily 
hold. When a ceteris paribus clause of a ceteris paribus law is satisfied (its 
cetera are paria), then the law applies to a given situation. But when it 
is not satisfied (its cetera are not paria), the law does not necessarily 
apply to a given situation.  
The idea of ceteris paribus laws is to show that biological 
generalizations are true and exceptionless, that is, not weakly 
contingent, because their ―exceptions‖ come from situations to which 
biological generalizations do not apply. In other words, the 
exceptions of biological laws come from situations in which the laws‘ 
cetera are not paria. 
A reply to strong contingency by Elliot Sober (1997) is that 
Beatty has failed to recognize that laws do not hold outside their 
domain of application. When this domain is added to the statement 
of a law, the result is a statement that is not contingent, but necessary. 
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For instance, the Hardy–Weinberg rule is restricted to situations in 
which ―there are no evolutionary forces present.‖ Let ―I‖ denote this 
applicability clause, which defines a domain of application. When 
there are evolutionary forces present, the Hardy–Weinberg rule does 
not apply. Let this rule be written as a statement of a universal form, 
x(FxGx); the probabilistic formulation would not affect the point 
being made here.  
According to Sober, we get a non-contingent statement if we add 
the clause ―I‖ as an antecedent to the statement of the Hardy–
Weinberg rule. That is, the statement ―I  (x(FxGx))‖ as a whole 
is not contingent, although both of its components ―I‖ and 
―x(FxGx)‖ could be. In this way the necessity of biological 
generalizations is redeemed. 
Sober‘s reply to strong contingency is not the same as the ceteris 
paribus account of laws above, but the two are nonetheless similar. 
Both aim to show that ―contingencies‖ can be avoided by adding a 
condition to the statements of laws. In both, the applicability of a law 
is restricted by some general protective or proviso clause that 
specifies in very general (and vague) terms those conditions under 
which the law in question is expected to apply to a situation.  
The ceteris paribus account of laws raises several empirical, 
epistemological, and semantic problems that are yet unresolved, at 
least given the proposal of ceteris paribus laws in the literature (see 
section 3.5). In other words, it has proven to be difficult to define 
what ceteris paribus clauses mean. Moreover, these same problems of 
the ceteris paribus account of laws seem to apply to Sober‘s reply given 
above. Consequently, I do not think neither is a convincing respond 
to Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency thesis.23 
                                                 
23 In another reply, Gregory J. Morgan (2009) has suggested that the 
Caspar–Klug theory of virus structure (see appendix) is a distinctively 
biological law and a counterexample to Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency 
thesis. Thus, Beatty‘s thesis is false.  However, there are two problems with 
this strategy of arguing against the evolutionary contingency thesis. First, 
even if the Caspar–Klug theory of virus structure were a distinctively 
biological law, it would not demonstrate that the evolutionary contingency 
thesis is not true of biological generalizations in general. Although Beatty 
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Nor do these responses define or examine further the meaning 
of Beatty‘s contingency or contingencies. Rather they just replace an 
unexamined or vague notion with another notion or idea that is 
equally vague. For instance, strong contingency does not appear to be 
a primitive concept. Thus, rather than being an explanans of why 
biological generalizations lack nomic necessity or lawlikeness, strong 
contingency is an explanandum that needs to be analyzed. The same 
goes for weak contingency. But with what should they be analyzed?  
Sandra Mitchell‘s (1997, 2000, 2002) idea is that strong 
contingency should and can be analyzed in terms of stability of 
generalizations. On the other hand, what was called above weak 
contingency should be analyzed in terms of scopes of generalizations 
as suggested by C. Kenneth Waters (1998).  Beatty‘s evolutionary 
contingency thesis can thus be paraphrased and analyzed in terms of 
stability and scope:  
1) According to weak contingency, biological generalizations 
are riddled with actual exceptions, that is, their  scope is far from 
universal 
2) According to strong contingency, biological 
generalizations lack the stability that guarantee that they would 
hold in many or all possible background conditions 
 
Sandra Mitchell understands stability to be something that deals with 
those background conditions on which the holding of a 
generalization is dependent. In other words, it is ―a measure of the 
                                                                                                    
formulated the evolutionary contingency thesis to address all biological 
generalizations, the alternative interpretation, one that formulates the 
evolutionary contingency thesis to concern biological generalizations in 
general, is meaningful, important, and defensible as a thesis. The fact is that 
Morgan offers no reasons to rebut this latter, more moderate interpretation 
of Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency thesis. Second, Morgan does not define 
what he means by a (strong) contingency of biological generalizations, but 
treats contingency as if it were a monolithic or primitive notion. But to 
demonstrate that his example is not evolutionarily/strongly contingent as a 
generalization, Morgan should re-think his example of a law in the light of 
my development of strong contingency presented below. 
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range of conditions that are required for the relationship described by 
the law to hold‖ ( Mitchell 2002: 346).   
As a first elaboration of Mitchell‘s stability, call a generalization 
(or regularity) stable if it holds in many possible background 
conditions. An alternative phrasing would be that a generalization is 
stable if it holds during numerous interferences. Unstable 
generalizations break down under such conditions. Stability is a 
concept of degree as well. In other words, a generalization is more 
stable the more possible background conditions there are in which it 
holds. I take it that the above characterizations of stability capture the 
essentials of Mitchell‘s definition of stability presented above.  
The connection between strong contingency and stability is 
that these are concepts of degree that are inversely related to one 
another: the more strongly contingent a generalization is, the less 
stability it has and vice versa. Stability considerations of 
generalizations are evaluated on the basis of how many background 
conditions there are and what kinds of background conditions the 
generalizations are dependent or contingent on. The more stable a 
generalization is, the less dependent it is in holding in these 
background conditions.  
Yet, there is a problem in Mitchell‘s idea that strong 
contingency should be analyzed in terms of lack of stability of 
generalizations. The problem is that she treats stability as if it were a 
monolithic thing, whereas stability actually is a conflation concept. In 
one way, stability is not problematic as a conflation concept, because 
we have different, yet related stability concepts that have definite 
meanings, which are sometimes covered by one concept, albeit 
imprecisely. The situation would be different and problematic if these 
different meanings of stability had nothing in common or were 
vague.  
I have identified seven related stability concepts or meanings 
of stability that I define as follows:  
1) Constancy: lack of changes in a system despite changes in its 
background conditions,  
2) Persistence: the survival time of a system when facing changes 
in its background conditions,  
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3) Inertia: the ability of a system to resist during changes in its 
background conditions,  
4) Elasticity: the speed of return of a system after changes in its 
background conditions,  
5) Amplitude: the area or extent of equilibrium of a system during 
changes in its background conditions,  
6) Cyclical stability: the ability of a system to return to a cycle or an 
oscillation despite changes in its background conditions, 
7) Trajectory stability: a property of a system whereby it could 
lead to the same or similar end results in its dynamics despite 
differences in its ―initial‖ background conditions.   
 
Sandra Mitchell‘s (2000: 252 and 2002: 346) definition of stability as a 
measure of the range of possible background conditions required for 
a generalization, relation, or regularity to hold is too general or non-
committal in that it does not distinguish between different forms of 
stability and their meanings. It is moreover only once we look 
carefully at her examples of generalizations and their stability, when it 
appears that she understood stability vaguely in the sense of my 
constancy, inertia, and/or trajectory stability without distinguishing 
their meanings from one another (see also section 5.5). 
Now, it is not the exact number of different forms of stability 
that is important in the present context. Rather, the important point 
concerns differences and commonalities that the forms of stabilities 
have. What is common to these forms of stability is that they describe 
what is needed from a system or a generalization in order to hold during changes of 
its background conditions (or interferences). Nevertheless, these forms of 
stability are also different. Whereas constancy, persistence, and inertia 
deal with the endurance of systems or generalizations during changes in 
the background conditions, elasticity, amplitude, and cyclic stability 
deal with recovery during changes in the background conditions. 
Trajectory stability could be understood as dealing with the sensitivity 
or inevitability of systems or generalizations during changes in the 
background conditions. Thus, we have different, but related concepts 
of stability. 
Stability should not be confused with the property of 
generalizations that was called scope (see Darden 1996: 413-414, 
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Cooper 1998: 578, 581, and especially Waters 1998). Scope – as I 
define it – describes the actual application domain of a generalization in the past 
and/or present. This domain includes those (dis)similar systems to 
which some generalization applies or has applied. Biological 
generalizations typically generalize about different taxa, features, 
entities, and so forth in different times and/or places. Many, although 
not all, biological generalizations evidently have narrow or limited 
scopes.24 For example, the scope of each of Mendel‘s two rules is all 
or nearly all sexually reproducing taxa. On the other hand, those 
conditions, like the evolution of mitosis and meiosis, on which 
Mendel‘s rules are dependent in their holding are their background 
conditions in the above sense of stability. 
Scope and stability are different properties of generalizations. 
For instance, a generalization that has a narrow scope could have a 
high degree of stability within this scope. The converse could also be 
true: a generalization that has a broad scope could have a low degree 
of stability within its scope. Scope is different from stability in that it 
deals with generality having to do with the actual distribution or range 
of (dis)similar systems to which a generalization applies or has been 
applied. Stability, on the other hand, has to do with the holding of a 
generalization in certain background conditions. In other words, 
scope is a non-modal concept and property of generalizations, 
whereas stability is a modal concept and property of generalizations 
because it has to do with considerations that deal with possibilities 
and counterfactuals. 
Next, I shall address the issue of what implications weak and 
strong contingency have for the existence of biological laws.  
Weak contingency appears to be true of biological 
generalizations in general. This is a serious problem only if one holds 
an account of laws according to which laws are (or from which 
follow) universal and exceptionless regularities. However, minority of 
                                                 
24See, for instance, Skutch (1949), Connell (1961), Hagmeir and Stults 
(1964), Brown (1971), Haartman (1971), Holmes (1977), Rabenold (1979), 
Connell (1983), Ralls and Harvey (1985), McFadden (1986), Hairston (1989), 
Gaston (1996b), Rohde (1996), Alroy (1998), Gaston et al. (1998), Hecnar 
(1999), Ashton et al. (2000), and Freckleton et al. (2003).  
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philosophers and biologists today think of biological laws in these 
traditional terms. Likewise there are accounts of laws that tolerate 
exceptions (cf. chapter 3). Consequently, it can be claimed that weak 
contingency is not a serious difficulty for the lawlike status of 
biological generalizations. This is one reason why I do not discuss 
Waters‘ (1998) reply to the evolutionary contingency thesis here in 
detail.25 Instead I shall proceed to strong contingency.  
Despite what has just been said about weak contingency, 
strong contingency is a serious problem for biological generalizations‘ 
lawlikeness in general, regardless of whether one maintains an 
account of law according to which laws can be weakly contingent or 
not. Why is this so?  
The main reason for above is that many philosophers and 
biologists, including John Beatty, think of lawlikeness/nomic 
necessity and strong contingency as contrary and perhaps even 
contradictory. Lawlikeness is likewise understood to be an 
―either/or‖ concept, that is, a concept that has no degrees (however, 
see also section 5.4). Consequently, for many, a generalization is 
either necessary/lawlike or it is contingent/accidental.  
This conceptualization of lawlikeness is shared by almost all 
definitions of lawlikeness. For instance, Beatty‘s (1995: 46-47, 52, 63-
64) idea seems to be that laws are necessary and non-contingent, but 
there could be degrees of contingency (or even contingencies) that 
non-laws display. If it is true that biological generalizations could 
have been otherwise had their background conditions been different, 
then such generalizations are strongly contingent. If they are strongly 
contingent, then they are not laws, because there are no degrees of 
lawlikeness or nomic necessity. Now, I agree with this kind of 
reasoning. At the same time, I think that we can do better in 
                                                 
25 Another reason is that it his reply is given in terms of scientific 
explanations. In other words, the issue here is not whether scientific 
explanations are possible without (universal) biological laws, which is the 
issue in Water‘s paper. Rather the issue here is on the implications and 
analysis of contingency of biological generalizations when it comes to the 
existence of laws.  
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analyzing how and why strong contingency should have damaging 
implications for the lawlikeness of biological generalizations.  
I identified seven stability concepts or meanings of stability 
above. Accordingly, there are seven possible interpretations of 
Beatty‘s strong contingency in terms of the stability of 
generalizations. There is no need to discuss all of them here, since not 
all the forms of stability are plausible as candidates in the present 
context. For instance, it does not seem to be a plausible interpretation 
of strong contingency to analyze it in terms of persistence or elasticity of 
biological generalizations. Nor does analyzing strong contingency in 
terms of amplitude or cyclical stability do justice to Beatty‘s thesis. In 
other words, it is not the recovery or temporal aspects of endurance 
of biological generalizations during their interferences or changes in 
background conditions that Beatty was concerned with as is the case 
with persistence, elasticity, amplitude, and cyclical stability, but rather 
with their more general endurance (constancy or inertia) and/or their 
sensitivity or inevitability (trajectory stability).  
With the three remaining concepts of stability we arrive at a 
clearer definition of what strong contingency means. The three 
plausible interpretations of Beatty‘s strong contingency are that 
strong contingency criticizes biological generalizations of lack of 
stability in the sense of trajectory stability, constancy, or inertia. The 
trajectory stability seems to be the most common interpretation of 
strong contingency. I deal with it first by arguing that it is the weakest 
interpretation of the three. 
First, low degree of trajectory stability does not seem at all 
distinctive of biological generalizations or systems. There are non-
biological systems that exhibit low degrees of trajectory stability, such 
as chaotic systems in general. While chaotic systems can be 
deterministic, they are extremely sensitive in their dynamics, behavior, 
and end results to the tiniest differences in initial conditions. 
Consequently, the existence of a low degree of this stability does not 
seem to be a sufficient condition to attribute any special nomological 
status to biological generalizations. Whether trajectory stability 
appears in biology with especially low degrees in contrast to other 
sciences is a topic that I will not take up.  Nor does Beatty give us any 
argument or justification for this. 
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Second, the connection between low trajectory stability and 
lawlikeness is an open question. Considerations of trajectory stability 
are important when we are explaining, manipulating, and predicting. 
But the effect of a low degree of such stability is not that it makes a 
generalization non-lawlike, non-explanatory, or non-predictive, but 
rather that we have to be sensitive and careful when setting and 
studying its initial and boundary conditions. Third, we should not 
confuse the process with its results. The process, such as natural 
selection, could be lawlike, although varying in results if its initial and 
boundary conditions were varied (see Carrier 1995: 85-89, 93-97 for a 
similar reply). Although it is possible that natural selection might 
produce alien-looking life forms on a planet that has antecedent and 
boundary conditions different from ours, this difference in results 
does not provide reasons to doubt the putative lawlike status of 
natural selection itself.26  
Fourth, there are other biological forces that might foster a 
system‘s other forms of stability or its scope despite the fact that the 
system has a low degree of trajectory stability, e.g., canalization or 
generative entrenchment (Wimsatt 2007: 133-145). Although on this 
planet it is true that hereditary information is carried (mostly) by 
nucleic acids, this seems to be ―a frozen accident‖: a conditional fact 
of our planet‘s and life‘s history. Had the historical or other 
background conditions been different, other materials could have 
evolved to do the job. Thus, the ubiquity of the genetic code is an 
accident whose evolution could easily have been derailed. Yet this 
code has now become so entrenched as to be nearly impossible to 
change because so many other things depend on it. Much of what 
was just said is also true of Mendel‘s rules. 
In my view, the points outlined above make the trajectory 
stability interpretation of strong contingency inconsequential insofar 
as the lawlikeness of biological generalizations is concerned. 
Curiously and unfortunately it is this interpretation of strong 
contingency that many apparently have adopted when they think of 
Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency thesis (cf., for instance, Carrier 
                                                 
26 What has just been said should not be interpreted as suggesting that 
natural selection is a lawlike process, however.  
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1995 and perhaps Morgan 2009; cf. also Powell 2010 and his 
discussion of Gould‘s macro-evolutionary contingency). 
Yet, strong contingency seems to have damaging implications 
for biological generalizations‘ lawlikeness, and for generalizations of 
other sciences if these are similarly contingent,27 if stability is 
understood in the sense of constancy and/or inertia. Generalizations 
with low and moderate degrees of these forms of stability only hold 
in special or limited background conditions, whereas laws are 
traditionally understood to be very stable or maximally stable 
generalizations that hold in most, if not in all, background conditions.  
Low and moderate degrees of these forms of stability deprive 
generalizations of their necessity and nomic force. Apparently, with 
these goes the support of counterfactuals, the distinctive property of 
laws, according to which these govern not just what actually happens, 
but what would have happened under various background conditions 
that did not actually happen. Nor are unstable generalizations 
―projectable‖ in the sense that laws are traditionally thought to be. 
One reason why these two latter forms of stability deprive 
generalizations their lawlike status is again that lawlikeness is 
traditionally understood to be a dichotomous thing. Accordingly, 
anything but the maximal degrees or very high degrees of these forms 
of stability deprive the lawlike status of a generalization, because with 
degrees come restrictions where and under what background 
conditions these hold.  Another reason is that biological 
generalizations in general seem to have low or moderate degrees of 
the above forms of stability. In other words, for many biological 
generalizations it is true that had some background conditions been 
different in the past or in the present, they would not hold (in 
addition to Beatty 1980, 1981, 1995, 1997 and Mitchell 2000, 2002, 
see also Skutch 1949, Hutchinson 1953, 1961, Utida 1953, Savile 
1960, Slobodkin 1964, Paine 1966, Paine and Vadas 1969, Dayton 
1971, Wiens 1977, Crow 1979, Rabenold 1979, Sober 1984: 34-36, 
Duràn & Castilla 1985, Ruse 1988: 18-19, and Ghiselin 1989 for 
                                                 
27 Beatty (1995: 47, 63) suggest that it is not only biological generalizations 
that are strongly contingent but also those of other sciences, including 
physical and chemical ones. Cf. also Mitchell (2000: 250-259).  
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examples and discussion). The ceteris paribus law account literature is 
actually riddled with examples of this kind (see, for instance, Kincaid 
1990: 77, Ereshefsky 1991, Weber 1999, and Lange 2005a). 
Consequently, I suggest that Beatty‘s strong contingency 
represents a serious problem for biological generalizations‘ 
lawlikeness, because laws are commonly understood to be maximally 
or highly stable generalizations in the sense at least of constancy 
and/or inertia. And if biological generalizations display (moderate or 
low) degrees of these forms of stability, then they are accidental 
generalizations.28 This is another sense in which my and Mitchell‘s 
examinations of Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency thesis differ for 
she does not think that the thesis has such implication. Sandra 
Mitchell has presented an alternative account of laws as a response 
Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency thesis. Her account turns the 
stability of biological generalizations into their virtue. I do not think 
that her account of laws is adequate to redeem the lawlike status of 
biological generalizations, owing to various difficulties in the account 
(see section 3.2). 
I hope to have shown why Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency 
thesis is a rare case of success among the arguments against the 
existence of biological laws presented in the literature if biological 
generalizations are contingent in the ways depicted above. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 I have treated constancy and inertia together here since their differences 
do not matter in the context. However, the two forms of stability are 
different, and their differences matter in other contexts. Constancy and 
inertia possibly have different (epistemic) functions in the context of 
scientific explanations, a topic that will be discussed elsewhere (cf. sections 
4.6 and 5.6). The two forms apply to different systems as well. Constancy is 
meant to apply to systems that do not exhibit dynamics, whereas inertia is 
meant to apply to systems that exhibit some dynamics. In other words, the 
difference between constancy and inertia has to do with the difference 
between non-change-relating generalizations (―co-existence laws‖) that are 
stable in the sense of constancy and change-relating generalizations (―succession 
laws‖) that are stable in the sense of inertia (see also chapters 4 and 5). 
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2.7 Conclusions 
 
I have analyzed nine arguments from various allegedly distinctive 
features of biological generalizations or phenomena to the absence of 
biological laws. Although my analysis of these arguments is perhaps 
not exhaustive, I nonetheless claim to have dealt with the most 
important of the arguments against biological laws.  
If my analysis of these arguments is correct, then it seems to 
follow that there are no distinctively biological laws. Taken together, 
weak and strong contingency pose a threat, both to biological 
generalizations‘ lawlikeness and to their truth. Biological 
generalizations‘ strong contingency suggests that they are not lawlike, 
whereas their weak contingency suggests that they are not even 
accidentally true generalizations, owing to their open-ended set of 
exceptions  that defy systematic and simple treatment. Thus, 
biological generalizations apparently hold only in limited spatio-
temporal domains.  
This seems to create a problem about the scientific 
explanations of the biological sciences, as have been noted by many 
scholars (e.g., Pietroski & Rey 1995 and Rosenberg 2001c). It seems 
that biologists provide with legitimate, successful, and autonomous 
scientific explanations. But how do they manage to do this if laws are 
necessary for scientific explanations as was claimed in the first 
chapter?  
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3 
 
ON LAWS AND EXCEPTIONS 
 
 
3.1 Genuine and Apparent Exceptions 
 
In this chapter, I will analyze accounts of laws that tolerate 
exceptions. According to these accounts, biological generalizations 
could be lawlike with exceptions if the generalizations are 
pragmatically or paradigmatically similar to laws, inference tickets, 
ceteris paribus laws, or if they held with probabilities. Another topic in 
this chapter is the distinction between two kinds of exceptions, the 
genuine and the apparent.  
Let us call an instance (Fa & Ga) a negative instance of a 
generalization of a universal x(FxGx) or probabilistic Pr(Gx/Fx) 
= r form. Let us call an instance (Fa & Ga) a positive instance of these 
generalizations. Instances (Fa & Ga) and (Fa & Ga) are cases to 
which the above generalizations do not apply. Generalizations apply 
only to cases where their antecedents are satisfied.  
What I call a genuine exception to a generalization is a falsifying or 
disconfirming negative instance of that generalization. If the 
antecedents of generalizations are as simple as in the generalizations 
x(FxGx) and Pr(Gx/Fx) = r, then the above negative instance 
(Fa & Ga) represents a genuine exception. This is because the 
generalizations‘ antecedents are satisfied in the case of (Fa & Ga), 
whereas their consequents are not. What I call an apparent exception is 
not a falsifying or disconfirming negative instance of a generalization, 
but its harmless negative instance, which only has the appearance of a 
genuine exception.  
A claim frequently encountered in the literature on biological 
laws is that the antecedents of biological generalizations are not as 
simple as they are in the examples above. Rather, biological 
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generalizations have complex antecedents that, in addition to the 
predicate term Fx, include qualifications or provisos that restrict the 
applicability of the generalizations. This claim maintains that negative 
instances of biological generalizations, such as (Fa & Ga) are the 
apparent exceptions because the complex antecedent of biological 
generalizations is not satisfied.  
The ceteris paribus account of laws is intended to establish that 
the negative instances of generalizations are not genuine exceptions, 
but only apparent exceptions to generalizations. The idea is that a 
protective clause – denote this with a predicate term CPx – is 
included in the statement of a law. The inclusion of this clause in 
antecedent of a statement of a law shows why negative instances of a 
ceteris paribus law are apparent exceptions rather than genuine ones, 
since they are instances ((Fa & CPa) & Ga) of a law that has the 
form x((Fx & CPx)Gx) or Pr(Gx/(Fx & CPx)) = r. Thus, ceteris 
paribus laws are riddled with apparent exceptions, which are not 
instances of these laws, owing to the fact that the laws‘ complex 
antecedents are not satisfied. Consequently, it could be claimed that 
biological generalizations are without genuine exceptions and possibly 
are even universally true if they are interpreted as ceteris paribus laws. 
Related idea is that what distinguishes the apparent exceptions from 
the genuine is that the apparent exceptions – in contrast to the 
genuine ones – can be explained and there is a corrective asymmetry 
in the sciences insofar as the legitimate explanations of exceptions to 
generalizations are concerned.  
In this chapter I will claim the accounts of laws that tolerate 
exceptions, as suggested by Sandra Mitchell, Marc Lange, and many 
others, have difficulties in redeeming the lawlike status of biological 
generalizations. In the next section, I criticize two alternative 
accounts of laws suggested by Sandra Mitchell, which she has labeled 
the pragmatic and paradigmatic accounts. In section 3.3, I take up 
Marc Lange‘s account of laws as inference tickets. In section 3.4, I 
present the difficulties in interpreting biological generalizations as 
probabilistic laws. In section 3.5, I criticize the ceteris paribus account 
of laws. In section 3.6, I criticize the idea that explanations of 
exceptions to generalizations are exclusively or typically expressed in 
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terms of the mechanisms and/or the vocabulary of the lower-level 
sciences.  
 
 
3.2 Pragmatic and Paradigmatic Accounts of Laws 
 
Sandra Mitchell (1997, 2000) has distinguished three ways of defining 
laws, which she calls normative, paradigmatic, and pragmatic 
accounts.  
A normative account of laws gives a prior definition of 
lawlikeness, which established the criteria that generalizations must 
fulfill in order to count as laws. Mitchell is convinced that because 
philosophers almost universally adopt some version of a normative 
account of laws, this – rather than something in biological 
generalizations – creates difficulties, suggesting that there are no 
biological laws.   
As an alternative, a paradigmatic account is a descriptive or 
comparative definition of laws that takes some examples of 
generalizations – presumably from physics – as examples of laws. It 
then compares them and their properties to other generalizations 
such as biological ones to see how the latter live up to the standards 
suggested or described by the examples.29  
The third alternative – one that Mitchell herself favors – is 
pragmatic. In a pragmatic account the focus is neither on a prior 
definition or criteria of lawlikeness as in the normative account, nor is 
it on comparisons between generalizations as in the paradigmatic 
account. Instead, the focus is on the role of laws, and especially on 
the question of whether different generalizations satisfy the roles that 
laws are supposed to have, and if so, how. If some generalizations 
satisfy the roles of laws, then these generalizations are laws, regardless 
of what their lawlike status is said to be according to normative or 
paradigmatic accounts.  
Are the pragmatic and paradigmatic accounts of lawlikeness of 
any help in salvaging the lawlikeness of biological generalizations?  
                                                 
29 Mitchell refers to Martin Carrier (1995) as a supporter of a paradigmatic 
account of laws. 
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There are problems with Mitchell‘s proposed pragmatic 
account. The first is the question of whose roles of laws should we 
adopt and why? Moreover, what roles are used to evaluate the lawlike 
status of generalizations? Rather than addressing these problems, I 
propose that the central role of laws has to do with providing 
scientific explanations. That this is the central and perhaps even the 
proprietary role of laws is an idea shared by many philosophers of 
science, including Sandra Mitchell.  Other roles have also been 
addressed in the literature, but since I have already addressed many of 
these (in section 1.5), I shall not take them up here. Moreover, it is an 
open question as to how laws function in many of these roles. In fact, 
it is an open question as to whether laws can function successfully in 
many of these other roles, many of which are also secondary in 
importance in the sense that by explicating what scientific 
explanations consist of, these other roles are reduced or even 
eliminated. Finally, the idea that the central role of laws is to provide 
scientific explanations is not only relatively well-developed as a 
philosophical idea, but also is an idea that has practical importance 
for scientists, as was argued in chapter 1.   
Another, more serious difficulty with the pragmatic account is 
that Mitchell has not provided a (normative) model of scientific 
explanations. How are we to evaluate how well the generalizations 
fulfill the (central) roles of laws if no model has been given that 
provide explicit criteria for these roles?  
On the other hand, Mitchell has carried out a preliminary work 
toward providing such an account. In this context she refers first and 
foremost to the stability of generalizations30:  
                                                 
30 Actually, Mitchell‘s account is multidimensional. In addition to stability, 
she refers to the degrees of abstraction, simplicity, and cognitive 
manageability as the other relevant dimensions of laws. Mitchell does not 
have much original to say about these other dimensions. Ultimately, she 
concentrates on stability and its analysis and devotes little effort to analyzing 
these other dimensions of laws. For these reasons the degrees of abstraction, 
simplicity, and cognitive manageability can be ignored in the discussion here. 
This does not mean that I am targeting a straw-man version of Mitchell‘s 
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Thus the difference between the laws of physics, the laws of 
biology, and the so-called accidental generalizations is better 
rendered as degrees of stability of conditions upon which the 
relations described depend, and the practical upshot is a 
corresponding difference in the way in which evidence for 
their acceptance must be treated in their further application. 
(Mitchell 2002: 346.) 
 
At one end of the continuum are those regularities whose 
conditions are stable over all time and space. At the other end 
are the so-called accidental generalizations. And in the vast 
middle is where most scientific generalizations are found. It is 
my view that to reserve the title of ―law‖ for just one extreme 
end is to do disservice to science by collapsing all the 
interesting variations within science into one category, non-
laws. (Mitchell 2000: 254.)  
 
If these passages were taken out of context, one might conclude that 
Mitchell is engaged in a normative project of defining lawlikeness via 
the stability of generalizations. This is not her point, however.31 
Rather Mitchell‘s point is that stability is a central property of 
generalizations whose possession makes them explanatory.  
The main difficulty with the pragmatic account of laws is that 
stability is a wrong property insofar as the explanatory power of 
generalizations is concerned. Moreover, the central idea of Mitchell‘s 
pragmatic account is incorrect, because there appear to be non-laws 
functioning in the role of laws. In other words, there are explanatory 
generalizations that are invariant rather than lawlike and/or stable (see 
also Woodward 2001: 13-17).32 Since in chapters 4 and 5 I will argue 
                                                                                                    
account, however. Clearly, Mitchell thinks that stability is a central 
dimension of her pragmatic laws. 
31 Other authors have been engaged in just such an account (see section 5.4). 
32 Of course, we can stipulate the word ―law‖ to mean whatever we wish. 
For instance, it could be claimed that if invariant generalizations are 
explanatory, then they are laws, because the term is functional in meaning, as 
in this statement: ―Whatever has a proprietary role in scientific explanations 
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for the claims just made, I will proceed here to the paradigmatic 
account of laws. 
The problem with the paradigmatic account of laws is simply 
put: there is no agreement on what the examples or paradigmatic 
(physical) laws teach about how biological lawlike generalizations 
should look. Yet such an agreement is needed to compare and 
evaluate whether biological generalizations are similar in properties to 
the paradigmatic examples of laws and their lawlike-related 
properties.  
Consider the ideal gas law. The ideal gas law states that at 
constant temperature, T, the pressure, P, of gas is inversely 
proportional to its volume, V, according to the equation PV = rT, 
where r is a constant. What does this example teach us about 
(physical) laws? Is there an agreement on what its central lawlike or 
non-lawlike properties are? Is there consensus that the statement is a 
law? There are no lucid or clear-cut answers to any of these 
questions.  
Some hold the ideal gas law (or van der Waal‘s law) to be a 
phenomenological generalization (Salmon 1984: 121, 136, 227), not a 
causal or explanatory one, whereas others hold the opposite 
(Woodward 2000: 207-209, 218-219).  While many think that the ideal 
gas law is an empirical generalization, some have put forward the idea 
that it is an analytical statement or a definition (Smith 2002: 254-257). 
Some think that the law is true; others, that it is false (Earman & 
Roberts 1999: 461-462). Among those who think  that the ideal gas 
law is a law, there are various ideas – even contrary or contradictory 
ones – about what kind of a law it is: a ceteris paribus law (Pietroski & 
Rey 1995: 82-83, 89-91, 97-98), a coexistence law (Hempel 1965:. 242 
and 352), a succession law (Salmon 1984: 135-136, 227), a law about 
                                                                                                    
is a law regardless of what other properties the thing has.‖ However, the fact 
is that invariant generalizations are quite unlikely to be laws, at least when 
compared to the ways in which most philosophers and scientists think of 
laws. Moreover, there might be other reasons to reserve the designation 
―laws‖ for generalizations that are not invariant and that have to do with 
such issues as induction, confirmation, theory structure (in physics), and so 
on.   
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disposition (Lipton 1999: 166, Cartwright 2002: 428, 430-433), and so 
on.  
The point of the list above is to show that there are different 
interpretations of both the ideal gas law and what its central (lawlike) 
properties are. And this holds true, even if some of the 
interpretations mentioned are like comparing apples and oranges. 
Moreover, the point does not really concern the ideal gas law itself. A 
comparable situation holds for other (more fundamental) physical 
generalizations, such as Newton‘s laws of motion and gravitation, for 
which there are also different interpretations as to what kind of 
generalizations they are and what their central (lawlike) properties 
are.33 In other words, different people not only view the same 
examples of physical generalizations as displaying different properties, 
but they also view different physical generalizations as examples of 
laws. 
The points outlined above suggest that the paradigmatic 
account is a non-starter, because there is no agreement as to what the 
central properties of physical lawlike generalizations are that can then 
be compared to other generalizations in order to see whether they 
live up to the standards suggested or described by the paradigms of 
laws. Note that for the paradigmatic account, some consensus is 
required on what the examples of laws and their central properties 
are, for this is what by definition distinguishes the paradigmatic account 
from the normative account of laws. There is a further idea to which 
proponents of a paradigmatic account of laws might refer, namely, 
that stability is the central property of (physical) lawlike 
generalizations of which all laws have some degree. Rather than 
discussing the idea here, I take it up and evaluate it in section 5.4. 
What has been said about physical generalizations applies as 
well to biological generalizations: for instance, there is no consensus 
or agreement among philosophers (or biologists for that matter) on 
                                                 
33 See, for instance, Nagel (1961: 61-62), Hempel (1965: 301), Joseph (1980), 
Cartwright (1983: 56-67, 2002), Lange (1993a: 236-237, 245-247), Carrier 
(1995: 89, 93-96), Pietroski and Rey (1995: 86, 89, 104-106), Earman and 
Roberts (1999), Earman et al. (2001), and Smith (2002). 
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how natural selection should be interpreted or what kind of a 
generalization it is.34  
If the situation is divided among philosophers, is it less varied 
among scientists? The answer is in the negative. For instance, 
ecologists have no consensus on the central properties of ecological 
lawlike generalizations and/or what the paradigmatic examples of 
ecological laws are. In fact, ecologists hold non-committal ideas about 
laws (as was discussed in section 1.4). I assume that the situation is 
similar among physicists as well. Thus, it is implausible that scientists 
help very much in this context.  
The above reasons militate against the paradigmatic account, 
and the situation seems to call for a normative definition of laws.  
 
 
3.3 The Inference Ticket Account of Laws 
 
Traditional inference rule account of laws maintained that laws are 
not statements, as many logical positivists thought of laws (cf. section 
1.3), but rules of inference that give justified inferential moves from the 
facts described by the antecedents of laws to facts described in their 
consequents without any indirect extra premises or statements, such 
as x(FxGx) in the background (see Schlick 1931/1961: 19035and 
Toulmin 1953: 88-93).   
The inference that ―had this object been copper, then it would 
have been an electric conductor‖ is justified, because the law ―all 
copper objects are electrically conductive‖ works as a rule to validate 
it, whereas accidentally true generalizations do not work in this way. 
The inference rule account encountered some serious difficulties, not 
least because the account was coupled with the denial that laws are 
statements, but I shall not take up these issues here (see Nagel 1956, 
1961: 137-140; Hempel 1965: 354-359).  
                                                 
34Cf. Scriven (1959), Williams (1970: 362), Ruse (1973: 38-41), Peters (1976), 
Brandon (1978), Mills and Beatty (1979), Reed (1981), Rosenberg (1985: 
126-129, 154-169, 211-225, 239-243), and Rosenberg and Kaplan (2005). 
35 The page number here refers to the English translation of the paper. 
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Marc Lange (1993a, 1993b, 1995) has developed the account 
further. Lange (1993b: 14) has dropped the ―instrumentalist‖ idea of 
the traditional account and claimed instead that laws as inference 
rules are statements, that is, things capable of having truth-values. 
The result is that some of the previous difficulties of the inference 
rule account do not apply to Lange‘s account.  
Since Lange‘s views of laws as inference rules are complex, I 
am not going to discuss all of them, simply because there is no space 
to do so. For instance, I will not discuss his views of inductive 
strategies in the context of laws. Here is how Lange describes a 
central aspect of his account of laws as inference rules:  
Whether scientists regard some claim as stating a natural law is 
revealed not by whether they call it a ―law‖ but by how they 
use it. If a scientist takes some claim to be a law statement, 
then she uses it to perform various functions that she does not 
regard accidental generalizations as able to perform. Although 
philosophers have yet to state these functions precisely, they 
have long believed that these functions involve counterfactual 
conditional, scientific explanations, and inductive 
confirmation. (Lange 1995: 435.)36  
 
Again, laws function as rules of inference, whereas accidental 
generalizations do not: laws justify inferences and therefore fulfill the 
functions of laws.  
The above reminds me of Sandra Mitchell‘s pragmatic account 
discussed earlier, and if this is what Lange intends by his account, 
then both authors share some similar difficulties. Yet there is a 
further element in Lange‘s account of laws as inference rules, namely, 
the idea that only rules of inference that are ―reliable‖ are laws, which 
gives some extra content to Lange‘s account: 
[A] law need not be associated straightforwardly with 
regularity. It may be associated with an inference rule that is 
‗reliable‘ – i.e., that leads to conclusions close enough to the 
truth for the intended purposes. (Lange 2002: 411.) 
                                                 
36 See also Lange (1993a: 243, 1993b: 14, and 2002:  412-413) for similar 
ideas and passages. 
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Lange is aware that biological laws – and perhaps even laws of 
physics – are not reliable rules of inference without provisos. Thus, 
Lange admits that biological laws are ―contingent‖ (see Lange 1993a, 
1995, 2002, and 2005a). This shows that they are not strict laws, but 
ceteris paribus laws (Lange 1993a, 2002). Thus, we can infer that an 
object is a G from the fact that it is an F on the basis of the law 
x(FxGx) only ceteris paribus.  
The ceteris paribus account of laws raises several difficult 
problems that are unresolved, at least given the main theories and 
proposals of such laws in the literature (see section 3.5). In short, it 
has proven difficult to define what ceteris paribus clauses mean. If a 
more precise meaning or semantics is not provided, then we have 
―laws‖ that are empirically, epistemologically, and semantically vague. 
Since Lange has not given any semantics or truth conditions for ceteris 
paribus clauses of ceteris paribus laws, this suggests that his account of 
laws is incomplete. Yet Lange (1993a: 239-245 and 2002) has insisted 
that ceteris paribus laws might be pragmatically justified or that there 
exist ―shared implicit and tacit scientific background knowledge‖ that 
is in need of no explication or exact determination that determines 
what the exact and intended meaning of a ceteris paribus clause is. It is 
this same background knowledge that then furnishes us with reliable 
rules of inference. Lange‘s appeal to ―background knowledge‖ 
determining the meaning of ceteris paribus clauses postpones the 
problem to one of defining in more general and philosophically 
enlightening terms what this background knowledge consists of.37  
These reasons suggest that Lange‘s inference rule account of 
laws does not offer an account that salvages the lawlikeness of 
biological generalizations. To Lange, there is more to lawlikeness than 
                                                 
37 Lange has presented many interesting examples of how laws function as 
reliable inference rules in specific contexts, given some audience, and so on 
(see Lange 1993a: 242-244, 1995: 440, 443-445, 2002: 411, 416). However, 
giving specific examples and cases of ―reliability‖ of laws does not amount 
to giving a general, explicative, normative, and/or methodologically 
clarifying ―theory‖ about these matters. Nor does it amount to giving ceteris 
paribus clauses general truth conditions or meanings. 
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the idea that laws function as reliable inference rules, namely, the idea 
that laws are collectively stable generalizations, which I take up in 
section 5.4. It is the latter idea and the account of laws that I consider 
to be more promising in providing a general account of (biological) 
laws rather than Lange‘s inference rule account of laws.  
 
 
3.4 Probabilistic Laws 
 
An anticipated idea is that biological generalizations should be 
interpreted as probabilistic laws.38 This is a simple and 
straightforward solution to the problem of weak contingency or 
―exceptions‖ of biological generalizations (section 2.6). Whereas 
universal laws claim something about all Fs and Gs, probabilistic laws 
state what happens in a definite proportion of Fs and Gs. In other words, 
the scope of probabilistic laws is not universal, but tolerates genuine 
exceptions. Also many biological generalizations appear probabilistic, 
as biologists are aware. For instance, Bernhard Rensch (1959: 123-
126, 1960: 107-110) reported percentages in which many ecological 
and evolutionary generalizations hold, including Allen’s, 
Bergmann’s, the clutch size, Cope’s, Dollo’s, and Gloger’s rule 
(see appendix). However, I will argue that there is a serious problem 
in interpreting ecological and paleobiological generalizations as 
probabilistic laws.  
In the context of probabilistic laws, the problem is not the 
weak contingency of biological generalizations for which the 
probabilistic law account offers a simple solution. Rather the problem 
is their strong contingency, which in the context of probabilistic laws 
emerges as a problem that biological generalizations evidently do not 
offer stable probabilities with which these generalizations hold in different 
backgrounds. In the given context the problem is that stable 
probabilities are required from probabilistic lawlike generalizations. 
Thus, instead of claiming that a definite or constant proportion of Fs 
                                                 
38 A probabilistic law can be written as Pr(Gx/Fx) = r, which states that the 
probability of an  F to be a G is r or that the frequency of Gs among Fs is r 
or that in any collection of sample Fs, r percent will be G. 
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are Gs in all, or at least most,  background conditions to which a 
probabilistic law applies, biological generalizations display 
probabilities that evidently vary between and among different taxa, 
times, places, and so on.  
Many studies show that some ecological rules, such as 
Bergmann‘s rule or the latitudinal diversity gradient, hold at some 
percentage for certain taxa, times, and/or places, whereas other studies 
show they hold at other percentages for other taxa, times, and/or places 
– or that they do not hold at all for some taxa, times, and/or place 
(see Davis 1938, Dale 1940, Rabenold 1979, Gaston 1996b, Hagmeier 
& Stults 1964, Ralls & Harvey 1985, Geist 1987, Ashton et al. 2000, 
Freckleton et al. 2003).The same is true for evolutionary (or 
paleobiological) rules, as well as for allometries and scaling laws. This 
is in contrast with physical probabilistic lawlike generalizations that 
evidently hold with stable probabilities that do not vary from one 
background to another, cf. the laws of radioactive decay.39 
 I am not the first to make this observation. Michael Ruse 
(1973: 60) had something similar in mind in the following passage: 
The theory of evolution cannot… assign a definite percentage 
to the number of exceptions to the evolutionary rules  – for 
this reason it is perhaps better to regard them as ―loose 
laws‖…. rather than as statistical laws. The whole point about 
a statistical law like the H–W [Hardy–Weinberg] law is that the 
statistical part is just as necessary as the rest of the law – 
following form the H–W law is not only the fact the there will 
be three genotypes in future generations (say, A1A1, A1A2, 
A2A2), but also the fact that the distribution will be p2 A1A1 : 
2pq A1A2 : q2 A2A2. In the case of evolutionary laws… no 
definite percentages follow from evolutionary theory. We 
                                                 
39 In developing the above argument, I had ecological and paleobiological 
generalizations in mind. Some authors have suggested that generalizations 
from evolutionary biology, such as what Brandon (2006) has dubbed as ―the 
principle of drift,‖ could be probabilistic laws. Although I think that the 
argument just presented applies to biological generalizations in general, I 
shall not argue for this here. 
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cannot, for example, infer that exactly 30 per cent of nearctic 
animals will be exceptions to Bergmann‘s principle. 
 
The problem is again that the probabilities of biological 
generalizations are not stable but vary from one background to 
another. Another way to put this problem is to the observation that 
biological generalizations seem to have an open-ended set of 
exceptions that defy systematic and simple treatment. This suggests 
that biological generalizations are not probabilistic strict laws but 
ceteris paribus laws. This is what I take that Ruse have in mind in the 
above passage when he calls them as ―loose‖ rather than as statistical 
laws.   
 
 
3.5 Ceteris Paribus Laws 
 
Currently, the ceteris paribus account of laws is popular among 
philosophers in the special sciences. Marc Ereshefsky (1991: 65-67), 
Martin Carrier (1995: 88), and Marcel Weber (1999), to mention a 
few, are among those who have suggested that biological 
generalizations should be interpreted as ceteris paribus laws. Laws that 
do not contain ceteris paribus clauses are called ―strict‖ laws in the 
literature. The idea of the ceteris paribus account of laws is that a ceteris 
paribus clause – denote this with the predicate term CPx –, is added to 
a statement of a universal or probabilistic strict law – as in x((Fx & 
CPx) Gx) or Pr(Gx/(Fx & CPx)) = r –, which then specifies  those 
conditions in which the law holds.40  
                                                 
40 There are other ways to include ceteris paribus clauses in statements of laws 
besides placing them in the antecedents. Nevertheless, I continue to speak as 
if ceteris paribus clauses were added in the antecedents of law statements, since 
this simplifies the discussion of ceteris paribus laws. Furthermore, the other 
ways are logically equivalent or logically ―equisatisfiable.‖ Besides, the 
problems of the ceteris paribus law account are independent of the different 
logical and formal ways we use to express or include ceteris paribus clauses in 
law statements. 
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A ceteris paribus clause is a protective, hedging, or qualifying 
proviso that prescribes the domain of a law outside of which the law 
does not necessarily hold. When a ceteris paribus clause of a ceteris 
paribus law is satisfied (its cetera are paria), then the law applies to a 
given situation. But when it is not satisfied (its cetera are not paria), the 
law does not necessarily apply to a given situation. The idea is to 
show that biological generalizations are not weakly contingent, 
because their ―exceptions‖ come from situations to which biological 
generalizations do not apply. In other words, the exceptions of 
biological laws come from situations in which the laws‘ cetera are not 
paria.  
The ceteris paribus account of laws purports to show that 
biological laws are riddled with exceptions that are apparent rather 
than genuine. Thus, a ceteris paribus law can even be riddled with an 
extreme number of exceptions as long as its ceteris paribus clause is not 
satisfied. Consider a situation in which the antecedent predicate, Fx, 
of a law applies, but law‘s ceteris paribus clause and consequent do not 
apply.  This is not a genuine exception to a ceteris paribus law, but only 
an apparent exception, since the ceteris paribus law x((Fx & 
CPx))Gx) or Pr(Gx/(Fx & CPx)) = r does not apply to the instance 
((Fa & CPa) & Ga), the reason being  that the law‘s complex 
antecedent is not satisfied. In other words, the law‘s cetera were not 
paria. An otherwise similar instance to which the ceteris paribus clause 
applies, ((Fa & CPa) & Ga), is a genuine exception to a ceteris paribus 
law. Moreover, probabilistic ceteris paribus laws can exhibit unstable 
and varying probabilities as long as their cetera are not paria. These 
points suggest that we have an account that fits the appearances of 
biological generalizations. 
A ceteris paribus clause of a ceteris paribus law should not be 
eliminable by a complete and finite list of external factors that could 
interfere with the law in question. In most cases, such an elimination 
or listing of factors cannot be done because we do not know all the 
interfering factors of a generalization, and/or the result would 
amount to a formulation of a law that is very complex in form. Yet if 
such an elimination or listing of factors can be done, and is carried 
out, then this amounts to a ―lazy meaning‖ of ceteris paribus laws. In 
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this case, we have a law that is strictly complemented and in which all of 
its interfering factors, Ixi, are mentioned in a conjunct of their 
negations in the antecedent of a law statement, such as in x(Fx & 
(Ix1 & Ix2 & Ix3 & … & Ixn)  Gx). We thus have a law with 
conditions of applicability fully specified, whereby the law applies to 
cases in which the listed factors, Ixi, are absent. Strictly 
complemented laws are strict laws, and their problems are not those 
of ceteris paribus laws. Consequently, genuine ceteris paribus laws at least 
refer to some unknown interfering factors.  
Suppose that the factors interfering in biological 
generalizations are so heterogeneous, complex, and numerous that at 
least in practice they defy simple and systematic treatment that would 
eliminate them by strict complementation. Prima facie, this is the right 
observation: many biological generalizations evidently have an open-
ended set of exceptions that defy such a treatment, such as Gause‘s 
rule.41 Appearances thus suggest that biological generalizations are or 
could be ceteris paribus laws. I wish to remain silent on the 
(metaphysical) issue of whether the number of interfering factors is 
so large, complex, or so heterogeneous in nature as to make the 
elimination of ceteris paribus clauses impossible in biology in principle. 
Some authors think that this is true of the special sciences in general, 
and some think it is even true of physics.42 
The ceteris paribus law account is perhaps the most promising 
for salvaging the lawlike status of ―contingent‖ biological 
generalizations. Regretfully, the account raises empirical, 
epistemological, and semantic problems that are unresolved, at least 
given the current accounts in the literature. In other words, it has 
proven to be a difficult problem to define what ceteris paribus clauses 
mean. If a more precise meaning is not found, then we have 
                                                 
41 The classic ecological reference here is Leslie et al. (1968) (see also sections 
2.3, 2.4, and 2.6).  
42 See Beatty (1980: 552-553, 1995: 62-63), Cartwright (1983: 112, 1989: 206-
212, but see also her 2002), Giere (1988: 40), Ereshefsky (1991: 66), Lange 
(1993a: 234-235), Pietroski and Rey (1995: 101-102), Schurz (2001a: 361), 
and Teller (2004: 733).  
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generalizations that are empirically, epistemologically, and 
semantically vague.  
What do ceteris paribus clauses mean or how should we translate 
them into meaningful sentences? Evidently, the best non-literal 
translation of ceteris paribus clauses is ―when some other (unknown) 
external factors remain absent and/or when some other (unknown) 
external factors remain constant‖ (cf.  Schurz 1995, 2001a, 2002). In 
other words, ceteris paribus clauses cover the absence of or the lack of 
change in the unknown external interfering factors that are 
responsible for the law not applying in some conditions. Since this 
translation of ceteris paribus clauses is too general, non-committal, and 
ambiguous, we need to say something more specific about their 
meaning.  
The central problem of the ceteris paribus law account is thus 
to give ceteris paribus clauses semantics or truth conditions. The 
problem involves not only giving formal truth conditions for ceteris 
paribus laws, but also to give ceteris paribus clauses definite content and 
meaning that allow us to distinguish legitimate uses of ceteris paribus 
clauses from illegitimate and ad hoc uses. Without such semantics, 
how can we tell whether a ceteris paribus law applies to a situation? In 
other words, we need an idea of how apparent exceptions can be 
distinguished from genuine ones. One possibility is that we have an 
apparent exception to a ceteris paribus law when the exception is 
explainable by factors or explanations that are causally and logically 
independent of exceptions and that explain or cause other things as 
well (cf. Pietroski & Rey 1995: 84-95). Another, related possibility is 
that explanations of exceptions are given in terms of ―lower levels‖: 
an apparent exception to a ceteris paribus law comes from a situation in 
which the law‘s completers are interfered with by external factors (see 
Fodor 1991; see also section 3.6). Both suggestions, however, are 
problematic and riddled with counterexamples.  
A related worry is that ceteris paribus clauses make 
generalizations ―empirically vacuous.‖ Empirically vacuous 
generalizations make trivially true or ad hoc claims, such as ―all Fs are 
Gs, except when they are not,‖ which are immune to empirical testing 
and disconfirmation. Empirically vacuous generalizations also lack 
explanatory and predictive power.  
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These are not the only problems with the ceteris paribus account. 
There is a danger that the account permits accidentally true 
generalizations to qualify as ceteris paribus laws. Thus, the account 
threatens to blur the distinction between laws and accidents. More 
worrisome is that some clear examples of false, arbitrary, and accidental 
generalizations – such as ―all white substances are poisonous for us 
to consume‖ and ―all spherical objects are good electrical 
conductors‖ – count as examples of true ceteris paribus laws according 
to the major accounts of ceteris paribus laws in the literature  (for 
instance, on this basis, Mott 1992; Earman & Roberts 1999, and 
Woodward 2000: 247-251, 2002a: 307-313 criticize various accounts 
of ceteris paribus laws, such as those of Fodor 1991 and Pietroski & 
Rey 1995 discussed above).  
I am not going to argue against different specific ceteris paribus 
accounts of laws,43 since I have criticized them elsewhere (Raerinne 
2003). In addition, there is already an extensive critical literature on 
the ceteris paribus account.44 My claim is that all of the specific 
accounts presented in the literature run into the several problems 
mentioned above, and thus, none is a satisfactory account of laws.  
The problems of the ceteris paribus account apply to another 
exception-tolerating account of laws, namely,  the disposition account 
(see, for instance, Cartwright 1989: 141-182, 1995a, 1997, 2002; 
Horgan & Tienson 1990; Woodward 1992; Hüttemann 1996; Lipton 
1999). The problem with the disposition account is that dispositions 
manifest themselves only when ―when some other (unknown) 
external factors remain absent and/or when some other (unknown) 
external factors remain constant.‖ Consequently, the epistemological, 
semantic, and empirical problems that plagued the ceteris paribus 
account similarly plague the disposition account. Without solutions to 
                                                 
43 See Cartwright (1983: 44-73, 2002), Hausman (1988), Kincaid (1990), 
Fodor (1991), Mott (1992), Lange (1993a, 2002, 2005a), Pietroski and Rey 
(1995), Schurz (1995, 2001a, 2001b, 2002), Silverberg (1996), Morreau 
(1999), Glymour (2002), and Spohn (2002). 
44 See Schiffer (1991), Mott (1992), Wallis (1994), Earman and Roberts 
(1999), Woodward (2000: 247-251, 2002a, 2003a: 307-311), Schurz (2001a, 
2002), Earman et al.( 2002), Mitchell (2002), and Smith (2002).  
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these, the disposition account is as unsatisfactory and unenlightening 
as a solution to the contingency of biological generalizations as the 
ceteris paribus account. 
The meaning of ceteris paribus clauses in generalizations is 
typically locally, discipline-, and/or science-specific (cf. Lange 1993a, 
2002; Levins 1998; Woodward 2006b: 13-15). For example, physicists 
are interested in the symmetry conditions of their generalizations (see 
Woodward 1992: 203-204 and Earman 2004), whereas biologists are 
not. Economists are not that concerned about there being a drug that 
makes people act non-rationally, whereas psychologists might be very 
interested in such a drug and its effects. However, economists are 
interested in whether economic generalizations hold under the 
changes of an agent‘s information as in Akerlof‘s lemon markets (see 
Sudgen 2002: 108-112). How are such conditions to be accounted for 
by general and abstract ceteris paribus clauses if these conditions are 
about locally and contextually-dependent things? Sandra Mitchell 
(2002: 339) has criticized the ceteris paribus account of laws from a 
similar angle:  
It is not particularly useful to say that laws are contingent or 
that they can be re-written as ceteris paribus generalizations, 
without detailing what kinds of conditions they depend upon 
and how that dependency works. Only by further articulating 
the differences rather than covering them over with a phrase 
denoting the existence of restrictions, can the nature of 
complex systems be taken seriously. The problem of laws in 
the special sciences is not just a feature of our epistemological 
failings; it is function of the nature of complexity displayed by 
the objects studied by the special sciences. Providing a more 
adequate understanding of laws in the special sciences requires 
a better taxonomy of contingency so that we can articulate the 
several ways in which laws are not ―universal and 
exceptionless‖.  
 
In lieu of the ceteris paribus account of laws and its solution to the 
―contingency‖ of biological generalizations in terms of abstract, 
schematic, and general ceteris paribus clauses, Mitchell suggests that we 
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provide a taxonomy of the contingency that generalizations exhibit. I 
agree with her suggestion.  
In fact, I provided a taxonomy of contingency in the previous 
chapter, where I argued that biological generalizations‘ weak and 
strong contingency should be analyzed in terms of scope and stability 
of generalizations. I suggest that we similarly analyze generalizations‘ 
ceteris paribus clauses or ―domains,‖ that is, we analyze them in terms 
of the scope and stability of the generalizations. I will continue the 
analysis of contingency of generalizations in chapter 5 by discussing 
the epistemic functions that stability and scope have in ―generalizing‖ 
explanations.  
 
 
3.6 Vertical and Horizontal Explanations of Exceptions 
 
The basic idea behind Gause’s rule is that species with similar niches, 
not to mention identical ones, cannot coexist in the same place for 
long periods of time. When faced with a situation that seems to be an 
exception to this rule, as happens with what appears to be a guild of 
birds of prey that hunt the same food, such as voles of the genus 
Microtus, an ecologist undertakes a closer investigation of the situation 
and the ecology of the species. As a consequence, it is not 
uncommon that competing species are found to be less similar in 
(auto)ecology than they first appeared (see, for instance, Lack 1945, 
1946; Heatwole and Davis 1965; cf. the theory of limiting similarity). 
Thus, what appeared to be a genuine exception to Gause‘s rule is 
found to be an apparent exception, since the rule does not apply to 
cases in which there are important differences between the niches of 
competing species.  
What makes an exception to a generalization apparent 
exception rather than genuine? Many philosophers (and scientists) 
maintain that if an exception to a generalization can be explained 
independently and in a non-ad hoc way, then the exception is 
apparent, not genuine (see, for instance, Pietroski & Rey 1995).  A 
related and equally common idea is that the explanations for 
exceptions to generalizations come exclusively or typically from the lower 
levels of mechanisms and/or are stated in the vocabulary of the lower-level sciences. 
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This latter idea of the explanations of exceptions to generalizations is 
what is being called into question here.  
Imagine a population of the species of the pocket gopher, 
Thomomys bottae, which is an anomaly with regard to Bergmann‘s rule 
(see appendix). Pocket gophers are rodents that dig up tunnel systems 
and spend considerable parts of their lives burrowing underground. 
The anomalous population lives in a mountainous area, where the soil 
is shallow and rocky. Suppose also that lower altitude populations of 
this species at the same latitude follow Bergmann‘s rule and thus are 
larger in body size.  
We could try to discharge the problematic status of the 
anomalous population with the following evolutionary considerations 
(as in Davis 1938): at high altitudes, the critical factor for an 
organism‘s survival is typically the ambient temperature, especially 
during the cold season. Since the soil of the habitat of the anomalous 
population in question is shallow and rocky, its members cannot dig 
deep holes or build extensive tunnel systems in which to escape the 
harsh environmental conditions. Thus, there seems to be strong 
evolutionary pressure that selects for small(er) body size, for smaller-
size organisms do not need such deep holes and extensive tunnel 
systems as their larger relatives in which to escape harsh 
environmental conditions. In addition, this pressure contradicts the 
selective advantages of Bergmann‘s rule (if there are any). In this way, 
an anomaly is rendered expected and understandable by 
considerations of a more fundamental, lower-level, or ―basic‖ theory 
that accounts for the anomaly. 
Jerry A. Fodor has been a strong advocate of the idea of 
finding more fundamental explanations of exceptions to 
generalizations; on several occasions he has stated something similar 
to the following (cf. Fodor 1974: 112, 1987: 4-6, 1989: 66-68, 75-7, 
1991: 24-25):  
Exceptions to the generalizations of a special science [i.e., a 
non-physical science] are typically inexplicable from the point of 
view of (that is, in the vocabulary of) that science. That‘s one 
of the things that makes it a special science. But, of course, it 
may nevertheless be perfectly possible to explain the 
exceptions in the vocabulary of some other science. In the most 
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familiar case, you go ‗down‘ one or more levels and use the 
vocabulary of a more ‗basic‘ science. (The current failed to run 
through the circuit because the terminals were oxidized; he no 
longer recognizes familiar objects because of a cerebral 
accident. And so forth.) The availability of this strategy is one 
of the things that the hierarchical arrangement of our sciences 
buys for us. Anyhow, to put the point succinctly, the same 
pattern that holds for the special sciences seems to hold for 
commonsense psychology as well. On the one hand, its ceteris 
paribus clauses are ineliminable from the point of view of its 
proprietary conceptual resources. But, on the other hand, we 
have – so far at least – no reason to doubt that they can be 
discharged in the vocabulary of some lower-level science 
(neurology, say, or biochemistry; at worst, physics.) (Fodor 
1987: 6.)  
 
Fodor is here generalizing an idea advanced by Donald Davidson 
(1970: 94-101), who claimed that there is a difference between 
generalizations that deal with physical phenomena and those dealing 
with mental phenomena. Generalizations that deal with the former 
are homonomic. Homonomic generalizations can be corrected and 
made more precise, and their exceptions can be explained within their 
own conceptual domain; in other words, they are distinctively 
physical and autonomous as generalizations. To homonomic 
generalizations Davidson contrasted heteronomic generalizations, 
which deal with mental phenomena.  
Heteronomic generalizations cannot be corrected or made 
more precise, and their exceptions cannot be explained within their 
own conceptual domain; they need the vocabulary of other sciences 
and presumably those that reside at lower levels in order to have 
these things. Heteronomic generalizations are thus not autonomous, 
because they need the vocabulary of other sciences to better 
themselves:  
Where there are rough, but homonomic, laws, there are laws 
drawing on concepts from the same conceptual domain and 
upon which there is no improving in point of precision and 
comprehensiveness. We urged in the last section that such laws 
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occur in the physical sciences. Physical theory promised to 
provide a comprehensive closed system guaranteed to yield a 
standardized, unique description of every physical event 
couched in a vocabulary amenable to law. 
It is not plausible that mental concepts alone can 
provide such a framework, simply because the mental does 
not, by our first principle, constitute a closed system. Too 
much happens to affect the mental that is not itself a 
systematic part of the mental. But if we combine this 
observation with the conclusion that no psychophysical 
statement is, or can be built into, a strict law, we have the 
Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental: there are no strict 
laws at all on the basis of which we can predict and explain 
mental phenomena. (Davidson 1970: 99.)  
 
When the idea of the heteronomicity of mental phenomena is 
generalized to biological phenomena that moreover appear to be as 
―open‖ as mental phenomena (see section 2.4), which is the reason 
for the heteronomicity of the mental according to Davidson, and 
when this idea is connected with the observation that biological 
generalizations are riddled with exceptions (see section 2.3), one is 
easily led to the conclusion that explanations of exceptions should 
exclusively or typically be vertical or bottom-up in character in biology, 
as Fodor suggested in  the passage cited above. Why? Simply and 
evidently because the default heuristics of many philosophers and 
biologists is reductionism (in the sense of Wimsatt 2006, 2007: 347-
352).45 
For instance, Michael E. Ruse (1970, 1973) set out to show 
that biology is a lawlike science.  As one defense of his position, Ruse 
claimed that, although there are exceptions to biological 
generalizations, these exceptions are not damaging to biological 
generalizations‘ lawlike status, because they can be explained away by 
                                                 
45 Although I have nothing against reductionism as heuristics as long as its 
biases are remembered (cf. Wimsatt ibid.), the issue of why reductionism 
should be adapted to the context of the explanations of exceptions to 
generalizations has remained unaddressed, as I argue below. 
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making reference to lower-level mechanisms that implement 
biological generalizations. Ruse‘s examples (1970: 243-245, 1973: 13-
14, 24-31) involve Mendel’s rules (see appendix).  
It is known that Mendel‘s rules are not without ―negative 
instances.‖ However, as later development in cytological and 
molecular biology has shown, negative instances of Mendel‘s rules are 
cases, in which the mechanisms of these rules do not apply or there 
are mechanistic stories at lower levels that account for the exceptions. 
I am referring to linkage, which is an apparent exception to Mendel‘s 
second rule. In linkage, different genes are located on the same 
chromosome, whereas Mendel‘s second rule applies only to genes at 
the same locus, i.e., to genes that are on different homologous 
chromosomes. Exceptions to Mendel‘s first rule – meiotic drive and 
non-disjunction (see Sandler & Novitski 1957; Crow 1979; Beatty 
1981: 407-409, 1982: 210-213; Darden 1995: 143-145)  – appear to be  
more genuine exceptions to Mendel‘s first rule than linkage, yet 
suppose for the sake of argument that there are lower-level 
explanations that show how these exceptions came about and that 
discharge their problematic status as genuine exceptions to the rule. 
Ruse thus evidently makes the claim that we have apparent, not 
genuine, exceptions to biological generalizations. He is therefore 
suggesting that biological generalizations are riddled with apparent 
exceptions (rather than genuine ones) and that, contrary to their 
appearances, biological generalizations are consequently exceptionless 
and perhaps even universal. 
Recently, Daniel P. Steel (2008: 125-148) discussed of a similar 
―corrective asymmetry‖ between different levels in the sciences, 
according to which lower levels of mechanism account for exceptions 
and even correct for generalizations found at higher levels.  
I object to the idea that corrections to generalizations in the 
special sciences should always be or typically be vertical in character.  
At least in community and population ecology, scientists explain away 
exceptions to their generalizations by using other concepts, causes, 
and mechanisms on the same level rather than those on lower-levels. 
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Let us call such explanations horizontal explanations of exceptions to 
generalizations in contrast to vertical explanations.46  
That ecologists explain exceptions to their generalizations 
horizontally suggests that the idea of the heteronomicity of biological 
generalizations – which some think of as proving an argument against 
existing distinctively biological lawlike generalizations (see section 2.4) 
– can be questioned. It likewise suggests that the idea of vertical 
explanations of exceptions is not a necessary and sufficient condition 
for explanations of exceptions in the special sciences. The idea of 
vertical explanations of exceptions is also a central premise of many 
ceteris paribus accounts of laws (see section 3.5).  
I wrote above as if it were the ―(auto)ecology‖ of the species 
that account for the exceptions to Gause‘s rule in the case of birds of 
prey. If an explanation of an exception to Gause‘s rule were given in 
terms of the autoecology of these species, this could perhaps be 
interpreted as an instance of a vertical explanation of an exception to 
a synecological generalization (i.e., Gause‘s rule), in which the 
autoecology level can perhaps be viewed as situated at a lower level 
(of mechanisms) than the synecological level. But there are other, 
synecological explanations of exceptions to Gause‘s rule. The 
explanation I have in mind is the below ―same level‖ explanation of 
the failure of Gause‘s rule, originally due to Robert T. Paine:  
In (rocky) intertidal marine habitats the top predators (e.g., 
starfish and gastropod species of genera Thais and Pisaster) prey on 
different consumer species (the different mussels, barnacles, and 
other species of many genera). In such habitats, there is severe and 
intense competition among the consumer species for living space, which 
is the major and critical limiting factor. However, there is surprisingly 
high alpha or local diversity of the consumer species in many such 
habitats. It is surprisingly high, because, on the basis of Gause‘s rule, 
one would expect only a few species, given the keen competition for 
living space (cf. also Liebig‘s rule). What Robert T. Paine (1966) 
                                                 
46 I have adapted the terms vertical and horizontal explanations of 
exceptions from the excellent paper by Wim J. van der Steen and Harmke 
Kamminga (1991: 449-453). The authors call these integrations instead of 
explanations, but their idea is similar to mine. 
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experimentally discovered was that removing one (or more) of the 
top predator species (e.g., Pisaster) from such a habitat had the effect 
of reducing the alpha diversity of the consumer species: without a 
common predator species, a few (and perhaps even one) 
competitively dominant consumer species come to monopolize the 
living space by outcompeting other consumer species. Thus, Paine‘s 
explanation was that (the top or key-stone)  predators can mediate 
the coexistence of their prey and maintain the local diversity of a 
community by keeping competing prey populations‘ densities or 
abundances below some level at which the competition would 
become so severe as to cause local extinctions. The removal of a 
predator not only reduced the alpha diversity of these species, but 
also the whole trophic structure of the manipulated habitat collapsed 
and was reduced to a simpler one. Other experiments have reported 
similar results (see Slobodkin 1964, Paine & Vadas 1969, and Durán 
& Castilla 1989).  
These and similar experimental findings and explanations of 
exceptions to Gause‘s rule by Paine and others were later generalized 
and labeled the intermediate disturbance rule. According to this rule, 
intermediate levels of abiotic or biotic disturbances, such as 
predation, pathogens, aridity, storms, and fires are capable of 
mediating the coexistence of competitor species and thus maintaining 
the local diversity of a community at a relatively high level. Too small 
or infrequent disturbances lead to local extinctions of competitively 
inferior species by competitively dominant ones, whereas too intense 
or too frequent disturbances allow for the few species that are the 
most stress-tolerant to exclude other species from a habitat. In other 
words, local species diversity often peaks with the intermediate levels 
of disturbances of a habitat. Biotic and abiotic disturbances have the 
same effect, for instance, through reduction of population densities 
of competitor species, which counter the strong competitive effects 
between species.  
The point of the above example is to suggest that ecologists 
explain away exceptions to generalizations by using ecological 
concepts, causes, or mechanisms on the same level rather than those 
on a lower level. I will give some other (same level) explanations of 
exceptions to Gause‘s rule in chapter 6. There are thus ―horizontal‖ 
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explanations of exceptions in ecology that makes ecology look 
homonomic in generalizations in contrast to what many previous 
authors have suggested about generalizations of the special sciences. 
Note that the above argument concerned explanations of exceptions, 
not their implementation or realization. Moreover, my claim is only 
that corrective asymmetry (or the idea of vertical explanations of 
exceptions to generalizations) is neither a sufficient and necessary 
condition nor a necessary condition for the explanations of 
exceptions or the corrections to generalizations.  
The question of why corrective asymmetry should be adapted 
into the context of explanations of exceptions to generalizations will 
be examined some other time. This is because there do not appear to 
be many explicit arguments for its use in the literature. For instance, 
Daniel P. Steel (2008: 125-148) presents many insightful and 
intriguing ideas concerning both reduction and corrective asymmetry 
in biology. Nevertheless, Steel does not elaborate on his reasons for 
corrective asymmetry over and above the idea that corrective 
asymmetry follows from his general mechanistic approach to 
scientific explanation. Yet reference to this general explanatory 
strategy in itself does not answer or justify the question of why 
corrective asymmetry should be adapted in the first place in the 
context of explanations of exceptions to generalizations. At the same 
time, to maintain that the lower-level sciences are more trust worthy, 
reliable, and so on in their generalizations or explanations than are 
the higher-level ones does not constitute a valid reason for corrective 
asymmetry either, because this only beg the question. It suffices to 
point out that some reasons for corrective asymmetry in the context 
of explanations of exceptions evidently have to do with the idea that 
the lower-level sciences are more comprehensive, or less complex, or 
less open than the higher-level ones. The problem is that these 
reasons can be easily contested as I argued in chapter 2.  
 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
I have argued that accounts of laws that tolerate exceptions, as 
suggested by Sandra Mitchell, Marc Lange, and many others, are 
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insufficient to redeem the lawlike status of biological generalizations. 
I have also suggested that ecological generalizations can be corrected 
and made more precise, and their exceptions can be explained within 
their own conceptual domain; in other words, these generalizations 
are distinctively ecological and autonomous insofar as their corrections 
and explanations of exceptions are concerned. 
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4 
 
INVARIANCE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the covering law account of scientific 
explanation suggested a practically relevant, historically influential, 
and strong justification for the ecological laws debate, namely, the 
idea that laws are indispensable or necessary for scientific 
explanations. There were also serious problems with this account. For 
one thing, it failed to discriminate between explanatory relevant and 
irrelevant information. In light of this and other problems, it could be 
argued that reference to generalizations‘ lawlikeness is not a sufficient 
condition for scientific explanations. The problems of the covering 
law account have been known for decades, but it has been retained 
owing to the lack of an adequate alternative.  
Another problem concerns the applicability of the covering 
law account to ecology. How are scientific explanations possible in 
ecology, given that there do not appear to be many – if any – 
ecological laws, as I argued in chapter 2? To answer this question, I 
will present and defend here a non-covering law account of scientific 
explanation – originally suggested by James Woodward – in which 
generalizations are explanatory if they are invariant rather than 
lawlike. I call this the interventionist account of causal scientific 
explanation.47 It shows that reference to lawlikeness is not even a 
                                                 
47 The account is also called the manipulationist account, although 
interventionist account is a better name for it. The term manipulation seems 
to be associated with the idea that there is an agent carrying out the 
intervention. However, any process that fulfills the criteria discussed in 
section 4.2 counts as an intervention, regardless of whether it is based on the 
agency or the activities of humans. For instance, there are natural 
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necessary condition for scientific causal explanations. Thus, I argue that 
there is an adequate alternative to the covering law account, which I 
will defend with ecology in mind.  This chapter also shows why I 
think the debate about ecological laws is a red herring. 
I proceed as follows: I first present an interventionist account 
of scientific explanation according to which it is invariance rather 
than lawlikeness that furnishes generalizations with their explanatory 
power. I then apply the account to ecological generalizations to show 
that invariance under interventions as a criterion of explanatory 
relevance yields interesting interpretations of the explanatory status of 
many ecological generalizations, such as allometries, scaling laws, and 
the species–area rule. Ecologists should find this section interesting, 
because some of them rely on (unreliable and implicit) intuitions, 
when deciding by what criteria the explanatory status of ecological 
generalizations should be evaluated. In section 4.4, I discuss the 
lawlike status of the so-called allometries and scaling laws. In section 
4.5, I distinguish between two kinds of causal explanations that I call 
simple causal claims and mechanistic explanations. I also review some 
recent definitions of mechanisms and argue that (representations of) 
mechanisms should be defined as invariant and modular. Section 4.6 
concludes.  
 
 
4.2 The Interventionist Account of Scientific Explanation 
 
The main claim of this section is that invariance is the correct relation 
of explanatory relevance in the case of causal explanations, as has 
been argued by James Woodward (2000, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; see also 
Woodward & Hitchcock 2003; Hitchcock & Woodward 2003) whose 
                                                                                                    
experiments in which the interventions are those of nature, not of 
experimenters. In other words, ―intervention‖ is not only broader in scope 
as a term than ―manipulation,‖ but also it is a more accurate term. Finally, 
with the name interventionist, I want to distance Woodward‘s non-reductive 
account of causal explanation from reductive accounts of causation that are 
called manipulationist accounts. 
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ideas I present in this section.48 In the interventionist account, causes 
are difference-makers. One should understand causes and effects as 
(representable as) variables. Many vernacular causal locutions can be 
understood to be about binary-valued variables. Causes are 
difference-makers in that they can be intervened upon to manipulate 
or control their effects.  A change in the value of a cause makes a 
difference in the value of its effect. This formulation extends to 
indeterministic contexts, where causes make a difference in the 
probability distribution of effects, such as when a drug makes a 
difference in the probability of the recovery of a patient. 
What gets here defended is a realist account of explanation as 
well. Although explanations can be reconstructed as arguments, 
explanations are not explanatory as a result of their argumentative 
structure as they are, for instance, in Carl G. Hempel‘s (1965) 
covering law account. Rather, explanations are descriptions of 
objective dependency relations between things. And the real and 
independently existing dependency relations of the world determine 
whether an explanation is true or not. Explanations are explanatory 
and true if explanations describe correctly dependency relations.  
An invariant generalization is one that continues to hold under 
a special change – called an intervention – that changes the value of its 
variables. For variable X to be explanatory with regard to variable Y,  
an invariant relation between the two is required in which 
interventions of the value of variable X change the value (or the 
probability distribution) of variable Y in accordance with the relation 
between the two variables. An invariant generalization describes what 
would happen to a value of a variable of a generalization if a value of 
one or more of its other variables were changed by an intervention. 
For instance, the ideal gas law states that at constant temperature, T, 
the pressure, P, of gas is inversely proportional to its volume, V, 
according to the equation PV = rT, where r is a constant. The ideal 
gas law describes how changes in the pressure, volume, and 
temperature of gases depend on one another and how an intervention 
                                                 
48 The account has been developed, among others, by Petri Ylikoski (2001, 
2007), Carl F. Craver (2007), and Ylikoski and Jaakko Kuorikoski (2010). 
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in one of the variables brings out changes in the others. In other 
words, the ideal gas law describes an invariant generalization. 
 An intervention is a manipulation affecting the value of Y by 
changing the value of X. It should not affect Y via a route failing to go 
through X. Nor should the intervention be correlated with the other 
causes of Y, except for those intermediate causes of Y – if there are 
such – that are between X and Y.  As long as a process has the above 
properties, it is an intervention, regardless of whether it is based on 
the agency or activities of humans (for a more detailed account of 
inte rventions, see Woodward 2000: 199-204, 2003a: 94-111). 
The interventionist account is a counterfactual account of 
scientific explanation that shows what would happen to variables of 
generalizations during interventions: how the value (or probability 
distribution) of Y would change during intervention in the value of 
variable X (see especially Woodward 2000: 205-209, 235-239, 2003a: 
187-238). What is needed for explanations are active counterfactuals in 
the form, ―if the value of the variable X of a generalization Yi = f(Xi) 
were changed by an intervention from x1 to x2, then the value of the 
variable Y would be changed from y1 to y2 in accordance with the 
relation Yi = f(Xi).‖ The ―stability‖ of a generalization under 
interventions in its variables is what matters in explanations. The 
ability to remain true under active – rather than passive – 
counterfactuals49  distinguishes explanatory generalizations from non-
explanatory ones:  
[T]he underlying idea of my account of causal explanation: we 
are in a position to explain when we have information that is 
relevant to manipulating, controlling, or changing nature, in an 
―in principle‖ manner of manipulation…. We have at least the 
beginnings of an explanation when we have identified factors 
or conditions such that manipulations or changes in those 
factors or conditions will produce changes in the outcome 
                                                 
49 Passive counterfactuals have the form ―had this-or-that background 
condition been different, a generalization would still have held‖ (see chapter 
5). I have adopted the terminology of active and passive counterfactuals 
from Woodward (2000: 235-239, 2001: 9-10, 2003a: 279-285) and 
Woodward and Hitchcock (2003: 19-21).  
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being explained. Descriptive knowledge, by contrast, is 
knowledge that, although it may provide a basis for prediction, 
classification, or more or less unified representation or 
systematization, does not provide information potentially 
relevant to manipulation.(Woodward 2003a: 9-10.) 
 
Explanations describe and exhibit how the phenomena described in 
explananda systematically depend upon the changes of explanantia. 
Invariant generalizations with their support of active counterfactuals 
provide answers to ‖what-if-things-had-been-different‖ questions 
that furnish us with understanding and explanatory information about 
phenomena. Answers to these questions provide us with information 
about how the explanandum would have changed had we changed the 
initial or boundary conditions of an invariant generalization to ―such-
and-such‖ (see Woodward 2000: 209-214, 2003a: 187-194, 196-203). 
In order for there to be an intervention and a possibility of a 
manipulation, at least some of the predicate terms of a generalization 
are required to be (representable as) variables (see Woodward 2000: 
206-209, 2003a: 111-114). If there is no well-defined notion or idea of 
what it would mean to change a value(s) of a predicate term(s) of a 
generalization, or what it means to represent its predicate terms as 
variables, then the generalization is not invariant. Let us call such 
generalizations non-change-relating.  The idea is that non-change-relating 
generalizations do not describe ―dynamic‖ relations. Generalizations 
expressing static, qualitative, or categorical relations can often be 
viewed as non-change-relating.   
Consider a generalization that is sometimes presented as a 
physical law, owing to its high degree of stability or constancy: ―all 
noble gases are chemically inert.‖ Although this generalization is 
stable in the sense that it holds in many different background 
conditions – and supports passive counterfactuals because of its 
stability –, it is not invariant, because it does not allow for a (well-
defined) change in its predicate terms. In fact, the generalization 
denies any changes in the properties of noble gases that could be 
used in the manipulation of their properties. A necessary condition for 
a generalization to count as explanatory and invariant is that it 
expresses a change-relating generalization (see Woodward 2003a: 
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245-254). 50  Although invariant generalizations are change-relating, 
not all change-relating generalizations are invariant.  
Invariance is a degree concept with a threshold (see Woodward 2000: 
214-222, 2003a: 257-265). There are generalizations that are not at all 
invariant, such as the above example of noble gases. Likewise, there 
are change-relating generalizations, such as correlations between 
factors that are joint effects of a common cause (i.e., confounding 
factors or cases of spurious causation), which are not invariant. A 
non-invariant, but change-relating relation between joint effects of a 
common cause breaks down during interventions in its effects. An 
example is the correlation between readings on a barometer and the 
occurrence of storms that correlate owing to their common cause, 
namely, the changes in atmospheric pressure: changing the value of 
one effect variable (a reading on a barometer) does not make any 
difference to the value of another effect variable (the occurrence of 
storms), although the correlation between the two can be very stable 
in the sense that it holds in many different background conditions. 
Only interventions in the value of a common cause make a difference 
to the values of the joint effects correlating.  
Above the threshold of invariance there are more or less 
invariant generalizations. Woodward calls the invariance domain the set 
or range of changes over which a generalization is invariant – the 
range over which it supports active counterfactuals (see also 
Woodward 2000: 205-209 and 2003a: 239-314). This range need not 
be universal in the sense that during all the interventions on its 
variables, a generalization holds. Typically, generalizations fail to be 
invariant under extreme values of their variables and/or under some 
background conditions. The ideal gas law, for instance, breaks down 
under extreme pressure.  
                                                 
50 Taxonomy is riddled with examples of non-change-relating 
generalizations, such as ―all crows are black,‖ ―all robins‘ eggs are greenish-
blue,‖ and ―many species of the genus Amanita are (deadly) poisonous.‖ The 
examples just mentioned are perfectly valid as classificatory and descriptive 
generalizations. In other words, ―non-change-relating‖ is not a pejorative 
label for generalizations, but can refer to legitimate, non-explanatory, but 
classificatory/descriptive generalizations. 
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There is a connection between invariance domain and 
explanatory depth (see Hitchcock & Woodward 2003). The ideal gas 
law and van der Waal‘s force law both describe how changes in the 
pressure, volume, and temperature of gases depend on one another 
and how an intervention in one of the variables brings out changes in 
the others. However, van der Waal‘s force law has a larger invariance 
domain than the ideal gas law, since it holds in conditions in which 
the ideal gas law breaks down, such as under extreme pressure. 
Consequently, it could be suggested that van der Waal‘s force law 
provides deeper explanations about the behavior of gases than do the 
ideal gas laws, because van der Waal‘s force law answers more of the 
―what-if-things-had-been-different‖ questions about the behavior of 
gases, owing to its larger invariance domain.  
As the above suggests, sometimes the invariance domain of a 
generalization is a proper subset of the invariance domain of another 
generalization. In such cases it is straightforward to claim that the 
latter generalization provides deeper explanations of their common 
explanandum than the former, because the latter answers more of the 
―what-if-things-had-been-different‖ questions about that particular 
explanandum. Nevertheless, such cases are possibly the exception 
rather than the rule; it is likely that invariance domains of many 
explanantia only intersect, which makes it more difficult to estimate 
which of the explanantia provides deeper explanations of their 
explanandum than other(s). Moreover, it is both the nature and the range 
of interventions that determine how shallow or deep are the 
explanations of generalizations offered (see Woodward 2000: 220-
222, 2003a: 257-265). This is because certain interventions are 
considered privileged or more important than others in different 
sciences or disciplines in the sense that generalizations should remain 
invariant. Let me therefore suggest that one generalization provides 
deeper explanations than another of their common explanandum if it 
remains invariant under a wider and/or more important set or range 
of interventions. However, whether a generalization remains invariant 
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during interventions is an objective fact that is unaffected by the 
considerations of importance we attach to interventions.51  
Invariance is different from generalizations‘ lawlikeness (see 
Woodward 2000: 222-228, 2003a: 265-272). There is no requirement 
that invariant generalizations should contain only purely qualitative 
predicate terms, be universal, maximally or highly stable, or belong to 
a systematic web of other generalizations, as many philosophers have 
suggested about laws. A generalization can be invariant and 
explanatory regardless of its lawlike status.  
Invariance is also different from stability (see chapter 5; see 
also Woodward 2001: 13-17, 2003a: 295-302, 2006b, 2010).  There 
are stable generalizations that are non-invariant. For instance, many 
examples of change-relating correlations between joint effects of a 
common cause can be stable in the sense that they hold in many 
different background conditions. Nevertheless, they are non-invariant 
as generalizations. Stability gives us the support of passive 
counterfactuals, whereas invariance gives us the support of active 
ones. The function of invariance has to do with providing 
explanations, manipulations, and control, whereas stability provides 
reliability and extrapolatibility (as I argue in section 5.6).  
The interventionist account has many advantageous features. It 
resolves the problems of explanatory irrelevance and asymmetry, 
which have plagued previous accounts of scientific explanation (see 
section 1.7). For instance, as an intervention, the hexing of a lump of 
table salt does not make any difference to its dissolving in water; that 
is, hexing is irrelevant for explaining why salt dissolves in water. It is 
the manipulation of the height of the flagpole that makes a difference 
in the length of the pole‘s shadow, not vice versa. The interventionist 
account allows us to speak of absences as omissions as causes and 
preventions as effects in contrast to some other accounts of scientific 
explanations (see Woodward 2003a: 86-91, 224-226), which is 
fortunate since such ―negative facts‖ are typically treated as causes 
and effects in the biological sciences. Besides being applicable to type 
                                                 
51 For discussion of other dimensions of explanatory depth between 
different explanations of an explanandum, such as precision and factual 
accuracy, see Petri Ylikoski and Jaakko Kuorikoski (2010). 
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causal claims the account applies to token or singular causal claims, 
and evidently delivers the right judgments of the traditional problems 
of causal over-determination and pre-emption  in this context (see 
Woodward 2003a: 74-86).  
The account allows for explanations of phenomena that have 
low probabilities of occurrence. Untreated syphilis is the cause of and 
can be used to explain the development of paresis, although only a 
small percentage of syphilitics develop paresis. This is because the 
incidence of paresis is higher among syphilitics who have not been 
treated than among those who have been. For a variable to count as 
an indeterministic cause of an effect, it is not required that it raise (or 
lower) the probability of the occurrence of its effect in every 
background condition, only that the variable should do this under 
some of the interventions in some background conditions (see 
Woodward 2003a: 147-149). This last feature is especially fortunate, 
since many ecological generalizations seem to lack stable probabilities 
(see section 3.4), and many ecological causes evidently are not 
unanimous in their effects.  
The interventionist account thus gives normatively right 
answers to many issues about explanations. This much cannot be said 
about any other account of scientific explanation.  
 
 
4.3 Ecological Generalizations 
 
Invariance under interventions as a criterion of explanatory relevance 
gives interesting interpretations of the explanatory status of many 
ecological generalizations,  
According to the interventionist account, many (macro-
)ecological generalizations are not explanatory, because they do not 
describe invariant relations. Putative examples include the intraspecific 
and interspecific patterns of abundance and distribution, the 
canonical distribution of abundances, and the hollow curve (see 
appendix), which represents phenomena, ―patterns,‖ or explananda 
rather than explanantia. This is because the above generalizations are 
either non-change-relating or change-relating, but not invariant 
during interventions. This is despite the fact that many of the above 
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generalizations could be stable generalizations, owing to their validity 
or holding in many different background conditions.  
Why do I claim that these generalizations are not explanatory? 
Well, it appears to be difficult to determine exactly what variables 
should be manipulated in these generalizations and exactly what kinds 
of effects the manipulation of variables should have on other 
variables mentioned in these generalizations. This suggests that the 
generalizations are non-change-relating. However, even if there were 
a well-defined notion of what is to be manipulated and of the results 
of such manipulation, I suppose that many of the above 
generalizations would break down during interventions. Thus, even if 
these generalizations represented stable and change-relating 
generalizations, they are likely to be only joint effects correlating, 
owing to their common causes, rather than invariant generalizations.  
The interventionist account gives experimentation and 
manipulation a central place in establishing and testing explanatory 
generalizations.  The interventionist account seems to accord well 
with the intuitions and practices of many ecologists concerning 
explanation and experimentation (cf. Hairston 1989). Nevertheless, 
some biologists use non-manipulative and non-experimental 
methods, such as regression equations and other correlations, to 
study phenomena. These are widely used in ecology and paleobiology, 
for instance, under the rubric of ―allometries and scaling laws.‖  
In allometries and scaling laws body size or weight is treated as 
an independent variable of anatomical, physiological, morphological, 
behavioral, life historical, ecological, or paleobiological traits of taxa 
(see Newell 1949; Rensch 1960; Gould 1966; Clutton-Brock & 
Harvey 1983; Peters 1983; McKinney 1990; Brown 1995: especially 
76-101; Marquet 2000; Marquet et al. 2005).  
Allometries and scaling laws are regression equations 
represented as power equations in which one variable changes as a 
power of another. These take the form  
Y = aWb, 
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where Y is the dependent variable (or response), W represents the 
independent (or ―explanatory‖) variable, a is the normalization 
constant, and b is the scaling exponent.52  
Depending on the value of their scaling exponents, allometries 
and scaling laws are called either allometric (b  1) or isometric (b 
=1). Scaling exponents can take both negative and positive values. In 
general, the larger the value of b, the faster Y increases (if b is positive 
in value) or decreases (if b is negative in value) with increasing W. If 
the scaling exponent, b, is less than unity, then Y increases (or 
decreases if negative in value) more slowly than W. After logarithmic 
transformation the above equations become linear and yield straight 
lines on double log axes, where a gives the intercept or elevation of 
the regression line and b, its slope (see Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 I have omitted error terms that represent variation in the dependent 
variable, owing to other possible independent variables and measurement 
errors in the independent variable. 
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Two regression lines with 
different b values, but 
with the same value of a   
Two regression lines 
with different a values, 
but with the same value 
of b   
Fig. 1. Illustration of the effects of different values of constant a and b on 
regression lines. The constant a gives the elevation of the regression line, 
and b gives its slope.  
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There is a plenitude of biological traits that correlate with body size, 
W, and can be represented as dependent variables, Y. Robert Henry 
Peters (1983) has provided hundreds of examples of allometries and 
scaling laws. Some of the more common are the following:  
1) Energy use is unaffected by body size: according to the 
energy equivalence rule, the energy use of all species 
(populations) in each size class tends to be equal, scales as aW0  
2) Fasting endurance scales as aW0.44 for mammals and 
between aW0.40 and aW0.60 in birds 
3) The size of the home range of birds and mammals varies 
positively with body size, aW1 
4) The inverse scaling rule: the maximum density, D, of 
herbivorous mammals declines as their body size increases, D 
= aW-0.75 
5) The thinning rule for plants, where D is density, is W = 
aD-1.33  
6) The body size frequency distribution of a taxon: species 
number declines with body size  
7) Kleiber’s rule: basal metabolism, an estimate of the 
energy required by an individual for the basic processes of 
living, varies as aW0.75 
8)  An Individual‘s total energy consumption varies as 
aW0.75 
9)  In most mammal groups gut volume is isometric to W, 
aW1  
10)  Blood volume varies as aW1 
11)  Blood circulation time varies as aW0.25 
12)  Heart rate varies as aW-0.25 
13)  Respiratory rate varies as aW-0.25 
14)  Mammal brain weight (excluding primates) varies as aW 
0.70 (a =   0.01) 
15)  Monkey brain weight varies as aW0.66 (a = 0.03) 
16)  Brain weight in man varies as aW0.66 (a = 0.09) 
17)  In mammals within species sociality increases with body 
size  
18)  Group behavior increases with body size in mammals  
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There are some interesting general patterns in these regressions (see 
Gould 1966 and Peters 1983). For instance, there is a constant scaling 
exponent, b (approximately 0.75) for regressions describing different 
kinds of biological rates that scale with W. Moreover, many biological 
frequencies scale as aW-0.25, biological times as aW0.25, and biological 
volumes as aW1.  The phenomenon that there are these constant 
scaling exponents is sometimes called the ―similitude principle.‖ 
Below are some general reasons to be suspicious of 
explanatory and causal relevance of some allometries and scaling laws. 
There are other problems with these regression equations that I will 
not take up here. For instance, I do not discuss the statistical 
problems and the problems of fitting data to regressions that are 
relevant in interpreting allometries and scaling laws and that affect 
their reliability (see Gould 1966, Peters 1983: 10-21, McKinney 1990). 
Nor do I discuss the adaptive significance of allometries and scaling 
laws (see Rensch 1960, Bonner 1968, and Clutton-Brock & Harvey 
1983). 
Even though we know that correlation is not intimately or 
necessarily connected to causation, in practical terms this dictum is 
sometimes forgotten in the allometry and scaling law literature. In 
this literature, body size as an independent variable is sometimes 
claimed to explain (a major) part of the variation in the dependent 
variable. How much it explains is dependent on the indices of fit, e.g., 
on the value of r2.  According to the interventionst account defended, 
however, correlations by themselves are not explanatory, regardless 
of how strong and/or stable the connection between the correlating 
factors is. For a correlation to be explanatory there has to be an 
intervention during which the relation between factors remains 
invariant.  
In many cases ―body size‖ is used as an independent variable, 
owing to convenience. Body size is relatively easy to quantify, 
compare, and estimate from fossil parts and other field samples. As a 
result of its convenient features, body size is often not intended to be 
a cause variable, but a proxy for or a correlate of other features that 
are not so easy to quantify, compare, or estimate and which represent 
the real causes. This becomes a problem if body size is subsequently 
interpreted to be the cause variable. It is problematic  because using 
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body size in this manner is not only causally inaccurate and false, but 
also misleading insofar as we are searching for ways to intervene in 
nature. Another problem arises when the use of body size as a proxy 
hides the fact that the real causes of allometries and scaling laws are 
not well defined as variables (see below).  
Sometimes it is not easy to understand how some allometries 
and scaling laws represent change-relating generalizations. Sometimes 
the dependent variable in allometries and scaling laws is such that it is 
difficult to understand what it means to change its value and/or what 
its different values would be. In other words, the problem is how 
dependent variables are to be represented as variables that have well-
defined values. Consider, for instance, the two regressions presented 
above that relate body size to ―within species sociality‖ and ―group 
behavior.‖ These generalizations are possibly non-change-relating, 
because what is meant by ―within species sociality‖ or ―group 
behavior‖ as variables appears not be well defined. If this is true, then 
it follows that it is unclear how changes in the value of an 
independent variable affect the dependent variables, simply owing to 
the fact that the dependent variables are not well defined. 
What has been said about dependent variables applies to 
independent variables as well. As was just discussed, body size is often 
used as a proxy for the real causes of dependent variables of 
allometries and scaling laws that are not so easy to quantify, estimate, 
and so on. In fact, precisely because the real causes are not well-
defined as variables, body size is apparently sometimes used as a 
proxy. Such use is inappropriate, since it hides the fact that the 
allometries and scaling laws in question are non-change relating as 
generalizations.  
If a generalization cannot be tested for how it might behave 
during interventions in or manipulations with its variables, then the 
claims made about its explanatory status should be treated with 
suspicion. The unfortunate fact in this context is that testing whether 
ecological and paleobiological regression equations represent 
invariant generalizations is often difficult purely for scale-related 
reasons (cf. large ecosystems studies and paleobiological allometries 
and scaling laws) and owing to many ethical, technical, and other 
reasons. 
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When the problems above can be avoided, it is quite likely that 
many allometries and scaling laws turn out to be change-relating but 
non-invariant during interventions. Thus, even though many 
allometries and scaling laws represent change-relating generalizations, 
it is quite possible that they might be joint effects correlating, owing 
to their common causes – that is, accidents that hold because of their 
common causes. Even if we find that some of these generalizations 
are change-relating and invariant, allometries and scaling laws seem to 
offer rather shallow and superficial explanations – or ―simple causal 
claims‖ – that need to be supplemented with information about the 
mechanisms that underlie them (see section 4.5).  
In principle, I have nothing against the idea that regression 
equations may be causal or explanatory. Again, whether these 
relations remain invariant during their interventions is the objective 
criterion that determines whether they are explanatory or not. It is the 
naïve use of regressions encountered in the literature that I object to 
here.53 
                                                 
53 Another role of allometries and scaling laws is using body size as a 
predictive tool. It is trivial that ―mere correlations‖ (or change-relating, but 
non-invariant generalizations) can be used to make successful predictions. In 
other words, a causal or explanatory interpretation of allometries and scaling 
laws is not a necessary condition for their functioning in making predictions. 
I have nothing against the idea that allometries and scaling laws function in 
making predictions. At the same time, this role should be adopted with some 
important qualifications.  Body size as an independent variable typically 
―explains‖ only part of the variation in the dependent variable of allometries 
and scaling laws. The presence of this residual variation around the 
regression lines shows that, for successful and accurate predictions, other 
independent variables are needed in addition to body size. Moreover, the 
predictive power of regression equations can be more a function of their 
statistical fitting than the fact that the equations describe data or phenomena 
correctly. In other words, it is often not true that allometries and scaling laws 
can be used to make successful or accurate predictions. Furthermore, 
although mere correlations can be used to make predictions, it is not true 
that all the predictions are equally good, reliable, or illuminating. Mere 
correlations represent accidents that hold, owing to common causes and 
certain background conditions. Predictions based on invariant 
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There is, nevertheless, another important function that the 
regression studies mentioned above have. Many allometries and 
scaling laws should be understood as elucidating phenomena from data – 
they reveal, describe, and classify phenomena-to-be-explained rather 
than things that do the explaining. This function is not to be 
overlooked. For instance, if the energy equivalency rule is generally 
true (i.e., it has a large scope and/or is very stable), then it is 
interesting as an object of explanation that would have other 
interesting implications. As another example, homeotherms, 
poikilotherms, and unicellular organisms have different a values in 
equations that relate their metabolic rates to body size. In the 
equation for a basal metabolic rate (Kleiber‘s rule), which scales with 
body size as aW0.75 in these taxa, the values of a are 4.1, 0.14, and 
0.018 for homeotherms, poikilotherms, and unicellular organisms 
(Peters 1983: 29-30). Rather than indicating explanatory 
generalizations, these generalizations represent interesting objects of 
explanation. Why is it that unicellular organisms have the lowest 
values of a in such equations? How and why do homeotherms 
metabolize at a higher level (and thus seem to utilize and exhaust 
relatively more resources) than poikilotherms and unicellular 
organisms of similar size? 
Does the claim that some allometries and scaling laws 
represent only phenomena-to-be-explained (or explananda) rather than 
things that do the explaining (or explanantia) cast a shadow over 
allometry and scaling law studies? No. A science or discipline without 
interesting explananda lacks the potential to progress and mature. In 
this respect these studies show a great potential. 
It is easy to criticize the ideas presented above by suggesting 
that there is a ―mathematical sense‖ of explanation according to 
                                                                                                    
generalizations are more than accidents, and invariant generalizations often 
lead to more reliable and illuminating predictions. In other words, mere 
correlations seem to provide the bases for fragile and unreliable predictions. 
Consequently, it is at least desirable to have predictions based on invariant 
generalizations. This shows that the issue concerning the explanatory status 
of allometries and scaling laws is relevant in the context of making 
predictions.  
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which allometries and scaling laws are explanatory, regardless of their 
explanatory status in the context of causal explanations. One problem 
with this suggestion is that it is difficult to explicate what this 
mathematical sense of explanation consists of or to develop this 
sense into a full-blown account of mathematical explanation (see, for 
instance, Sandborg 1998 and Mancosu 2008). There is one account of 
scientific explanation that perhaps could used, namely, the unification 
account by Philip Kitcher (1989). But Kitcher‘s account has faced 
serious difficulties in the context of non-mathematical explanations 
(see section 1.8), which suggests that it is defective as a general 
account of scientific explanation. Nor has the unification account 
been properly applied to mathematics to determine how well it 
accounts for the mathematical sense of explanation. In other words, 
the ―mathematical sense‖ of explanation rests on undeveloped ideas 
and (unreliable) intuitions. Furthermore, the idea of a mathematical 
sense of explanations is evidently not first and foremost to show how 
regression equations could be explanatory ―in the non-causal sense of 
the word,‖ but rather to explain how and under which conditions 
such mathematical activities could be explanatory as providing proofs 
and solving equations. Finally, allometries and scaling laws should be 
dealt with in the context of non-mathematical explanations, since the 
authors who discuss them interpret allometries and scaling laws as 
providing non-mathematical explanations of phenomena; in other 
words, they are often interpreted to be about the causal relations 
between body size and the dependent variables mentioned in 
allometries and scaling laws. I have nothing against the idea that there 
should be mathematical explanations that differ from causal 
explanations. Another dissertation would be needed to explore the 
legitimacy of this account fully.  
As another example, consider the species–area rule. 
According to this rule, the number of species varies with the area of 
an island or habitat, where this relation can be presented as a power 
equation, S=cAz, in which S is the number of species of a given 
taxonomic group, A is the area of the island or habitat, and c and z 
are (fitted) constants. There appears to be an invariant relation 
between the variables area and species diversity (see Simberloff 
1976b) despite the fact that the mechanism(s) behind the rule are 
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disputed (see Simberloff 1974, 1976b; Diamond 1975; Connor & 
McCoy 1979; Gilbert 1980; Williamson 1989a; Lawton 1996). 
According to a rule of thumb, the manipulation of an area of an 
island or habitat that ten-fold it, doubles the species diversity. The 
explanatory status of the species–area rule does not depend on there 
being a generalization that is universally true that holds in many or 
most background conditions, and that has no exceptions (see Cook 
1974, Gilbert 1980). In other words, it does not depend on the 
putative lawlike status of this rule as some authors believe (see 
Simberloff 1974; Lawton 1996, 1999; Lange 2005). Rather it depends 
on whether the rule is invariant during its interventions or not.  
Some other putative examples of invariant ecological 
generalizations include the area rule of the equilibrium theory of 
island biogeography, the distance rule of the equilibrium theory of 
island biogeography, the diversity–stability rule, and the 
endemicity rule of the equilibrium theory of island biogeography.  
According to the area rule, an island‘s extinction or turnover rates 
depend on the island‘s size. When an area of an island is decreased 
(or increased), its species extinction rate is increased (or decreased). 
According to the distance rule, the immigration rates of islands 
depend on their distance from the continental source of the 
immigrant species. When the degree of isolation from the source 
region(s) of an island is increased (or decreased), its immigration rate 
is reduced (or increased). According to the diversity–stability rule, 
increased (alpha, beta, and/or gamma) diversity enhances 
(population, community, and/or ecosystem) stability.   
 
 
4.4 Allometries and Scaling Laws Interpreted as Laws 
 
Some biologists and philosophers think of allometries and scaling 
laws as representing biological laws because of their apparent 
generality and non-contingency (see Rensch 1960, Peters 1983, 
Marquet 2000, Marquet et al. 2005, Elgin 2006). This is a wrong 
interpretation as I demonstrate below.  
Against the prevailing opinion among many scientists and 
philosophers that there are no universal, exceptionless, strict, empirical, or 
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distinctively biological laws, Mehmet Elgin (2006) suggests that certain 
allometries and scaling laws could well be examples of such laws. For 
Elgin, allometries and scaling laws are biophysical laws: generalizations 
or statements of these that, in their antecedents, describe physical and 
chemical conditions, whereas their consequents describe biological 
properties that hold because the conditions mentioned in their 
antecedents hold (and are selected for): 
The form of such laws is as follows: given certain physical 
constraint p and under certain specifiable conditions c, all 
organisms exhibit behavior b where p is a physical property, c 
may be physical, chemical or biological property and b is a 
biological property. (Elgin 2006: 130.) 
 
These biophysical laws of Elgin are allometries and scaling laws to 
which the above kinds of antecedents are added, and which, 
according to Elgin, yield biological lawlike generalizations.  The idea 
seems to be that, say, Kleiber’s rule or the inverse scaling rule holds 
because certain physical or chemical constraints or conditions, p, 
hold. 
Elgin argues forcefully for the biological distinctiveness of these 
laws. This is understandable, since the problem in his position is that 
his examples of laws appear non-biological, owing to their non-
biological antecedents. Thus, Elgin could not have shown that there 
are biological laws. I am not going to discuss this aspect of Elgin‘s 
project. Let us grant for the sake of the argument that his biophysical 
laws are distinctively biological. In lieu of arguing for their biological 
distinctiveness, Elgin should have argued for their strictness, universality, 
lack of exceptions, and lawlikeness, as I will show next.  
First I will take up the strictness of Elgin‘s laws.  
Elgin advocates a view that appears similar to Elliot Sober‘s 
answer (1997: S462-S465) to John Beatty‘s (1995) evolutionary 
contingency thesis. Responding to Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency 
thesis, Sober (1997: S462-S465) replied that Beatty had failed to 
recognize that laws do not hold outside their application domain. 
And when such a domain is added to a statement of law, the result is 
a statement that is not contingent. For instance, the Hardy–
Weinberg rule is restricted to situations in which ―there are no 
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evolutionary forces present.‖ Let ―I‖ denote this applicability clause. 
When there are evolutionary forces present, the rule does not apply. 
Let us write this rule as a statement in a universal form, x(FxGx). 
According to Sober, we get a non-contingent statement if we add the 
clause ―I‖ as an antecedent to the statement of Hardy–Weinberg rule. 
In other words, the statement ―I  (x(FxGx))‖ as a whole is not 
contingent, although both of its components ―I‖ and ―x(FxGx)‖ 
could be.  
Although Sober‘s reply to the evolutionary contingency thesis 
is not the same as the ceteris paribus account of laws, the two are 
similar. In both, the applicability of a law is restricted by a protective 
clause that specifies in very general (and non-committal) terms those 
conditions under which the law in question is expected to apply to a 
situation. Likewise both intend to show that ―contingency‖ of 
biological generalizations can be avoided by adding an applicability 
condition to the statements of laws. 
If then, as Elgin‘s passage quoted above suggests, the idea of 
Elgin‘s laws can be written ―p  (x(cxbx)),‖ where p represents 
those physical and chemical conditions that guarantee the holding of 
the included biological (strict) generalization, x(cxbx),  then 
apparently the resulting view is similar to Sober’s view in which Elgin‘s 
p‘s are Sober‘s I‘s.  In other words, biophysical laws hold and are non-
contingent, according to Elgin, when and if their p‘s are satisfied, that 
is, certain non-biological conditions guarantee the holding of 
biological generalizations.  
Not only is Sober’s reply to the evolutionary contingency thesis 
similar to the ceteris paribus account of laws, but they also apparently 
share similar problems. This creates two difficulties for Elgin’s view. 
First, it suggests that Elgin‘s laws are (similar to) ceteris paribus laws 
rather than strict ones because Elgin‘s view appears to be similar to 
Sober‘s view. However, this is contrary to what Elgin believes and 
suggests, because he seems to think that his biophysical laws are 
strict. Second, the problems that plague the ceteris paribus account of 
laws apparently plague Elgin‘s view as well, which suggest that Elgin‘s 
project is unlikely to succeed, because the ceteris paribus account of 
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laws is encumbered by problems that we are unlikely to overcome 
(see section 3.5).    
There is perhaps a way around these problems. Elgin‘s idea 
could be that his biophysical laws are  strict after all, because their 
applicability domains or ceteris paribus clauses, that is, the p‘s of Elgin‘s 
biophysical laws, can be discharged or eliminated at least in principle, 
since we can explain them or give explanations as to why they hold.  
There is some evidence that the above is Elgin‘s strategy. For 
instance, Elgin claims that there are explanations for the constancy of 
scaling exponents of some allometries and scaling laws. In this 
context Elgin is referring to a phenomenon that can be called the 
similitude principle.  I do not think that reference to this principle 
offers a good argument to avoid the problems mentioned above. 
However, before I take up my objections to this argument, I will first 
turn to the claim that allometries and scaling laws represent lawlike, 
universal, exceptionless, general, stable, non-contingent, and/ or 
constant generalizations.  
Although allometries and scaling laws appear to be 
generalizations applying to many taxa, they are neither universal nor 
exceptionless. There are hundreds of examples of these 
generalizations in the literature. In fact there appear to be exceptions 
to all of them. Nor are these regressions universal in the sense that 
they apply to all taxa. There is a strong correlation between ―density‖ 
and ―body size‖ across motile taxa, a phenomenon that is called the 
inverse scaling rule. There is a similar strong correlation for plants 
and other sessile organisms between these two variables, but the 
relation is hypothesized to be the opposite: it is the density of 
populations that is treated as the independent variable affecting body 
size. And there seem to be good reasons why this thinning rule, 
rather than the inverse scaling rule, applies to sessile organisms.  
Consider, for instance, green plants. There should be intense 
competition both within and between green plant species because all 
these compete for a limited set of critical resources (light, water, and 
similar nutrients). Thus, the thinning rule might hold because there is 
intense competition within and between the species for resources that 
these organisms cannot evade or avoid by migration (in their adult 
forms) as motile organisms can. The fact that in one generalization 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
 
 
135 
another‘s dependent variable is another‘s independent variable spells 
trouble only if one thinks along traditional lines of lawlikeness 
according to which laws are universal in scope. 
Nor are the constants in allometries and scaling laws, namely 
the normalization constant, a, and the scaling exponent, b, truly 
constant, stable, or universal in character. In fact, these constants 
refer implicitly to particulars in values, that this, to the data from which 
they were derived. This is, however, not the point I want to make. My 
point is that these constants vary in value across different taxa and 
background conditions. These a‘s and b‘s in biological regressions are 
not immutable constants of nature.  
For instance, homeotherms, poikilotherms, and unicellular 
organisms have different a values in equations that relate their 
metabolic rates to body size. For example, in the equation for a basal 
metabolic rate (Kleiber’s rule), which scales with body size as aW0.75 
in these taxa, the values of a are 4.1, 0.14, and 0.018 for 
homeotherms, poikilotherms and unicellular organisms (Peters 1983: 
29-30). Rather than indicating universal or covering laws with 
immutable constants, these values and their variance suggest that the 
generalizations represent interesting explananda (as was already argued 
in section 4.3). What has just been said is also true of other 
allometries and scaling laws: the values of their a‘s vary across 
different taxa and/or background conditions. 
But perhaps the variance of a values is not that revealing, since 
fixed or similar values of b‘s give the appearance of qualitative similar 
trends in data, especially when the data are plotted on double-log 
axes. Yet, the variance in the values of b‘s should be revealing:  
Variance in b values shows that there are qualitatively different trends 
among taxa and not just differences in the ―elevation‖ in the 
regression lines. This is because the variance in b values amounts to 
different slopes in the regression lines (see Fig. 1). Thus, biological 
regression equations exhibit qualitatively different trends among taxa 
if there is variation in their b‘s. 
And there is considerable variation in the values of b‘s in many 
regression equations. For instance, the above regressions for brain 
weights (section 4.3) vary among taxa with respect both to their 
normalization constants, a, and scaling exponents, b. The inverse 
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scaling rule‘s b is said to be -0.75 for herbivorous mammals and/ or 
within trophic levels, but it is close to -1 for animals in general. These 
two regressions with different b values exhibit different phenomena 
with different implications, for instance, for the energy equivalence 
rule (see Damuth 1981, 1991; Peters 1983: 169-170; Brown 1995: 95-
99; Marquet 2000, Marquet et al. 2005: 1754-1756). 
These values of a‘s and b‘s in regression equations are not only 
taxa- or data-specific. In general, the value of a‘s and b‘s varies with 
respect to how one partitions the ―reference class‖ in question. These 
reference classes can be divided more or less explicitly, e.g., by taking 
into account the taxonomy, latitude, ecology, metabolic classes, mode 
of reproduction or locomotion, levels of activities, trophic position, 
diet, habitat, ambient temperature and so on.  
Again, that the values of a and b vary among many such 
partitions suggests that there are no universal or stable generalizations 
with immutable constants coming from such partitions nor are there 
perhaps qualitatively similar trends among them. Furthermore, in 
many cases it is the variations in data and its patterns that are more 
interesting as objects of explanations rather than the general and 
average or mean trends or the fitted regression lines and their 
constants (cf. Brown 1995 for examples). 
Now I have admitted that there are some allometries and 
scaling laws that seem to have constant b values. I am referring to 
those that deal with biological rates, volumes and the like. In the 
previous section, I called this the similitude principle. Note, first, that 
the similitude principle is true, however, only as far as the mean values 
of b‘s are considered; individual b values apparently do vary. But 
suppose for the sake of argument that b values in the regressions 
having to do with biological rates, volumes and so on, vary 
considerably less than in other allometries and scaling laws for which 
this principle is not true, that is, that do not deal with biological rates, 
volumes, times, and frequencies.  
Elgin is aware that there are these constant values of b‘s in 
some regressions. With this knowledge he could try to establish that 
some allometries and scaling laws are universal or strict because there 
are physical, chemical, and geometrical explanations for why these 
constant and general values in (the means of) b‘s are found among 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
 
 
137 
different taxa. This brings us back to the idea of explaining 
applicability domains or ceteris paribus clauses of laws and showing 
how these could be strict laws with immutable constants. The fact is, 
however, that the importance and generality of the similitude 
principle is neither known nor well-established contrary to what Elgin 
assumes. In addition, the many explanations offered for this 
phenomenon have been found to be speculative or defective in the 
literature (cf., for instance, Peters 1983: 213-226). Unfortunately and 
revealingly, Elgin cites no critical discussion of the explanations of 
the similitude principle. 
Moreover, these equations represent evolutionary contingent 
generalizations. In other words, allometries and scaling laws do 
encounter Beatty‘s (1995) evolutionary contingency thesis, which 
apparently threatens their lawlike status (section 2.6). In general and 
for instance, the coefficients or constants of allometries and scaling 
laws do not remain constant, but are subject to natural selection in 
values in contrast to what Elgin seems to assume (see Newell 1949: 
123 and Gould 1966: 603-604, 616-621). Consider, for instance, a 
species of an ungulate for which there has been an evolutionary trend 
to increase body size and for which the size of the antlers scales or 
correlates strongly and positively with body size. Eventually this 
would lead to the size of the antlers of the species becoming so large 
as to become unwieldy and disadvantageous, as presumably happened 
with the Irish Elk, Megaloceros giganteus. In such a situation one would 
expect that there is strong selection pressure to change the value of b 
in the correlation between its body size and the size of its antlers, or 
otherwise the species becomes extinct. 
The moral is that although for many animal taxa there has been 
a general evolutionary trend toward larger body size (a phenomenon 
that is known in the literature as Cope’s rule), the destiny of the Irish 
Elk is an exception rather than the rule among them. That is, 
evolutionary pressure evidently has prevented their feet, tail, ears, bill, 
and other protruding body parts, which typically scale positively but 
non-isometrically with their body size, from increasing out of proportion 
and becoming disadvantageous to them.  
I hope to have shown why we should not think of allometries 
and scaling laws are representing (strict or non-strict) biological laws. 
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Why is it that some think that these should represent laws in the first 
place? What is the justification behind such claims? The answer 
apparently lies in the view that many still have, namely, that laws are 
necessary for scientific explanation  – an idea that I have questioned 
in this chapter.  
 
 
4.5 Simple Causal Claims and Mechanistic Explanations 
 
A frequently raised claim is that ecologists explain phenomena or 
patterns by mechanisms.54 Yet ecologists have not given us 
definitions of mechanisms. For them, the concept is evidently 
pragmatic: mechanisms are things – whatever they are – doing the 
explaining of phenomena. Ecologists likewise speak of causes and 
processes as something explaining phenomena (or ―patterns‖) 
without being explicit about what the causes or processes are.55  
There is a distinction in the philosophical literature between 
two kinds of causal explanation, which I shall call ―simple causal 
claims‖ and ―mechanistic explanations.‖ A simple causal claim 
describes the causal connection between the phenomenon-to-be-
explained and the thing that does the explaining. It refers to a 
―phenomenological‖ or superficial causal explanation in which one 
has an invariant relation between variables, but no account – or 
mechanistic explanation – as to why or how the relation holds 
between the variables.  
The account of explanation presented above describes how 
simple causal claims function by identifying what is required of a 
causal dependency relation to be explanatory. That is, simple causal 
claims need to be invariant during interventions. Describing a 
                                                 
54 See, for instance, Brown (1995: 119-187), Gaston (1996), Blackburn et al. 
(1999: 170-172), and Ashton et al. (2000: 406-410). 
55 In the interventionist account defended here, causes are difference-makers 
in that they can be intervened upon to manipulate or control their effects. 
Consequently, the species-area rule, for instance, can be called a causal 
generalization, if it is true that an intervention in an area of a habitat makes a 
difference in its species diversity. 
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mechanism of a phenomenon is not something that is contrary to 
describing what the causal dependency relation of a simple causal 
claim of that phenomenon is. Instead, a mechanistic explanation is a 
complement to a simple causal claim, since it describes how the 
dependency relation produces its phenomenon-to-be-explained.  
A mechanistic explanation describes the internal causal 
structure of the phenomenon-to-be-explained. It describes the 
underlying mechanism within the system by showing how the system 
is constituted and how this produces the phenomenon-to-be-
explained. Mechanistic explanations are causal and bottom-up 
explanations. Mechanistic explanations or representations of them are 
explanatory and true if they correctly describe the mechanisms in 
nature.  
Recently, interest has revived in mechanisms in the philosophy 
of science. Previous philosophers had usually considered the concept 
to be primitive and had failed to define mechanisms (cf. Wimsatt 
1976) and/or investigated mechanisms as the physical sciences in 
mind. For instance, Wesley C. Salmon (1984, 1989, 1994) gave no 
definition of mechanisms. Moreover, his causal processes interacting, 
which evidently constituted his mechanisms, were discussed with the 
physical sciences in mind. And there are serious doubts about 
whether his ideas concerning causal processes can be extended or 
applied to the biological sciences. Finally, there are serious difficulties 
with Salmon‘s causal-mechanical account of explanation that suggest 
it is not successful as an account (see Kitcher 1989: 459-477 and 
Hitchcock 1995). Thus, previous philosophers shed no light on the 
questions of what mechanisms are in biology or ecology and how 
they furnish us with explanations or understanding of phenomena 
there.   
Fortunately, there are some recent (non-Salmonian) definitions 
of (biological) mechanisms in the philosophical literature. The most 
well-known is the one given by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and 
Carl F. Craver (2000: 3):  
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they 
are productive of regular change from start or set-up to finish 
or termination conditions.  
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I have no doubt that these authors give a more or less accurate 
description of mechanisms at least in such biological disciplines as 
neurobiology, molecular biology, cytology, and perhaps even ecology 
(see Pâslaru 2009). However, I have one problem with their 
definition; namely, they do not tie their definition to any account of 
scientific explanation that would tell how or under what conditions 
(descriptions of) mechanisms are explanatory. This makes their definition of 
mechanisms normatively shallow or unenlightening. This same 
problem applies to other recent definitions of mechanisms that are, in 
other respects, different. For instance, it applies to William Bechtel 
and Adele Abrahamsen‘s (2005) definition of mechanisms and to 
Stuart Glennan‘s (1996).56  
Thus, the problem is not so much that of giving accurate 
definitions or descriptions of mechanisms in the biological sciences, 
but to come with an account of mechanistic explanation. As a 
solution to the latter problem, I suggest that we adopt James 
Woodward‘s definition of (representations of) mechanisms, which 
ties mechanisms to the account of scientific explanation presented 
                                                 
56 Now, it is true that, for instance, Stuart Glennan (2005) and Carl F. Craver 
(2007: 107-162) have, in their more recent and revised definitions of 
mechanisms, also defended ―Woodwardian‖ definitions of mechanisms as I 
do below by emphasizing that the behavior of components of mechanisms 
should be describable by invariant generalizations. However, neither 
Glennan nor Craver have defended Woodward‘s modularity condition and 
neither of them discuss mechanistic explanations in the context of ecology 
as I do here. There is one paper that discusses mechanisms in ecology as 
well as their modularity, namely, Viorel Pâslaru‘s (2009).  Pâslaru claims that 
Woodward‘s definition of mechanisms (to be defended in this section) is not 
sufficient for ecologists. Instead, he suggests, ecologists seek something 
similar to the definition of Machamer et al. (2000) as the correct description 
of their mechanisms. This observation may be correct. However, there is 
one problem in Pâslaru‘s paper. Pâslaru also seems to confuse the 
description or definition of mechanisms (and/or the fact that mechanistic 
explanations need to be ―anchored‖ in entities, activities, and their 
organization) with the normative account of mechanistic explanation. The 
latter is discussed here, not the former. 
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above by emphasizing the modularity of components of mechanisms 
and invariance as the activity of the components:  
(MECH) a necessary condition for a representation to be an 
acceptable model of a mechanism is that the representation (i) 
describe an organized or structured set of parts or 
components, where (ii) the behavior of each component is 
described by a generalization that is invariant under 
interventions, and where (iii) the generalizations governing 
each component are also independently changeable, and where 
(iv) the representation allows us to see how, in virtue of (i), (ii) 
and (iii), the overall output of the mechanism will vary under 
manipulation of the input to each component and changes in 
the components themselves. (Woodward 2002: S375.)  
 
One can think of a representation of a mechanism as a modular 
system of invariant generalizations or equations. Modularity can be 
understood to do with ―the separability of different causal 
contributions to an overall effect‖ (Mitchell 2008: 699). In a modular 
system it is possible – at least in principle – to intervene in a variable 
of some generalization or equation without interfering or disturbing 
other generalizations or equations of that system. In other words, a 
component of a mechanism should be independently changeable with its 
other components (for a detailed presentation of the modularity 
condition, see Woodward 2003a: 327-342; see also Hausman & 
Woodward 1999, 2004; Cartwright 2002; Steel 2006).  
Physical mechanisms are governed by physical forces. 
Consider physical component forces of Newtonian theory, such as 
gravitation and electricity, which have effects on the acceleration of 
massive bodies. As far as we know, these physical component forces 
are such that that we can intervene on one of these forces, say, 
gravitation (as in Newton‘s law of gravitation) without interfering 
with other such forces, say, electricity (as in Coulomb‘s law). In other 
words, it is possible to intervene on a mass of a system without 
affecting its charge. Thus, physical component forces are 
independently changeable or modular. I will assume that many 
ecological ―component forces,‖ such as competition and predation, 
are modular as well.  
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If a component of (a representation of) a mechanism is not 
modular under an intervention, then it is possible that one has 
misrepresented or mis-decomposed the mechanism into components. 
Likewise, a non-modular system cannot be used to provide answers 
to ―what-if-things-had-been-different‖ questions that provide us with 
understanding and explanatory information about the phenomenon-
to-be-explained. The reason for this is that in a non-modular system, 
interventions are not ―surgical‖ in the sense that they would affect 
only the intervened-upon component, but they affect other 
components of the system as well, with unpredictable effects on the 
system‘s behavior.  
There are counterexamples to the above definition. Some 
(biological) mechanisms are not modular in any general and/or 
absolute sense, but are non-modular under some interventions. 
Nancy Cartwright (2004: 807-811) and Sandra Mitchell (2008) think 
that this ruins the above definition. However, modularity as a 
condition should not be understood in an absolute or ―either/or‖ 
sense, but as a degree condition of components, in contrast to above 
authors.  It is likewise not a condition evaluated in isolation, but in 
comparison to interventions, for some interventions are more likely 
to be ―structure-altering‖ than others (see Steel 2008: 154-160 for an 
interesting general discussion with examples). Thus, it is a mistake to 
think of modularity as a general, unconditional, and non-relative 
condition of (representations of) components of mechanisms or to 
claim that because some (biological) mechanisms are not modular 
under some interventions, modularity as a condition is questioned.  
Examples of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations from 
philosophers of biology typically come from genetics, molecular 
biology, and neurobiology. We philosophers seem to be enthusiastic 
about such paradigmatic examples of mechanisms as photosynthesis 
(Tabery 2005: 4-8), the Krebs cycle (Perini 2005: 260-265), protein 
synthesis or the central dogma of molecular biology (Machamer et al. 
2000: 18-21; Darden 2002, 2005), cellular respiration or metabolism 
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005), Mendel‘s rules and Mendelian 
genetics (Glennan 2005: 446, Darden 2005), action potentials and 
synaptic plasticity (Craver 2002: S85-S88 and 2007; Bogen 2005), and 
the replication of HIV (Steel 2008: 55-58).  
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Many ecological mechanisms are not well known. In fact, most 
mechanistic explanations in ecology are undetermined by data or 
lacking in data (see Pianka 1966, whose paper is representative of 
ecological mechanistic explanations even today). Thus, many causal 
explanations in ecology are simple causal claims in the sense that 
there are no known or confirmed mechanistic explanations, for how 
the causes in these explanations produce their effects. This is true, for 
instance, of the species-area rule in which the ―area‖ seems to be a 
cause of ―species diversity,‖ although we do know exactly why or 
how because the mechanism(s) behind this rule are disputed and 
under discussion. When ecology is contrasted with other biological 
disciplines, such as genetics, molecular biology, and neurobiology, in 
which the mechanistic aspects of explanations seem to be more 
prominent, ecological causal explanations appear to be 
―phenomenological‖ invariant generalizations whose mechanistic 
aspects remain to be discovered. This is the reason why I am unable 
to provide the reader with a paradigmatic example of an ecological 
mechanism or mechanistic explanation (but see Pâslaru 2009). Yet it 
is not my task to provide these, but rather it is the task of ecologists. 
My task was to discuss and defend an account of mechanistic 
explanation.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
I have defended a non-covering law account of scientific explanation. 
According to it, it is the invariance of generalizations rather than their 
lawlikeness that gives generalizations explanatory power. An invariant 
generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change – 
called an intervention – that changes the value of its variables. A 
generalization can be invariant and explanatory regardless of its 
lawlike status. There is no requirement that invariant generalizations 
should contain only purely qualitative predicate terms, be universal, 
maximally or highly stable, or belong to a systematic web of other 
generalizations, as many philosophers have suggested about laws. The 
interventionist account also provided some interesting interpretations 
of the explanatory status of ecological generalizations, such as 
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allometries and scaling laws. The nature of mechanistic explanations 
in ecology was likewise discussed. 
The interventionist account of explanation strengthens my 
argument for the same-level explanations of exceptions to ecological 
generalizations (section 3.6) by showing that explanations at higher 
levels can be explanatory to begin with. Whether a generalization 
remains invariant during its interventions is the criterion that 
determines whether it is explanatory. For a generalization to count as 
invariant during interventions, it does not make much difference 
whether it is a ―macro,‖ ―micro,‖ ―higher-,‖ or ―lower-‖level 
generalization. Of course, there are sometimes reasons to prefer 
lower-level generalizations over higher-level ones. For instance, 
lower-level generalizations sometimes provide better or deeper 
explanations. However, this difference can be analyzed by saying that 
sometimes generalizations of lower levels (of mechanisms) have larger 
invariance domains (or stability domains) than higher-level ones – or 
that lower-level generalizations provide more ―surgical‖ possibilities 
for manipulation and control. However, it is a mistake to conclude 
from this that higher-level generalizations are non-explanatory or 
non-invariant during their interventions because lower-level 
generalizations sometimes offer deeper or better explanations than 
higher-level ones.   
The interventionist account covers causal explanation only, 
that is, the account is not an all-encompassing account of 
explanation, as some have mistakenly thought. Non-causal 
explanations, such as constitutive and mathematical explanations, are 
not dealt with here. By constitutive explanations I refer to 
explanations of property instantiations in which an explanation of a 
property of a system is given by its underlying nature. An example is 
an explanation of solubility of salt by reference to its molecular 
structure in which the latter explains and determines non-causally but 
asymmetrically the former. Another example is the explanation of 
noble gases‘ chemical inertness by the fact that noble gases, such as 
helium, neon, and argon, have their outermost electron shell filled, 
and consequently, they cannot form bonds with other elements. 
Anatomy and histology are biological disciplines that are looking for 
constitutive explanations. Although in the case of constitutive 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
 
 
145 
explanations, there is a determination relation between ―macro‖ and 
―micro‖ properties of a system, this determination relation is 
different from causal determination relation. Constitutive relations 
are synchronic and componentially related to their phenomena-to-be-
explained, whereas causal relations are diachronic and non-componentially 
related to their phenomena-to-be-explained. 
Yet it is possible that constitutive explanations are similar to 
causal explanations, although the two differ insofar as their 
determination relation is concerned. For instance, Carl F. Craver 
(2007: 139-160; see also his 2002) has made the suggestion that the 
explanatory relevance of constitutive explanations is based on their 
―mutual manipulability.‖ This, in turn, suggests that some forms of 
non-causal explanation do not significantly differ from causal 
explanation. Furthermore, even if the scope of this paper is limited, 
an important species of explanation is nevertheless discussed, for 
causal explanations allow controlling, changing, and manipulating 
nature in contrast to some non-causal forms of explanation.  
Finally, if the interventionist account can be defended 
successfully, then it would follow that there is no strong, practically 
relevant, or (historically) influential justification for the ecological 
laws debate, because laws are neither indispensable nor necessary for 
scientific explanations. This suggests that the ecological laws debate is 
a red herring.  
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5 
 
STABILITY AND SCOPE57 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will analyze such properties of generalizations as 
their scope and stability. I will also show how ―contingent‖ biological 
generalizations function to provide us with reliable and generalizable 
scientific explanations.  
James Bogen and James Woodward (1988; see also Woodward 
1989) have articulated an interesting distinction between data and 
phenomena. What differentiates the two, say these authors, are their 
roles. Data function as evidence for or against phenomena, whereas 
phenomena function as explananda. Moreover, phenomena are 
recurrent, repeatable, and general, whereas data are less so. Often 
reliable data can be produced only in highly artificial or contrived 
conditions. Data also come in a variety of forms: graphs and curves; 
numbers, ratios, and measurements; reports of observations; readings 
of instruments; test scores; fossilized hard parts of organisms; and so 
forth.58 
A major part of the discussions and controversies in scientific 
journals concerns the data and their reliability as evidence for or 
                                                 
57 A version of this chapter was presented at the Philosophy of Science 
Group/Trends and Tensions in Intellectual Integration seminar 30 
September 2009 at the University of Helsinki. 
58 What is here called data is more exactly a ―data model‖ (cf. Suppes 1962 
and Harris 2003). Bogen and Woodward do not use this term, but it is what 
they have in mind. Data models are derived from ―raw data‖ by 
manipulating, processing, and interpreting the latter by various means. The 
distinction between data and phenomena has interesting implications for 
theory testing, which I shall not discuss here (see Bogen and Woodward 
2003). 
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against phenomena. For instance, in community ecology there is a 
famous controversy that is sometimes confused with being about a 
phenomenon, namely, the null or neutral models (or hypotheses) 
debate in the context of competition theory. The critics do not claim 
that the phenomenon of competition does not exist. Rather, they 
claim that there are no (statically significant and) reliable data for 
phenomena which are claimed by competition theorists to be the 
effects of interspecific competition, such as Hutchinson’s rule, 
character displacement, and the species–genus ratio (see 
appendix).59  
One admittedly fallible criterion for identifying a real 
phenomenon in data is to establish that the phenomenon is 
detectable via different and independent means, procedures, 
instruments, and so on. If the phenomenon is not ―robustly 
detectable‖ in this sense, then we have reason to suspect that it is 
spurious or artificial (see Wimsatt 1981, 2006: 233-235; Bogen and 
Woodward 1988: 317; Culp 1994; Hudson 1999). I am not going to 
discuss the data and their reliability in detail, since it is difficult to be 
brief on the subject. Reliability of data as evidence for or against 
phenomena depends on many heterogeneous things that often are 
case- and study-specific, although there are also some general issues 
(see Bogen & Woodward 1988: 326-334, 2003: 244-249; Woodward 
1989: 410-422). Besides, there is already considerable literature on the 
issue, and I shall not recapitulate those themes here (see, for instance, 
Wiens 1981, Hairston 1989, Arnqvist & Wooster 1995).  
Yet there is one central property that phenomena do have, 
namely, stability. James Woodward observed something similar: 
[S]cientific investigation is typically carried on in a noisy 
environment; an environment in which the data we confront 
reflect the operation of many different causal factors, a 
                                                 
59 See Simberloff (1970, 1978, 1983, 1984), Grant (1972), Horn and May 
(1977), Wiens (1977, 1981), Connor and Simberloff (1979), Strong et 
al.(1979), Strong (1980), Simberloff and Boecklen (1981), Strong and 
Simberloff (1981), and Hastings (1987). Not all the authors mentioned are 
null or neutral  modellers, but all of them criticize the data of competition 
theorists as being unreliable or deficient. 
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number of which are due to the local, idiosyncratic features of 
the instruments we employ (including our senses) or the 
particular background situation in which we found ourselves. 
The problem of detecting a phenomenon is the problem of 
detecting a signal in this sea of noise, of identifying a relatively 
stable and invariant pattern of some simplicity and generality 
with recurrent features – a pattern which is not just an artifact 
of the particular detection techniques we employ or the local 
environment in which we operate. Problems of experimental 
design, of controlling for bias or error, of selecting appropriate 
techniques for measurement and of data analysis are, in effect, 
problems of tuning, or learning how to separate signal and 
noise in a reliable way. (Woodward 1989: 396-397.)  
 
In the sciences, phenomena or explananda are often expressed as stable 
generalizations. This does not imply that generalizations or regularities 
are the only scientific phenomena, but they are my focus here. In 
ecology, phenomena or stable generalizations are called by a variety 
of names, the most common being ―patterns.‖ In paleobiology, 
phenomena are called evolutionary, anagenetic, or cladogenetic 
―trends.‖60 Although some ecologists use the term ―rule‖ 
interchangeably with patterns, I reserve the term rule for 
generalizations in general, whether these are phenomena (stable 
generalizations), explanantia (invariant generalizations), or something 
else.  
I will investigate here the nature of the central property of 
phenomena, namely, stability.  Although, Bogen and Woodward left 
                                                 
60 Examples of phenomena in ecology and paleobiology include evolutionary 
and ecological rules, such as Bergmann’s and Dollo’s rule; and such 
generalizations as intraspecific and interspecific patterns of abundance and 
distribution, the body size frequency distribution of a taxon, the canonical 
distribution of the abundances of species, the latitudinal diversity gradient, 
the energy equivalence rule, and the hollow curve (see appendix). These 
are examples of explananda rather than explanantia (or covering laws), because 
as generalizations they appear to be stable, but non-invariant (cf. section 
4.3).  
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the concept undefined, I will show that there are different forms of 
stability. This is an important finding, given that stability is used to 
analyze the contingency of biological generalizations and some have 
suggested that stability should be identified with lawlikeness of 
generalizations. Furthermore, I will claim that stability is not a central 
or proprietary property of phenomena as suggested by Bogen and 
Woodward, but that it is also a central property of their explanantia. In 
other words, stability is a central property of explanatory 
generalizations insofar as their reliability and generalizability as 
explanantia are concerned.  
I proceed as follows: In the next two sections I analyze the 
scope and stability of generalizations. My central claim is that stability 
is not a monolithic property of generalizations as previous 
philosophers have thought, but that there are different and related 
concepts or meanings for stability. In section 5.4, this finding is then 
used as a reason to criticize the idea that stability should be identified 
with lawlikeness. In section 5.5, I discuss and criticize the ideas of 
previous authors in more detail. In section 5.6, I discuss the different 
functions that stability and scope have in the context of 
―generalizing‖ scientific explanations. This shows that ecology or 
biology is capable of proving something more than ―case studies‖ 
with invariant and stable generalizations of varying scopes. 
 
 
5.2 Stability and Scope: A Preliminary Analysis 
 
Sandra Mitchell (1997, 2000, 2002) has written extensively about the 
stability of (biological) generalizations. She understands stability to be 
something that deals with those background conditions on which the 
holding of a generalization depends. In other words, stability is ―a 
measure of the range of conditions that are required for the 
relationship described by the law to hold‖ (Mitchell 2002: 346).  
The more stable a generalization, the less dependent it is on 
background conditions to remain true. For instance, the 
generalization ―all persisting lumps of pure uranium-235 have a mass 
of less than 1,000 kilograms‖ appears stable, because it depends on a 
small number of nuclear physical facts that are pervasive and deep 
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facts about the universe. Unstable generalizations require a host of 
incidental conditions to remain true or to hold. Consider, for 
instance, such generalizations as ―all persisting lumps of pure gold 
have a mass of less than 1,000 kilograms‖ and ―all coins in my pocket 
are 50-cent pieces‖; these statements hold true only if several 
incidental background conditions are in place.  
As a first approximation, let us call a generalization (or 
regularity) stable if it holds in many possible background conditions.61 
An alternative phrasing would be that a generalization is stable if it 
holds during numerous interferences. Unstable generalizations break 
down under such conditions. Stability is a concept of degree as well. 
In other words, a generalization is more stable the more possible 
background conditions there are in which it holds. I take it that the 
above characterizations of stability capture the essentials of Mitchell‘s 
account of stability presented above. Let us call the range of possible 
background conditions over which a generalization continues to hold 
its stability domain. 
Stability should not be confused with the property of 
generalizations that is called scope (cf. also Darden 1996: 413-414, 
Cooper 1998: 578, 581, and Waters 1998). Scope as I understand and 
define it gives the application domain of a generalization in the past 
and/or in the present. This domain includes all those (dis)similar 
systems to which some generalization applies or has applied. For 
example, both of Mendel’s rules have their scope as (nearly) all 
sexually reproducing taxa.  Conditions, such as the evolution of 
mitosis and meiosis, on which the validity or holding of Mendel‘s 
rules depend, are the background conditions in the above sense of 
stability. Other examples of scope include the following:  Some of the 
members of the lineage of horses exhibited the pattern of Cope’s rule in the 
Miocene. Currently, rain forests are almost exclusively located at low latitudes. 
                                                 
61 Of course, stability does not depend only on the number, but likewise on 
the nature of the background conditions. There are background conditions 
to which some generalizations (or rather regularities) are very sensitive to in 
their holding, whereas other conditions have milder impacts on their 
holding. Likewise, in certain sciences and disciplines certain background 
conditions are deemed as more important than others.  
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Although the scope sometimes works as data – e.g., the so-called 
checkerboard distribution of species of a guild to habitats is 
sometimes taken as evidence for the presence of interspecific 
competition – scope likewise works as phenomena. For example, why 
are non-Mendelian inheritance systems nearly non-existent among 
sexually reproducing diploid taxa? 
Biological generalizations typically generalize about different 
taxa, features, entities, and so on in different times and/or places. 
Scope captures the idea that biological generalizations are distributed 
in their applicability to different taxa, places, epochs, and so on. Many 
biological generalizations evidently have narrow or limited scope (cf. 
section 2.6).62 The important point is that a generalization that has a 
narrow scope could have a high degree of stability within this scope. 
The converse could also be true: a generalization that has a broad 
scope could have a low degree of stability within its scope. As an 
example, consider the criticism that Rapoport’s rule (see appendix) 
has a narrow scope, that is, it is a local phenomenon at certain 
latitudes only (see Rohde 1996, Gaston et al. 1998, and Hecnar 1999). 
This criticism does not establish much about the extent of those 
background conditions on which the holding of this generalization 
depends. It is conceivable, although perhaps not plausible, that the 
rule is a very stable generalization within its scope. Moreover, as I 
argue below (section 5.6), criticizing generalizations of narrow or 
limited scope does not establish much insofar as the explanatory 
status of generalizations is concerned.   
Although stability and scope both seem to deal with the 
generality of generalizations, they are also different in this respect. 
Scope deals with generality that has do with the actual distribution or 
range of (dis)similar systems to which a generalization applies or has 
applied. Stability, however, has to do with a holding of a 
generalization in possible background conditions. In other words, 
scope is a non-modal concept and property of generalizations, 
whereas stability is a modal concept and property of generalizations 
                                                 
62 Note that laws are typically thought of as having universal or unlimited 
scope. The same is true of stability: laws are often thought of as having 
maximal or very high degrees of stability (see sections 2.6 and 5.4).  
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because it has to do with considerations that deal with possibilities 
and counterfactuals. Stable generalizations provide support for passive 
counterfactuals rather than active one (see sections 4.2 and 5.6). 
Passive counterfactuals have the form ―had this-or-that background 
condition been different, a generalization would still have held.‖63  
 
 
5.3 Forms of Stability 
 
A classic idea in ecology is that diversity should enhance the stability 
of ecological systems. Although the idea of this so-called diversity–
stability rule (see appendix) at first appeared to be plausible and such 
that it could be used in conservation policies,  theoretical and 
empirical studies came up with exceptions to the rule (e.g., natural 
monocultures of plants with considerable stability, see May 1975: 
165-166) and studies also showed that conflicting and opposite 
results hold between the variables of ―diversity‖ and ―stability‖: 
sometimes diversity is a cause of stability, but sometimes it causes 
instability.  
In the 1970s, it became evident that there might not be 
contradictions in the latter results for the diversity–stability rule. The 
reason was that different ecologists used different stability concepts 
when they studied the relation between diversity and stability (see 
Orians 1975 and Pimm 1984). It was found that diversity is a cause of 
some forms of stability, but also causes some forms of instability. 
This in turn suggests that there seems to be just not just one 
diversity–stability rule, but many rules with different stability 
concepts and different, even opposing relations holding between the 
variables in question.64   
                                                 
63 Active counterfactuals have the form, ―if the value of the variable X of a 
generalization Yi = f(Xi) were changed by an intervention from x1 to x2, then 
the value of the variable Y would be changed from y1 to y2 in accordance 
with the relation Yi = f(Xi).‖  
64 Additional complexities for the diversity–stability rule(s) arise from the 
fact that there are many concepts of diversity as well. Moreover, while 
diversity could enhance population stability, it could also enhance ecosystem or 
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Thus, ecological systems exhibit different forms of stability. 
How many forms of stability are there? What are they? How do they 
differ? I answer these questions by distinguishing seven forms of 
stability defined as follows  
1) Constancy: lack of change in a system despite changes in its 
background conditions.  
2) Persistence: the survival time of a system when facing changes 
in its background conditions.   
3) Inertia or resistance: the ability of a system to resist change in 
its background conditions.  
4) Elasticity or resiliency: the speed of return of a system after 
changes in its background conditions.  
5) Amplitude or domain of attraction: the area or extent of 
equilibrium of a system during changes in its background 
conditions;  cf. local versus global stability of equilibrium, or 
positive, negative, and neutral equilibrium. A system could 
have several different amplitudes as is the case in systems with 
multiple (stable) equilibria (cf. Scheffer et al. 2001).  
6) Cyclical stability: the ability of a system to return to a cycle or an 
oscillation, despite changes in its background conditions. 
7) Trajectory stability: a property of a system whereby it could 
lead to the same or similar end results in its dynamics, despite 
differences in its ―initial‖ background conditions.  
 
I have adapted the names and definitions of stability concepts from 
the ecological literature (see Orians 1975, Pimm 1984, and Grimm & 
Wissel 1997) with some modifications. Although ecologists disagree 
how to name different forms of stability, there seems to be agreement 
on their basic definitions. Thus, although some housecleaning is 
needed in the use of and names for stability concepts, ecologists do 
recognize there being different stability concepts and they do agree 
on what the basic meanings of the concepts are.  
The above forms of stability appear to be different, but related 
and well-defined concepts that apply to systems and generalizations 
                                                                                                    
community instability. For discussion of these points, see Pimm (1984), 
Lehman and Tilman (2000), Mikkelson (1997, 2004), and Odenbaugh (2001). 
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about them. What is common to these forms of stability is that they 
describe what is needed from a system or a generalization in order to hold during 
changes of its background conditions or interferences. Nevertheless, the forms 
of stability are also different. Whereas constancy, persistence, and 
inertia deal with the endurance of systems or generalizations during 
changes in the background conditions or interferences, elasticity, 
amplitude, and cyclic stability deal with recovery during changes in the 
background conditions or interferences. Trajectory stability could be 
understood as dealing with the sensitivity or inevitability of systems or 
generalizations during changes in the background conditions or 
interferences. Thus, we have different, but related concepts of 
stability. This suggests that stability is not a problematic conflation 
concept (see section 2.2). 
Constancy, that is, remaining unchanged, is meant to apply to 
systems or generalizations that do not exhibit dynamics in contrast to 
inertia, which is meant to apply to systems or generalizations that 
exhibit some dynamics or active behavior. The point of distinguishing 
between constancy and  inertia has to do with the distinction between 
non-change-relating and change-relating generalizations (see section 
4.2). In other words, non-change-relating generalizations are stable in 
the sense of constancy and change-relating generalizations are stable 
in the sense of inertia. Ergodic systems exhibit most of the above 
forms of stability to some extent. I define ergodic systems as those 
capable of returning to their original or initial state or dynamic. Non-
ergodic systems are non-stable in the sense of elasticity and 
amplitude. This suggests that the forms of stability are not just 
continua properties, but also properties with thresholds and 
continua.65 
                                                 
65 My point is not that all the forms of stability just listed apply to non-
ecological systems in addition to ecological ones; I shall, however, presume at 
least that most of them do apply to non-ecological systems. For instance, 
there are ergodic systems in thermodynamics that probably display most of 
the forms of stability listed above. Nor is my point here that all the forms of 
stability apply to generalizations about systems; I think that they do, but I have 
to leave the demonstration of this point to some other occasion.  Nor is the 
important point here that there are seven forms of stability. There might be 
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 My point here is to show that stability is not a monolithic property 
of generalizations as many evidently believe, but that there are different 
forms of stability that are distinct, yet related concepts that apply to 
systems and generalizations about those systems. And this is an 
important discovery insofar as the analysis of lawlikeness (and 
evolutionary contingency) with stability is concerned. Moreover, 
analyzing the forms of stability might help to illuminate how and why 
stability or stabilities are relevant in the context of scientific 
explanation.   
 
 
5.4 Stability as Lawlikeness 
 
Accounts of laws typically conceptualize lawlikeness as a 
dichotomous thing that is contrary to the ―contingency‖ or 
―accidentality‖ of generalizations (see section 2.6). There is an 
account that conceptualizes lawlikeness differently, namely, the 
stability account of laws.  
Because Sandra Mitchell is an advocate of a pragmatic account 
of laws (section 3.2), it is not fair to attribute the stability account of 
laws to her. Nor it is right to claim that she has replaced the 
dichotomous distinction between laws and accidental truths with a 
continuum of lawlikeness based on the continuum of stability as is 
also sometimes done. Such an account can nevertheless be extracted 
from her ideas, and she has statements that, to the unwary, seem to 
identify stability with lawlikeness and replace the dichotomy of 
                                                                                                    
more forms of stability. It is also possible that some of the above stabilities 
are reducible to others as well. For instance, the main reason I have kept 
cyclical stability as a separate item rather than included it under amplitude is 
to emphasize that many biological ergodic systems display other kinds of 
stabilities over and above point equilibrium (see May 1972, 1975, 1976; see 
also section 6.5). In other words, the exact number of forms of stability is an 
open question. Finally, the issue in the present chapter is not whether there 
is an adequate mathematical notion of stability, such as the Lyapunov stability 
that captures the different aspects or different notions of stability in ecology 
(see Justus 2008). 
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lawlikeness with a continuum of stability (see Mitchell 1997: S470, 
2000: 254-255, 2002: 346). Yet other philosophers have proposed 
that lawlikeness is similar to stability, if not in fact to be identified 
with it, and moreover that lawlikeness is a continuum (e.g., 
Woodward 1992, Lipton 1999, Cooper 1998: 571-578, Mikkelson 
2004: 124-125; see also section 5.5).  
It seems that stability has many right properties to redeem the 
lawlike status of biological generalizations. Since stability is a degree, 
there might be degrees of lawlikeness. Consequently, even if some 
biological generalizations failed to achieve a maximal or a very high 
degree of stability – that is typically attributed to physical laws –, they 
nevertheless could count as lawlike if they had a high enough degree 
of stability. Likewise, the continuum nature of lawlikeness might 
explain why it has been so difficult to demarcate between laws and 
accidental truths. If stability is the right property to identify with 
lawlikeness and if it is a property with degrees, then the 
―contingency‖ of biological generalizations is not as serious  a threat 
for their lawlike status as it would be if a dichotomous account of 
lawlikeness is held (cf. section 2.6). Besides, since all generalizations 
are more or less stable, the contingency of biological generalizations 
is not a sufficient condition to deny their lawlike status. To make 
such criticism potent it has to be shown that biological 
generalizations lack high degrees of stability in general and/or in 
contrast to the generalizations of other sciences. Finally, it is the 
ability of laws to support counterfactuals that is taken to be indicative 
of or a defining property of lawlikeness. And stable generalizations 
seem to support counterfactuals – which I called passive – having do 
to with the holding of generalizations in different background 
conditions.  
As persuasive as these properties are for the identification of 
lawlikeness with stability, I have qualms about whether stability will 
be satisfactory in the given context. 
To begin with, the stability account appears to count cases of 
spurious causation as laws, when and if they exhibit a high degree of 
stability. However, cases of spurious causation are paradigms of 
accidentally true generalizations. This suggests that the stability account 
fails to provide an account of lawlikeness, since it fails to distinguish 
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between laws and non-laws.  The central issue of any account of laws 
is to give a clear demarcation between laws and accidentally true 
generalizations.  
Moreover, there was not just one stability, but several different 
forms of stability to identify with lawlikeness. Accordingly, there are 
several interpretations of the lawlikeness of (biological) 
generalizations in terms of their stability.  There is no need to discuss 
all of them here, since not all are plausible candidates in the present 
context. For instance, it does not seem to be a plausible interpretation 
of lawlikeness to analyze it in terms of persistence or elasticity of 
generalizations, since these properties ―only‖ concern temporal 
aspects of stability. But with the remaining five concepts we have 
somewhat plausible candidates of lawlikeness, since they have to do 
with more general aspects of endurance, recovery, or sensitivity of 
generalizations. In other words, lawlikeness can possibly be identified 
with constancy, inertia, amplitude, cyclical stability, and/or trajectory 
stability of generalizations.  
Is it an advantage or a disadvantage of the stability account of 
laws that there are so many forms of stability to be identified with 
lawlikeness?  On the one hand, it is perfectly conceivable that 
different sciences favor different forms of stability of generalizations 
as the most important one(s) in their domain. Consequently, it could 
be argued that there are different lawlikenesses in different sciences. 
This is an intriguing suggestion that has remained relatively 
unexamined. This suggests that the fact that there are many forms of 
stability to be identified with lawlikeness is an advantage of the stability 
account of laws. On the other hand, most philosophers think of 
lawlikeness as a common property of laws. Thus, they treat 
lawlikeness as a monolithic thing in contrast to what I have just 
suggested as being true of stability.  This suggests that the fact that 
there are many forms of stability to be identified with lawlikeness is a 
disadvantage of the stability account of laws. 
The problem with the latter view– i.e., the view that 
lawlikeness is a monolithic thing – is that it is not clear which of the 
five forms of stability just mentioned should be preferred as the 
lawlikeness of (biological) generalizations. Moreover, biological and 
non-biological examples of putative lawlike generalizations presented 
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in the literature apparently display many of the above-mentioned 
forms of stability rather than some specific stability. The problem 
with the former view – i.e. the view that there are different 
lawlikenesses in different sciences – is that there are no systematic 
connections between forms of stability of generalizations and 
different sciences (or their disciplines). Nor it is true that different 
sciences favor different forms of stability of generalizations as the 
most important in their domain. Finally, generalizations about some 
science or discipline exhibit the above stabilities with heterogeneous 
and diverse patterns. To establish the points just made, consider 
ecology, its generalizations, and those forms of stability that 
ecological generalizations display.  
For instance, there are ecological generalizations or theoretical 
systems that display many of the forms of stability mentioned. 
Consider island biogeography, which investigates such putative 
examples of ecological laws as area, distance, endemicity, and 
species–area rule (see appendix). A famous experiment of island 
biogeography consisted of small islands – of different sizes and from 
different distances from their faunal source area – that were 
―defaunated‖ (see MacArthur & Wilson 1967 and Wilson & 
Simberloff 1969). After the defaunation of the islands, re-
colonization of fauna on the islands was monitored. The results of 
the experiment indicated that ―the species number‖ of an island is in 
a globally stable point of equilibrium determined by the variables ―the 
area or size of an island‖ and its ―distance from the faunal source 
area.‖ Although there was thus amplitude stability in the species number 
and a trajectory stability or succession towards it, there was no constancy 
or inertia in ―species composition,‖ at least in the first years, nor was 
there any trajectory stability toward it. In addition the speed of return 
(elasticity), inertia, and so on of species number and some other factors 
were studied in this and later experiments on island biogeography. At 
the same time, many allometries and scaling laws (see sections 4.3 and 
4.4) exhibit only specific stability, such as inertia. 
Thus, there are no systematic connections between the forms 
of stability of generalizations and different sciences. Instead, 
generalizations of some science display all forms of stability 
mentioned above. Nor are there reasons to think that some areas or 
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disciplines of science, such as ecology deem only some of the forms 
of stability mentioned in the context of laws to be important. The 
points just outlined suggest that the view that there are different 
lawlikenesses in different sciences (or disciplines) is implausible. 
Moreover, since many above and below generalizations are often 
presented in the literature as examples of putative laws, this spells 
trouble for the view and idea that some specific stability should be 
identified with the lawlikeness of biological generalizations.  
There is another concern about the stability account of laws. 
The main reason behind the stability account is that its proponents 
apparently subscribe to a covering law account of scientific 
explanation (cf., for instance, Cooper 1998). If it can be shown that 
stability is a wrong concept in the context of scientific explanations, 
then the general idea of identifying stability with lawlikeness loses 
much of its justification or motivation. Consider cases of spurious 
causation that, as generalizations, often display high degrees of 
stability, especially inertia. For instance, there is a stable and positive 
correlation between ―readings on a barometer‖ and ―the occurrence 
of storms‖ that is due to a common cause, namely, ―changes in 
atmospheric pressure.‖ This stable correlation allows for predicting 
the occurrence of storms.  But readings on a barometer neither 
explain nor cause the storms. Nor does the stability of the correlation 
between joint effects of the common cause just mentioned have 
much to do with explanations. Rather, it is the common cause, that is, 
changes in the atmospheric pressure that explains the 
occurrence/non-occurrence of storms and accounts for why there is 
a correlation between the two.   
What has just been said applies to many ecological allometries 
and scaling laws. Although allometries and scaling laws as 
generalizations could be stable, many of them are apparently not 
explanatory, because they are cases of spurious causation.  For 
instance, there is a relation between the variables ―the maximum 
density of herbivorous mammals‖ and ―body size‖ that holds in many 
different background conditions. But although the relation is stable, it 
appears to be a case of spurious causation (or one, which does not 
remain invariant under its interventions; see section 4.4). This 
suggests that many allometries and scaling laws do not represent 
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causal or explanatory generalizations, but accidentally true 
generalizations that hold, owing to their common causes. This is also 
true of many putative examples of physical laws presented in the 
literature often display high degrees of inertia or constancy, such as 
―all regions of space exhibit a cosmic background radiation of 2.7 
degrees of Kelvin.‖ 
In a response, one could suggest that stability in the context of 
laws is something that the forms of stability have in common, such as 
it is a measure of the range of possible background conditions 
required for a generalization, relations or regularity to hold (cf. 
Mitchell 2000: 252 and 2002: 346). This would be an unenlightened 
account, because it simply replaces one vague or unanalyzed notion 
with another equally vague or unanalyzed notion.  Nor would this 
response bypass the problems of the stability account of laws just 
mentioned. For instance, the response would not show that stable 
generalizations furnish us with explanations.  
Let me take stock. The first problem of identifying stability 
with lawlikeness is not that there is a lack of stability in biological 
generalizations or generalizations of some other science, but that 
there are different forms of stability to identify with lawlikeness, 
which generalizations and examples of putative lawlike 
generalizations display by means of heterogeneous patterns. As a 
normative account of lawlikeness, stability is a concept that is too 
diversely present in (biological) generalizations. This is also a problem 
for the paradigmatic account of laws if it is used here to suggest that 
paradigmatic laws are stable generalizations (see section 3.2). The 
second problem of the stability account is that it counts as laws cases 
of ―stable‖ spurious causation. Many of us think of these as 
paradigmatic cases of accidentally true generalizations, however.  The 
third problem of the stability account of laws is that stability does not 
furnish generalizations with explanatory power, which is also the 
critical problem for the pragmatic account of laws discussed in 
chapter 3. This is a problem for the stability account of laws, because 
lawlikeness is commonly thought of a central property of 
generalizations in the context of scientific explanations. Finally, many 
biological generalizations seem to lack maximal and high degrees of 
stability (see also section 2.6). 
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5.5 Mitchell and Lange on Stability 
 
Many philosophers have discussed stability in the context of 
generalizations.66 Rather than going through all the articles and the 
ideas about stability in detail, I here concentrate on two different 
proposals, namely, Sandra Mitchell‘s and Marc Lange‘s. There are 
some general or common trends in the articles and authors that 
discuss the stability of generalizations. First, although explicit 
definitions of stability are missing, it becomes clear once we look at 
their examples of stability that the authors understood stability in the 
sense of my inertia and sometimes perhaps as constancy, which are 
not distinguished from one another (as in Woodward 1992, 2006b, 
2010; Lange 1995, 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Mitchell 1997, 2000, 2002; 
Cooper 1998; Lipton 1999 and many others). Second, other stability 
concepts are typically neglected, with Mitchell (1997, 2000, 2002) 
being an exception; in addition to inertia, she also discusses trajectory 
stability. Third, some authors confuse stability with invariance, 
although the two are different properties of generalizations and 
moreover have different functions in scientific explanations (see 
section 5.6). 
Sandra Mitchell (1997: S470-S473, 2000: 259-259, 2002) has 
dealt extensively with contingency and the stability of (biological) 
generalizations. The present chapter is intended as an elaboration on 
her ideas concerning the stability of generalizations and the function 
of stability in the context of scientific explanations. However, there 
are differences between us, which I briefly restate below.  
Mitchell‘s definition of stability as a measure of the range of 
possible background conditions required for a generalization, relation, 
or regularity to hold (cf. Mitchell 2000: 252 and 2002: 346) and as a 
continuum is too non-committal in that it does not distinguish 
                                                 
66 See, for instance, Skyrms (1977), Schaffner (1980: 80, 1995), Cartwright 
(1983, 1989, 1995, 1997, 2002), Woodward (1992: 213, 201-206, 2006b, 
2010), Carrier (1995), Lange (1995, 2002, 2005a, 2005b), Mitchell (1997: 
S470-S473, 2000: 250-259, 2002), Cooper (1998: 571-578), Lipton (1999: 
163-166), Mikkelson (2004: 124-125), Elgin (2006: 124-130), Craver (2007: 
65-72, 99-100), and Wimsatt (2007: 133-147). 
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between different forms of stability and their meanings as I do. 
Moreover, once we look at her examples of generalizations and their 
stability, it becomes clear that she understands stability in the sense of 
constancy, inertia, and/or trajectory stability – and she does so 
without distinguishing these concepts or properties from one 
another.  
Her reply to John Beatty‘s evolutionary contingency thesis in 
terms of stability was dissimilar to mine as well, for she does not 
think that the thesis has such negative implications for the existence 
of biological laws as I claim (cf. section 2.6). Furthermore, Mitchell 
seems to conflate stability with invariance, and/or she refuses to 
distinguish between the two (see Mitchell 2002: 344-347). Finally, 
Mitchell‘s reference to stability in the context of her pragmatic laws is 
misplaced (section 3.2). Again, it is not the stability of generalizations, 
but their invariance that she should be looking for as distinctive of 
explanatory generalizations as I argued in chapter 4.  
Recently, Marc Lange (2002:  412-421, 2005a: 396-402, 2005b) 
has referred to stability in the context of laws. In lieu of focusing on 
stability conditions of individual and separate generalizations as many 
others have done, Lange makes the intriguing claim that laws are 
necessary, support counterfactuals, and/or are lawlike owing to their 
―collective stability.‖ Lange‘s point with his collective stability is 
apparently to reinforce and supplement his inference rule account of 
laws (section 3.3) with considerations that deal with strong 
contingency of laws, where his reliability was a solution to laws‘ weak 
contingency.67  
For Lange, collective stability means that laws remain true in 
every counterfactual scenario that is nomically possible, that is, in 
every counterfactual scenario consistent with the logical consequences of 
other laws that, together with the law in question, form a set of laws of 
that science or discipline. Collective stability gives the stability 
                                                 
67 I will be concerned here only with the stability part of Lange‘s account of 
laws. Other papers that target Lange‘s law accounts (e.g., Alexander 2004) 
present more general criticism concerning Lange‘s ideas about the role and 
function of laws, for instance, in the context of inductive strategies. 
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domain over which laws are supposed to hold. Lange (2007: 471) 
expresses the basic idea of collective stability as follows:  
On this view, what makes the laws special, as far as their range 
of invariance is concerned, is that they are stable: collectively, 
taken as a set, the laws are as resilient as they could logically 
possibly be. All of the laws would still have held under every 
counterfactual supposition under which they could all still have 
held – every supposition with which they are all logically 
consistent. No set containing an accident can make that boast 
non-trivially. A stable set is maximally resilient under 
counterfactual perturbations; it has as much invariance under 
counterfactual suppositions as it could logically possibly have. 
(Lange 2005b: 424.)  
 
Consider one of Lange‘s (2004: 103, 2005a: 400) examples. The 
Lorentz force law is a physical law that would not hold if charged bodies 
that travelled at a speed faster than the speed of light existed. But 
other physical laws and their logical consequences guarantee that a 
counterfactual scenario of such bodies travelling faster than the speed 
of light is forbidden. Hence, the Lorentz force law is a member of a 
stable set of integrated physical laws, and it is nomically necessary, 
owing to its stability within the collective stability domain that the 
other physical laws restrict or limit for it.  Accidental generalizations 
do not hold or remain stable within counterfactual situations or 
suppositions given by laws and their logical consequences that are 
consistent with these accidents. There is nothing in the laws of 
physics or in their consequences that would make the construction of 
a gold cube larger than 1,000 kg impossible, whereas the logical 
consequences of laws of nuclear chain-reactions forbid the 
construction of a lump of uranium-235 weighing over 1,000 kg that is 
much greater than the critical mass of the isotope, which is around 50 
kg. Thus, ―all persisting lumps of pure uranium-235 have a mass less 
than 1,000 kilogram‖ is necessary (and lawlike), whereas the similar 
gold generalization is not.  
Evidently, Lange developed the collective stability account first 
and foremost with physics in mind. However, he has applied the 
account to biology to show how the stability account could salvage 
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the lawlike status of biological generalizations (see Lange 2004 and 
2005a).  
Lange (2005a) uses examples of biogeographical 
generalizations, such as the area, distance, endemicity, and 
species–area rule (see appendix) to show how ecological 
generalizations form a set of integrated laws that moreover could be 
independent in their collective stability from considerations that deal 
with physical counterfactual scenarios that would or could violate 
ecological laws. What makes ecological generalizations necessary (or 
lawlike) is that they remain stable within the domain of counterfactual 
scenarios dictated by other ecological laws in their integrated set of laws. If 
they break outside this domain, they could be necessary (or lawlike), 
because non-ecological or non-biological counterfactual scenarios 
need not be within the ―purposes‖ of ecology or within its collective 
stability domain that is given by its laws. In other words, ecological 
laws do not have to remain unviolated in physical counterfactual 
situations that remain within the possibilities of physical laws. 
Consider a ―physically‖ possible counterfactual scenario: had the 
earth been struck in the distant past by a large meteorite that 
destroyed all life permanently, then ecological laws would not have 
held on this planet. However, this scenario is not one that ecologists 
need to be worrying about, because it is outside the domain or 
―purpose‖ of ecology. Thus, there is no problem if ecological laws are 
violated in such counterfactual scenarios.  
Although ecological generalizations need not hold given every 
physically possible counterfactual scenario, if they are collectively  
stable within the possibilities restricted by a set of ecology‘s laws, they 
are still necessary (or lawlike) generalizations. Collective stability 
seems to be a clever solution to John Beatty‘s (1995) strong 
contingency criticism of biological generalizations. 
I have no criticism of Lange‘s (2005b) analytical or formal 
treatment of collective stability or lawlikeness. Nor do I claim that 
Lange is to be blamed because the collective stability account is a 
non-reductive, but non-circular account of laws (cf. Lange 1999a: 
249-251), provided the account illuminates laws in other ways. There 
are other reasons that suggest his stability account is inadequate 
and/or inapplicable to biology. Moreover, I think that his idea of 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
 
 
165 
stability and laws‘ support of counterfactuals (or subjunctives) is not 
illuminating insofar as the explanatory status of generalizations is 
concerned. 
Lange‘s treatment of and focus on collective stability leaves 
open what he means by the stability of individual or isolated 
generalizations. Unfortunately, Lange does not give these general 
semantics or indicate, how and under what conditions they acquire 
truth values over and above his insistence that individual lawlike 
generalizations need only be ―reliable‖ rules of inference as discussed 
above (section 3.3).  Nor does he give stabilities of individual 
generalizations any specific meaning(s), as I did in section 5.3.  
I suspect that in the biological sciences, we have at our 
disposal sets of integrated laws that restrict one another‘s stability in 
the neat and systematic way supposed by Lange‘s stability account of 
laws. Putative examples of such sets of laws involve the theory of 
biogeography and the competition theory in community ecology. But 
there is more to ecology than these two theories. To present just one 
example, consider synecology, the study of ecological ―interrelations.‖ 
For decades, ecologists have sought a general, unified, and integrated 
theory of species interactions. Yet even today there is considerable 
disagreement about, first, whether, such a theory can be given and, 
second, how such interactions between species, such as predation or 
mutualism, can be presented as parts of such a theory. The only part 
of the synecological theory that has any coherence, is the competition 
theory. But even this theory appears reticulate and loose when it 
comes to the connections of its generalizations. Thus, it is far from 
clear that ecological generalizations form such sets of laws that 
restrict one another‘s stability in the sense that Lange postulates as 
being distinctive of laws. The above suggests that Lange‘s stability 
account does not redeem the lawlike status of (current) ecological 
generalizations in contrast to what he seems to believe.  
In addition, it is not clear how collective stability furnishes 
generalizations with their explanatory or predictive power – or how 
collective stability supplies us with ―reliable inference rules‖ insofar as 
scientific explanations are concerned. Moreover, it appears that the 
explanatory and predictive power of generalizations depend on more 
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―local‖ kinds of considerations than on collective stability (see section 
5.6).  
Besides, it seems that, as a solution to strong contingency, 
collective stability presupposes that the other laws that give the 
stability domain of some law cannot be ―weakly contingent,‖ because 
Lange apparently needs exceptionless laws to establish the collective 
stability domain laws. The question is how does Lange‘s collective 
stability cohere with his previous idea of exception-ridden, but 
reliable inference rule account of laws? 
The problem is that exception-ridden generalizations admit 
exceptions to stability conditions of laws, whose stability domain the 
former determine, according to Lange. If there are exceptions to the 
law that charged bodies cannot travel at a speed faster than the speed 
of light, then how does this law constrain the stability of the Lorentz 
force law in the manner discussed above? The admittance of 
exception-ridden laws to a set of laws seem to imply that laws are not 
necessary or that they are strongly contingent after all, because laws 
do not necessarily hold even within their collective stability domain, 
since there are exceptions to laws. This outcome seems to be a 
consequence of the fact that Lange treats stability as a feature that has 
no degrees (see Lange 1999a, 2005a: 397, 2005b: 425, 2009: 325), as the 
next passage illustrates:  
Possessing some variety of ‗necessity‘ is supposed to be 
qualitatively different from merely being invariant under a wide 
range of counterfactual suppositions. Because the set of laws is 
maximally resilient – as resilient as it could logically possibly be 
– there is a species of necessity that all and only its members 
possess. No variety of necessity is possessed by an accident, 
even by one that would still have held under many 
counterfactual suppositions. (2008: 83.)  
 
Now, if there are exceptions to the law that charged bodies cannot 
travel at a speed faster than the speed of light, then it would seem to 
follow that the Lorentz force law is not ―maximally resilient,‖ since it 
does not hold under all the counterfactual situations consistent with 
the logical consequences of other physical laws. Owing to the 
exception(s) of the former law, there is a nomically possible 
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counterfactual situation in which the Lorentz force law does not hold 
or remain stable, namely, the one in which charged bodies travel at a 
speed faster than the speed of light. Thus, the Lorentz force law is 
not maximally resilient and consequently it is no law. Rather, it is an 
accidentally true generalization.  Similarly, if there are exceptions to 
the laws of nuclear chain-reactions, then the implications seems to be 
that the construction of a lump of uranium-235 weighing over 1,000 
kilograms is nomically possible after all – or at least that the physical 
laws do not forbid the construction of such a lump of uranium every 
time and in every place, owing to the exceptions to the laws of 
nuclear chain-reactions.  That is, the uranium-235 generalization is 
not maximally resilient, and consequently, no law, but an accident. 
Furthermore, the argument above could perhaps be generalized to 
other examples of physical laws if it is true, as suggested by Lange 
(1993a, 2002), that all physical laws have exceptions. This in turn 
would suggest that there are no laws in (current) physics, a 
consequence that Lange would not be happy with. A similar 
argument can also be used to reason against the existence of 
biological laws, given that there appear to be exceptions to biological 
generalizations (section 2.3), which thus seems to suggest that 
biological generalizations are not maximally resilient within the 
integrated set of biological laws, and consequently, there are no 
biological laws.68 Again, Lange‘s claim that laws need only be 
―reliable‖ is unenlightening and ad hoc in this context (see section 3.3 
and Lange 2002: 413-414, 416 and 2004: 100-101).69 
                                                 
68 It could be asked, whether a more robust account of laws would have 
been produced had Lange treated collective stability as a degree. A degree 
account could be helpful when countering arguments to the kinds of 
counterexamples given above. 
69 In the context, Lange might refer to his suggestion that there are meta-
laws, which ―govern‖ ordinary laws (see Lange 1999a: 248-249, 252, 2005c: 
280, 2007, 2009: 342-344). The idea would be that meta-laws are not riddled 
with exceptions and thus they are capable of delimiting the range of ordinary 
laws‘ collective stability. The problem is that the idea of universal and 
exceptionless meta-laws begs the question. It remains to be shown or argued 
that there are universal and exceptionless meta-laws.  Finally, Lange (1993a, 
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Taken together, the points presented suggest that Lange‘s 
collective stability does not offer an account that could salvage the 
lawlike status of biological generalizations.  
I have a different account of how individual generalizations are 
―stable,‖ one that is being presented in this chapter. This account 
preserves many things that Lange wants to achieve with laws. The 
account shows how individual generalizations support 
counterfactuals and what kinds of counterfactuals they support. 
Lange‘s requirement that laws remain true in every counterfactual 
scenario that is nomically possible is not particularly illuminating in 
this respect. It likewise shows how biological generalizations furnish 
us with reliable scientific explanations. Moreover, the account shows 
how biological generalizations that refer to ―particulars‖ can be 
explanatory (see Lange 1995).  In other words, I do not think there is 
much wrong in thinking that there are reliable generalizations that 
function in the roles of laws. These are invariant and stable 
generalizations. These need not be laws, and they need not be 
collectively stable in contrast to Lange, however.  
 
 
5.6 From Case Studies to Extrapolable and Unified 
Explanations 
 
Some philosophers and biologists claim that biological explanations 
especially at the ―middle levels‖ of biology, merely amount to case 
studies or natural history, that is, to explanations that cannot be 
generalized to other taxa, places, times, and so on over and above 
those from which the explanations originally came (see Simberloff 
1982; Rosenberg 1985: 219-225; Shrader-Frechette 2001; Shrader-
Frechette & McCoy 1993: 106-148, 1994). The reasons given are 
often the same or at least similar to the reasons given for why there 
are no distinctively biological laws, namely, that biological 
generalizations or phenomena are complex, unique, open, contingent, 
and so on (see chapter 2). In contrast, we have the defenders of the 
                                                                                                    
2002) admits that there are exceptions to all laws, including fundamental 
ones.  
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generalizability of biological explanations, who typically argue that 
biological explanations are expressed in terms of generalizations that 
include supervenient predicate terms that furnish us with ―higher-
level‖ generalizations claimed to be more lawlike and less 
―contingent‖  than those dealing with middle or lower levels (see 
Sober 1984: 47-59, 74-85, 95-96, 125-126, 1993: 73-77, 1997,  1999; 
Rosenberg 1985: 219-225, 2001c: 755, 758; Cooper 1990; Brown 
1995; Carrier 1995; Lawton 1996, 1999; Mikkelson 2004). I do not 
find these defenses convincing for I have argued that reference to the 
lawlikeness of biological generalizations is not the right strategy for 
justifying their explanatory status.   
Although it remains unclear to me exactly what case studies 
are,70 I restrict the meaning of the term to those scientific 
explanations that are not generalizable in the sense of ―extrapolation‖ 
and/or ―projection‖ defined below. The problem in this section is 
similar to the problem that deals with the generalizability or ―external 
validity‖ of experimental results (see Guala 1999, 2003; see also 
Hutchinson 1961, Wiens 1977, Hairston 1989).    
In the first section of this chapter I discussed the idea that 
stability is a central property of explananda. However, stability is not 
an important property of explananda only, but also of their explanantia. 
I defended an account of scientific explanation in the previous 
chapter in which explanatory generalizations are invariant rather than 
lawlike. Invariant generalizations support active and the same object 
counterfactuals rather than passive and/or other object counterfactuals.71 In 
other words, an invariant generalization provides us with an 
understanding about what would happen to a specific system if some of 
its properties were changed through intervention. What would happen 
to other, dissimilar systems under their similar changes is irrelevant to 
the explanatory status of an invariant generalization.  Does this imply 
                                                 
70 Shrader-Frechette and McCoy (1993) list among the properties of case 
studies that they are bottom-up, quasi-experimental, inductive, 
particularistic, wholistic, and heuristic. Although some of these properties 
strike me as peculiar, I do not discuss them here. 
71 I have adapted the names of the counterfactuals from Woodward (2001: 
9-10, 2003a: 279-285) and Woodward and Hitchcock (2003: 19-21).  
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that I am forced to admit that biology provides only case studies with 
no generalizable content? No. Stability and scope are relevant insofar 
as the generalizability of scientific explanations is concerned. 
However, the two have different functions.  
With respect to the distinction between the same and other object 
counterfactuals, let me first make a distinction between two kinds of 
generalizability. What I call extrapolation has to do with the 
generalizability of explanations in terms of passive and the same object 
counterfactuals. Extrapolation deals with the generalizability of 
scientific explanations to other possible background conditions with systems 
similar to the original. What I call projection has to do with the 
generalizability of scientific explanations in terms of passive and other 
object counterfactuals. Projection deals with the generalizability of 
explanations to other possible background conditions with dissimilar systems. 
The similarity and dissimilarity referred to should be understood in 
terms of the similarity and dissimilarity of the causes and mechanisms 
of systems. 
Although it is invariance – rather than stability – of 
generalizations that furnishes us with explanatory generalizations, 
there is an important function that stability of generalizations has in 
this context of explanations, namely, stability furnishes us with 
extrapolability and reliability of scientific explanations (cf. Mitchell 
1997, 2002 and Woodward 2006b, 2010 whose ideas I elaborate on 
and synthesize here). Stability is an important property of 
generalizations insofar as their extrapolability and reliability are 
concerned, because stable generalizations furnish us with support for 
the counterfactuals I called passive. Passive counterfactuals have the 
form ―had this-or-that background condition been different, the 
generalization would still have held.‖  
I called the stability domain of a generalization the range or 
extent of background conditions or interferences over which it 
supports passive counterfactuals. A generalization could have many 
stability domains over which it is stable when stability is understood 
in the sense presented above. In the latter case, a more specific term 
for a stability domain can be used. When the context does not 
demand the use of a more specific term, I use the general term 
―stability domain‖ instead of ―inertia domain‖ and the like. A stability 
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domain appears to be a measure of a generalization‘s extrapolability 
and reliability. In general, the larger the stability domain of a 
generalization, the more (important) passive counterfactuals it 
supports, and accordingly, the more extrapolable and reliable the 
generalization is, because it holds in many – and/or in more 
important – different possible background conditions rather than 
holding owing to  some actual or incidental background conditions. A 
lack of stability of a generalization has the effect of diminishing its 
extrapolability and reliability.72     
The different forms of stability given above are measures of 
extrapolability and reliability. What was common to these forms of 
stability was that they described what is needed from a system or a 
generalization in order to hold during changes of its background 
conditions or interferences. At the same time they are somewhat 
different measures of extrapolability and reliability. Whereas 
constancy, persistence, and inertia deal with the endurance of systems 
or generalizations during changes in the background conditions or 
interferences, elasticity, amplitude, and cyclic stability deal with 
                                                 
72 There is a problem in explicating exactly what are the background 
conditions of a generalization over which it is supposed to hold. Although 
this is a question for which I have no general or formal solutions, I have 
claimed that considerations having to do with ceteris paribus clauses or 
―domains‖ of generalizations are local and discipline-specific in character 
(section 3.5). At the same time, my analysis of ceteris paribus clauses or 
domains of generalizations in terms of stability and scope shows that these 
issues can be conceptually clarified and analyzed. As I have further claimed, 
ecological generalizations can be corrected and made more precise, and their 
exceptions can be explained within their own conceptual domain (section 
3.6). Consequently, it is possible to explicate ceteris paribus clauses or domains 
of ecological generalizations without ―going down levels.‖ Note that the 
latter does not imply that ecological generalizations can be ―strictly 
complemented.‖ Finally, as James Woodward (2000: 228-235, 2003a: 273-
279) has argued, we can make use of generalizations that have vague 
domains if these domains are investigated independently of generalizations, 
whereas if the domains are included in (statements of) generalizations 
themselves (as in the ceteris paribus account of laws), we obtain generalizations 
that are vague and of little use in the context of scientific explanations.  
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recovery during changes in the background conditions or 
interferences. Trajectory stability could be understood as dealing with 
the sensitivity or inevitability of systems or generalizations during 
changes in the background conditions or interferences. 
Extrapolability and reliability of generalizations are no doubt 
dependent on the endurance, recovery, and/or sensitivity of 
generalizations under changes of their background conditions or 
interferences, that is, from their forms of stability.  
For instance, the larger the inertia and constancy domain of a 
generalization, the larger and/or more important is the ―set‖ of 
background conditions or interferences over which it holds. The 
larger the amplitude or cyclical stability domain of a generalization, 
the larger and/or more important is the set of background conditions 
or interferences  over which the generalizations is capable of 
maintaining its equilibrium, cycle, or oscillation. The larger the 
trajectory stability domain of a generalization, the less sensitive is the 
generalization to the changes in its initial conditions. For instance, the 
species–area rule appears to be an invariant generalization (see 
section 4.3). The explanatory status of the rule does not depend on 
there being a generalization that holds in all or in most of the 
background conditions and that has no exceptions. Yet the rule could 
be generalizable and reliable if its relation between ―the number of 
species‖ and the ―area‖ remains invariant during changes in many of 
the (ecologically important) background conditions, such as in the 
biotic richness of the archipelagos to which it is applied (see also 
section 6.2). 
Consequently, stable generalizations can be claimed to be 
relatively context insensitive, applicable to different background 
conditions, generalizable, predictable, and reliable in the sense that 
they continue to hold in many possible (important) background 
conditions.73 In this sense invariant and stable generalizations 
                                                 
73 My claim is not that all these forms of stability are equally important in 
this context. For instance, persistence and elasticity appear to be less 
interesting properties of generalizations insofar as generalizability and 
reliability of scientific explanations are concerned in contrast to constancy, 
inertia, amplitude, and trajectory stability. Furthermore, constancy was 
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function as many philosophers believe only laws function (see Lange 
1993a, 1993b, 1995, 2002, 2005a, 2005b; and Mitchell 1997, 2000, 
2002; see also Goodman 1954 and Brandon 1997). In addition just as 
there is a connection between the invariance domain and explanatory 
depth (section 4.2), there also seems to be a connection between the 
stability domain and explanatory depth. Explanations with high 
degrees of stability are often seen as deeper than explanations with 
low degrees of stability (cf. Hitchcock & Woodward 2003: 187-188 
and Woodward 2006b, 2010, who seem to be have something similar 
in mind).   
Yet stability does not establish much insofar as projection is 
concerned. There is no guarantee that generalizations dealing with 
dissimilar systems are similar in their support of passive 
counterfactuals. In fact, the default assumption seems to be that 
generalizations dealing with dissimilar systems are independent from 
one another insofar as their support of passive counterfactuals is 
concerned. There is thus no reason to think that generalizations 
dealing with dissimilar systems depend on similar background 
conditions in order to hold.   
What about the function of scope? Scope does not appear be 
related to extrapolation, since scope furnishes us with information 
about the factual application domain of a generalization to (dis)similar 
systems rather than about the holding of a generalization in different 
background conditions. In fact, a generalization with a narrow scope 
could be extrapolable if it has a high degree of stability within its 
scope. Nor does the scope have much to do with how good or deep 
is an explanation furnished us by a generalization, because this has to 
do with how large is the invariance and/or stability domain of a 
generalization rather than the actual domain of application of that 
generalization (cf. Woodward 2000: 224-226, 2003a: 270; Hitchcock 
& Woodward 2003: 192-194 for similar ideas).  
                                                                                                    
defined to apply to non-change-relating generalizations. Although this 
implies that constancy is not an important form of stability in the context of 
causal explanations, there are non-causal explanations, such as constitutive 
explanations (see section 4.5), in which it could play an important role 
insofar as the generalizability of such explanations is concerned.  
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At the same time, scope appears to be related to projection. But 
in lieu of accounting for how projection is accomplished or on what 
properties of generalizations the support of other object 
counterfactuals depends, scope simply describes the systems to which 
a generalization applies or has applied. Consequently, scope does not 
illuminate the issue of projection. Regretfully, I do not have much to 
say about how the problem of projection is to be resolved. This is 
partly because other object counterfactuals involve changes in the 
identity of systems, which makes it difficult to estimate what 
consequences such drastic changes have (see  Woodward & 
Hitchcock 2003: 20).74   
Scope has a different, yet related function: it provides unification 
and systematization of (causal) knowledge (see also Waters 1998: 192-
194). This is generalizability, but one that has more to do with 
classifications and descriptions than with explanations. Although it 
could be claimed that unification is not what makes explanations 
explanatory (see Barnes 1992, Waters 1998, Woodward  2003a: 362-
367), unification can nevertheless be viewed as a serendipitous feature 
of causal explanations. Unification, for instance, allows for 
economical ways to present explanations. In other words, there are 
pragmatic and practical advantages in having unified explanations, 
especially in the sciences, where there appear to be different causes or 
mechanisms with similar effects, such as ecology. These points also 
suggest that projection is not a problem in the context of generalizing 
scientific causal explanations, because the scope or projectability of 
                                                 
74 Daniel Steel (2008) has made some other suggestions about what he calls 
―extrapolation.‖ Steel has developed a mechanistic approach to 
―extrapolation‖ supplemented with inferences that he calls ―comparative 
process tracing.‖ He endeavours to show that it is possible to ―extrapolate‖ 
qualitative claims about positive and negative causal relevance from one 
population to another population which ―heterogeneous‖ to the original. 
This suggests that his ―extrapolation‖ is what I call projection. It is 
unfortunate that Steel (2008) does not distinguish between what I call 
extrapolation and projection, since this makes it difficult to evaluate some of 
his developments and claims concerning his ―extrapolation‖ and 
generalizability of mechanistic explanations.   
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generalizations has to do with the pragmatic and practical aspects of 
explanations rather than with how deep or good are the explanations 
offered by different generalizations with varying scopes. 
 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 
In contrast to what previous philosophers have said about stability, I 
have suggested that it is not a monolithic property of generalizations 
but rather there are different, yet related concepts or meanings for 
stability. On this basis I criticized the idea that stability should be 
identified with lawlikeness. Although stability and scope seem to deal 
with the generality of generalizations, I argued that they differ in this 
respect. In my view, scope deals with generality that has do with the 
actual distribution or range of (dis)similar systems to which a 
generalization applies or has applied, whereas stability deals with 
generality that has to do with holding of a generalization in various 
possible background conditions. 
I discussed the different functions that stability and scope have 
in the context of ―generalizing‖ scientific explanations. Stability is an 
important property of generalizations insofar as their extrapolability 
and reliability are concerned, because stable generalizations furnish us 
with support of the counterfactuals I called passive, which have the 
form ―had this-or-that background condition been different, a 
generalization would still have held.‖  I called the stability domain of 
a generalization the range or extent of background conditions or 
interferences over which it supports passive counterfactuals. In 
general, the larger the stability domain of a generalization, the more 
(important) passive counterfactuals it supports, and accordingly, the 
more extrapolable and reliable the generalization it is, because it holds 
in many – and/or in more important – different possible background 
conditions rather than holding owing to  some actual or incidental 
background conditions. In this sense stable generalizations function 
as many philosophers believe only laws function.  
I have argued that scope has a different, but related function, 
namely, to provide unification and systematization of (causal) 
knowledge. I suggested that more unified explanations are not deeper 
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or better as explanations. Nevertheless, unification can be viewed as a 
serendipitous feature of causal explanations, owing to the practical 
and pragmatic advantages that unified or ―projectable‖ explanations 
have in contrast to less unified explanations.  
A choice that traditional law-centered views have forced upon 
us is the distinction between (universal) laws and case studies. The 
choice is made even by those who think that there is no (need for) 
biological laws. In a sense, I have presented the degrees between the 
two extremes. I have suggested that we have at our disposal 
ecological explanatory generalizations that are extrapolable and that 
unify or systematize our knowledge. Invariant and stable 
generalizations with varying scopes function in the above-described 
manner despite the fact that they need not be lawlike as 
generalizations and despite the fact that they are weakly and strongly 
contingent as generalizations.  
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6 
 
ROBUSTNESS AND SENSITIVITY75 
 
 
6.1 Scientific Models 
 
The sciences employ different kinds of models, and these models 
serve various different functions (cf. Odenbaugh 2005). I will focus 
on the theoretical and mathematical scientific models that the 
theorists postulate to explain phenomena.76 In such models, a causal 
generalization or a mechanism is modeled, and various modeling 
assumptions are made about it. I refer to these scientific models 
simply as models. For instance, models of competition theory – such 
as the Lotka–Volterra model of interspecific competition (see 
appendix) – are postulated to explain phenomena. Phenomena refer 
to stable patterns, such as local extinctions of populations of species, 
constant partitions of resources between species within a guild, 
checkerboard patterns of distribution of species on islands, species–
genus ratios on islands, and so on.  
Models contain simplifications, approximations, and 
idealizations, for which I use the collective term modeling 
assumptions.77 Modeling assumptions sometimes make false, 
unrealistic, or inaccurate presumptions of their targets. These targets 
                                                 
75 A version of this chapter was presented at the Philosophy of Science 
Group/Trends and Tensions in Intellectual Integration seminar 17 
November 2008 at the University of Helsinki. 
76 Note that I do not claim that these models are explanatory. Rather, I claim 
that these models are constructed with the aim at mind that they might 
provide explanations of phenomena.  
77 In this section, the term ―modeling assumptions‖ is used ambiguously on 
purpose. Later on I discuss the kinds of modeling assumptions that exist and 
how these might affect the way we classify, analyze, and define analyses of 
robustness. 
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are typically natural systems. Modeling assumptions of theoretical and 
mathematical models concern, for instance, the type and number of 
equations in the model and the number and type of variables and 
parameters in equations. Modeling assumptions are used for various 
reasons. For instance, they are called for when a theorist seeks 
computationally tractable solutions.  
The presence of modeling assumptions is one reason why 
some have questioned the representational accuracy, realism, and 
veracity of models. Moreover, many have criticized ecological models 
for lack of testability, lack of fit to data, and for giving inaccurate 
predictions (cf. Smith 1952, Pielou 1981, Hall 1988, and Peters 1991). 
In general, ecological models are often not amenable to direct 
empirical tests that provide clear results. Data are often equivocal, 
contested, or scarce, and parameter values of models are difficult to 
estimate or measure.  
Above are important issues of scientific models to which I 
offer no solutions. Nor do I discuss them in detail. My point is that 
they are some of the main reasons why modelers engage in 
robustness and sensitivity analyses. It is because models are not 
amenable to rigorous empirical tests, data is equivocal, and so on that 
modelers sometimes choose to investigate models and their results by 
means of non-empirical investigations that I call robustness and 
sensitivity analyses.  
I distinguish in this chapter, first, between robustness and 
sensitivity analyses. Second, I distinguish between two senses of 
robustness analyses, which I call derivational robustness and sufficient 
parameter robustness.  All three – sensitivity and the two senses of 
robustness analyses – have different functions. The purpose of 
sensitivity analysis is to investigate the stability conditions of a model. 
The purpose of derivational robustness analysis is to investigate 
whether the results of similar models depend on certain modeling 
assumptions about models. Finally, the purpose of sufficient 
parameter robustness analysis is to warrant the use of unifying, 
abstract, and simple models of complex biological phenomena. 
Although robustness and sensitivity analyses are non-empirical 
investigations of models, they could help in developing, testing, and 
confirming models, since they have the potential to show which 
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stability conditions and/or modeling assumptions the results of 
models depend on.   
I proceed as follows. In section 6.2, I discuss sensitivity 
analyses with examples. In sections 6.3 and 6.4, I both present 
derivational and sufficient parameter robustness analyses and 
examine the taxonomies of robustness analyses of previous authors. 
In section 6.5, I give an example of how derivational robustness and 
sensitivity analyses are used in ecology in the context of interspecific 
competition models. In section 6.6, I discuss sufficient parameter 
robustness analyses with examples. Section 6.7 concludes. 
 
 
6.2 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
I call sensitivity analyses investigations in which one model is studied 
with regard to its stability conditions by making changes and variations to 
the values of the model’s parameters.  
 Besides manipulating the values of variables of a modeled 
generalization or mechanism in a model to study its dynamic behavior 
– which amount to investigating the invariance conditions of that 
modeled generalization or mechanism – models are manipulated to 
study the behavior of the modeled generalization or mechanism 
under variation of its parameter values. The latter sometimes amounts 
to the investigation and simulation of the model‘s stability or 
background conditions; and to displaying how the modeled 
generalization or mechanism could function if its background 
conditions were varied in the devised manner.  
As an example, consider the species–area rule that can be 
modeled as a power equation, S=cAz, where S is the number of 
species in a given taxonomic group, A is the area of a habitat, and c 
and z are constants. There appears to be an invariant relation between 
the variables, ―area of a habitat‖ and its ―species diversity‖: according 
to a rule of thumb, manipulation or intervention in an area that 
increases it by ten-fold, doubles the species diversity of a habitat. The 
manipulation of area in a model of the species–area rule would 
amount to a non-empirical investigation of invariance conditions of 
the modeled generalization, such as  ―if an area of a habitat were 
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varied or manipulated in value to such-and-such, its species diversity 
would have changed to such-and-such.‖  
Although the parameter z of the species–area rule has some 
―canonical‖ values in the range between 0.15 and 0.35 (see, for 
instance, Preston 1962a, 1962b), its value depends on several 
different background conditions, such as whether the area in question 
is isolated or non-isolated as a habitat. Isolated habitats have higher z 
values than non-isolated habitats, and thus steeper slopes in the 
species–area curve, since z determines the slope of the curve.  In 
isolated habitats, such as islands, there is a reduced rate of 
immigration of the species, and as a consequence they support 
comparatively fewer species than non-isolated habitats of similar size. 
The value of the constant c of the species–area rule likewise depends 
on many background conditions, such as the latitudinal or general 
biotic richness of the area in question and so on. With variation of 
the values of z and c in a model of the species–area rule we can study 
how the species–area rule could behave in different background 
conditions. For instance, if the value of c is varied in a sensitivity 
analysis of a model of the species–area rule, this can sometimes be 
viewed as changing the biotic richness background condition for the 
species–area rule, and this manipulation displays how the rule could 
behave under changes in its background conditions. Such 
manipulations would amount to a non-empirical investigation of the 
stability conditions of the modeled generalization or mechanism.  
As another example of sensitivity analysis, Robert M. May 
(1974, 1976) demonstrated that simple, traditional non-linear models 
of population growth – such as the logistic and exponential models 
(see appendix) – in their difference equation forms drastically change 
their dynamic behavior if a value of one of their parameters – r, the 
intrinsic growth rate of population – is set above a certain threshold 
value. When r is set above its threshold value, the dynamics the above 
models exhibit is not that of classical point equilibrium but n-point 
cycles and even deterministic chaos, depending on how high the 
value of r is set. The results of May‘s sensitivity analyses of classical 
population growth models demonstrated that above the threshold 
value of r, well-behaved classical models exhibit new kinds of 
stabilities (e.g., cyclical stability instead of point equilibrium) and that 
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they likewise exhibit changes in their stability conditions (e.g., they 
displayed low trajectory stability characteristic of chaotic systems). 
The result of May‘s sensitivity analyses received a great deal of 
attention among ecologists; they appeared to be important for the 
research on population regulation since the results suggested that 
observations of stochastic fluctuations in population densities or 
numbers do not necessary imply density-independence in population 
growth as was traditionally thought by ecologists and as was 
suggested by their classical models on population growth. 
There seems to be no biological generalization that has no 
exceptions to it. It is no wonder that the study of exceptions and the 
study of conditions under which exceptions become possible have 
interested biologists. This is true also of biological modelers: for 
instance, there are many studies that investigate how Gause’s rule 
(see appendix) could have exceptions. These studies often use 
sensitivity analyses. Sensitivity analyses can show how a modeled 
causal generalization or mechanism could be broken up, and while 
doing this, we learn potentially something about the stability 
conditions of the causal core which is being modeled.  
However, since it can be claimed that models include modeling 
assumptions, which sometimes make false, inaccurate, or unrealistic 
presumptions of their targets, it could be suggested that nothing 
straightforward can be claimed on the basis of a sensitivity analysis of 
a model. In other words, there is a worry that it is modeling 
assumptions rather than – what are supposed to be – the core 
explanatory aspects of models that are responsible for the results of 
models. There is an answer to this problem. If it can additionally be 
shown that the results of a sensitivity analysis are robust with respect 
to other, similar models, then something might have been learned 
from a sensitivity analysis that prima facie is not affected or biased by 
the caricature status of an individual model. This is because it can be 
claimed with some plausibility that it is the common causal core of 
models rather than their different modeling assumptions about this 
core that were responsible for the results.  
It might be objected that my concept of sensitivity analysis is 
problematic. There are ―radical‖ variations of a model‘s parameter 
values that seem to yield new models (of different phenomena) rather 
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than being variations of an old model. For instance, when a modeler 
sets a value of a parameter of model – which is originally assumed to 
have non-zero values – to zero, this seem to amount to producing a 
new model rather than being a variation of the old model. As another 
example, setting the carrying capacity, K, of an environment to an 
extremely high value in an intraspecific competition model of 
population growth, such as the logistic population growth model 
discussed above, seems to amount to suggesting that the population 
in question is density independent in its growth or, in other words, that 
there is no intraspecific competition. Or consider a case in which 
both or one of the competition coefficients, 12 and 21, in a model 
of interspecific competition, such as the Lotka–Volterra model 
discussed below, are changed from negative to positive in value. Such a 
manipulation of parameter values would amount to not modeling 
interspecific competition, but symbiosis or 
commensalism/parasitism! 
At the same time, there seem to be examples of sensitivity 
analyses in which variations of models‘ parameter values preserve the 
identity of the model. Sometimes such analyses yield interesting 
results – especially when they are complemented by derivational 
robustness analyses – as I try to show below. In such studies 
modelers do not think that a new model is produced by variations but 
that an old one is studied to see what kinds of effects variations of 
the model‘s parameter values have on its ―output values.‖  
The problem here has to do with the identity of models. On 
what basis can one claim that the identity of a model has remained 
intact in sensitivity analyses? There is no space to discuss in detail 
how and on what criteria we should decide whether the identity of a 
model has changed in sensitivity analyses.  Perhaps it suffices to say 
that (at least some central) parameters in models are not 
undetermined things, but things that come with a biological 
interpretation, meaning, and motivation that restrict the values that 
they take (cf. also Levins 1993:552-553).  Thus, sensitivity is typically 
investigated over some range of parameter values. For instance, the 
parameter z in the model of the species-area rule has ―canonical 
values‖ in the range between 0.15 and 0.35. The important point is 
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that this range is determined separately for each model‘s parameter. 
These issues are moreover empirical and subject-matter specific. In a 
word, saying something general about these issues is difficult. Finally, 
a model‘s ―substantial assumptions‖ partly determine the limits within 
which the parameters of the model can be varied in a sensitivity 
analysis. For instance, in a model of interspecific competition, it is 
presumed that species have negative effects on each other‘s growth 
rates or population numbers (otherwise, it would not be a model of  
interspecific competition, but of some other syn-ecological 
relationship between species), which limits the values the competition 
coefficients of the model can take; in other words, the coefficients 
have negative values. This suggests that at least some ―radical‖ 
variations of parameter values discussed above should not be counted 
as sensitivity analyses, among other things, since some of the model‘s 
―substantial assumptions‖ are violated. 
As non-empirical investigations of models, sensitivity analyses 
are not as philosophically interesting or puzzling as robustness 
analyses are. However, sensitivity analyses need to be discussed in the 
context of robustness analyses for two reasons. First, some authors 
have failed to distinguish between robustness and sensitivity analyses 
and even confused the two (see section 6.4). This is not only 
conceptually inaccurate, but misleading as well, for robustness and 
sensitivity analyses differ in functions. Second, although robustness 
and sensitivity analyses are different as non-empirical investigations 
of models, robustness and sensitivity analyses are also intertwined as 
investigations and can be used in a manner that they reinforce one 
another.   
Sensitivity analysis is a term with different meanings. My 
definition is not intended to correspond to the activity in which the 
modeler investigates how the ―(un)certainty‖ in the input of a model 
could affect the ―(un)certainty‖ of its output, despite the fact that this 
is sometimes referred to in the literature as sensitivity analysis. 
Moreover, by sensitivity analysis I am not referring to perturbation 
analysis, which is a method for solving intractable equations, although 
this too is sometimes referred to as sensitivity analysis in the 
literature. Despite there being no generally shared definition of 
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sensitivity analysis, the meaning of the term as it is used in this 
chapter should be clear. 
 
 
6.3 Derivational and Sufficient Parameter Robustness Analyses 
  
In robustness analysis one is investigating different models and their 
variations to see how the results of models are (not) affected by 
differences and variations of models.  
As a general definition of robustness analyses I propose that 
they are investigations of variations in modeling assumptions of different models 
of the same phenomenon in which the focus is on whether they produce similar or 
convergent results or not. Because robustness analyses cover 
investigations of models under changes in their modeling 
assumptions, there are different ways to proceed in such 
investigations, because there are different ways to change modeling 
assumptions of models. Moreover and more importantly, there are 
different kinds of modeling assumptions that can be investigated in 
robustness analyses as to what effects their variations among or 
differences between models could have for the results of the models.  
The above general definition is meant to apply to Richard 
Levins‘ robustness. I distinguish between two senses of ―Levinsian‖ 
robustness, which are called derivational robustness (a term adopted 
from Woodward 2006a) and sufficient parameter robustness. 
Although Levins did not make such an exact distinction, it seems to 
be implicit in his examples of robustness analyses.  
Robustness analysis is a search for similar or convergent results 
of different models under the variation of their modeling 
assumptions. What does one mean by the claim that models are 
different? According to my first sense of robustness, derivational 
robustness, different models are similar in the sense that they model the 
same or similar causal generalizations or mechanisms (which I here 
call the ―common causal core‖ of models, borrowing the term from 
Weisberg), but different in the sense that they make different 
modeling assumptions about this core.  For instance, there are 
models of interspecific competition in ecology that share a causal 
core, but that differ in modeling assumptions made about the core: 
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cf. different variations and versions of the classical Lotka–Volterra 
model.  
Richard Levins was aware that models contain modeling 
assumptions that are open to suspicion, and that there is the 
possibility that the results of models depend on modeling 
assumptions rather than ―on the essentials of the models.‖ As a 
remedy he proposes robustness analysis:   
Therefore, we attempt to treat the same problem with several 
alternative models each with different simplifications but with 
a common biological assumption. Then, if these models, 
despite their different assumptions, lead to similar results, we 
have what we can call a robust theorem that is relatively free of 
the details of the model. Hence, our truth is the intersection of 
independent lies. (Levins 1966: 423.)  
 
This is an often-cited passage from Levins. This passage fits with the 
above idea of derivational robustness, where Levins‘ ―common 
biological assumption‖ is equivalent to my ―common causal core‖ of 
models. This sense is also the one which many of the papers on 
robustness adopt (cf. Gibbard and Varian 1978: 674-677; Weisberg 
2006a: 640-643, 2006b; Weisberg & Reisman 2008; Kuorikoski, 
Lehtinen & Marchionni 2010).  
The second sense of robustness has to do with investigations 
of dissimilar models, that is, models that model different causal 
generalizations or mechanisms for one and the same phenomenon. In 
other words, such models differ in their causal core. This second 
sense of robustness, which is discussed under sufficient parameter 
robustness below, has been neglected in the literature.  
Jaakko Kuorikoski, Aki Lehtinen, and Catherine Marchionni 
(2010) distinguish between two kinds of modeling assumptions, 
which they call tractability assumptions and substantial assumptions. 
The authors suggest that tractability assumptions are introduced into 
models through mathematical tractability, and they distinguish 
tractability assumptions from models‘ substantial assumptions, which 
define the causal core of models. This distinction allows the meaning 
of derivational and sufficient parameter robustness analyses to be 
more closely defined.  
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I suggest that we define derivational robustness analyses as 
investigations of how differences in the models‘ tractability assumptions 
could affect their results, while sufficient parameter robustness analyses 
could be defined as investigations of how differences in the models‘ 
substantial assumptions affect their results. The point of distinguishing 
sufficient parameter robustness analysis from derivational robustness 
analysis is to emphasize that robustness analyses are not simply 
investigations of how differences in ―modeling assumptions‖ could 
affect the results into models, but also that there are different kinds 
of modeling assumptions. Consequently, there could be different 
kinds of robustness analyses as long as different kinds of modeling 
assumptions are investigated.78  
In addition to Levins‘ robustness, there is William C. Wimsatt‘s 
robustness analysis as ―multiple means of determination‖ (see 
Wimsatt 1980a: 306-315, 1980b, 1981, 1994: 210-220, 2007: 37-74; 
see also Culp 1994, Hudson 1999, and Calcott 2010). This concept 
appears to be different from the two ―Levinsian‖ notions just 
discussed. Wimsatt‘s robustness analysis has been used in the context 
of evidence and data, hypothesis testing, objectification, calibration of 
instruments and results, realism, and so on. Kuorikoski et al. (2010) 
show how derivational robustness can be embedded within Wimsatt‘s 
scheme of robustness. Kuorikoski et al. show how what they and I 
have called derivational robustness can be interpreted as an example 
of Wimsatt‘s robustness and how derivational robustness analysis can 
be understood as an activity in model building (in economics) that 
supplies epistemic credence to the robust results of models.  
I have not discussed the epistemic relevance of derivational 
robustness analysis, since it does not seem to be typical of biological 
modelers to be mainly engaged in investigating the effects that 
different tractability assumptions have on the results of models, such 
as Kuorikoski et al. (2010) suggest is the case with economic models 
and their robustness analyses. Rather, it is typical of biological 
                                                 
78 The taxonomy of modeling assumptions presented above is undoubtedly 
far from exhaustive. In fact, with a more detailed taxonomy of modeling 
assumptions (see, for instance, Mäki 2000 and Musgrave 2001), we could 
arrive at a more detailed taxonomy of robustness analyses of models. 
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modelers to investigate what effects different substantial assumptions 
could have on the results of the models. In other words, biological 
modelers investigate models with regard to their derivational and 
sufficient parameter robustness, based on two reasons that reflect the 
nature of the models‘ targets. First, there is variation within biological 
systems and, second, there appear to be alternative, redundant causes 
or mechanisms for many biological phenomena. Consequently, it 
would be difficult to argue that robustness analyses have significant 
epistemic implications for the robust results of biological models, 
since biological models‘ substantial assumptions appear less 
―substantial‖ and more ―varied‖ in robustness analyses than they 
might be in the case of economic models and their robustness 
analyses. 
I admit that the distinction between derivational and sufficient 
parameter robustness is slippery insofar as it rests on the distinction 
between similarity and dissimilarity of models‘ ―causal core.‖ Yet, this 
distinction is slippery, because similarity is a concept of degree rather 
than an absolute.  
 
 
6.4 Previous Taxonomies of Robustness Analyses 
 
Other authors have also provided taxonomies of robustness. I will 
comment upon two vis-à-vis my robustness and sensitivity analyses.  
Michael Weisberg and Kenneth Reisman (2008) distinguish 
three kinds of robustness, parameter robustness (results surviving 
changes to the parameter set of a model), structural robustness 
(results surviving changes to the structure of the model), and 
representational robustness (results surviving changes to the whole 
representational framework in which the model has been framed).  
The idea of their parameter robustness appears to be 
problematic, given my distinction between robustness and sensitivity 
analyses. I defined sensitivity analysis as having to do with variation 
of parameter values of a model. Sensitivity analyses differ from 
robustness analyses in that in the former only one model is studied 
and the focus is on the stability conditions of the model rather than 
on different modeling assumptions introduced into (dis)similar 
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models and their effects on the results of the models. The point just 
outlined suggest that Weisberg‘s and Reisman‘s parameter robustness 
as an investigation of how ―results survive changes to the parameter 
set of a model‖ should perhaps be viewed as an instance of sensitivity 
analysis rather than robustness analysis. In any event, the authors do 
not provide criteria according to which sensitivity analyses are to be 
distinguished from robustness analyses. This suggests that Weisberg 
and Reisman have not differentiated (parameter) robustness analysis 
sufficiently from other non-empirical investigations of models, such 
as sensitivity analysis, which in turn suggests that their definition of 
(parameter) robustness is insufficient.  
Another problem with their characterization of parameter 
robustness analysis is that some ―radical‖ variations of parameter 
values of models apparently produce dissimilar models of different 
phenomena rather than being investigations of similar models of the 
same phenomenon; cf. the example in section 6.2, in which one or 
both of the competition coefficients in a model of interspecific 
competition were changed from negative to positive in value. Again, 
this shows that Weisberg and Reisman owe us criteria by which 
robustness analysis can be distinguished from other non-empirical 
investigations and manipulations of models. 
The idea of Weisberg‘s and Reisman‘s representational 
robustness is to investigate what effects different representational 
frameworks of a model could have on the results of the modeled 
causal core. The idea of their structural robustness is to investigate 
whether variation in the structure of a model makes a difference in 
the results of the modeled causal core. To my mind, Weisberg and 
Reisman have identified interesting and important scientific activities 
in these robustness analyses. One problem with structural robustness 
analysis is that the term ―structure‖ appears to be non-committal in 
meaning insofar as it does not specify what kinds of differences in or 
variations among models we are interested in through such analyses. 
In fact, a similar criticism seems to apply to representational 
robustness analysis and its ―representational framework‖ of a model.  
The main problem with representational and structural 
robustness, however, is that both presuppose, without any 
justification or argument, that robustness analyses are investigations 
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of how certain differences in or variations among similar models 
could affect their results. Note that without this assumption, their 
representational and structural robustness analyses would not 
function in the way Weisberg and Reisman suggest. For instance, 
ecologists model and simulate competition within and between 
species by using differential and difference equations, stochastic and 
deterministic models, and so on. Although these are models of the 
same phenomenon, which are presented by using different 
representational frameworks, the models can also be dissimilar insofar 
as their causal core is concerned. In such situations, representational 
robustness analysis would not function, simply because it could not 
be claimed that it is the differences in or variations among models‘ 
―representations‖ that are responsible for the differences in the 
results of such models, since the models also differ in their causal 
core. A similar argument can be made in the case of structural 
robustness analysis, that is, there are ―structurally different‖ and 
dissimilar models of many ecological phenomena.  
There would be no problem if derivational robustness analysis 
were the only game in town. However, as I have suggested, there 
seem to be robustness analyses that investigate dissimilar models. This 
is a problem for Weisberg and Reisman, because their definition of 
robustness analysis neglects the possibility that there might be 
different kinds of modeling assumptions in addition to tractability 
assumptions. These could be investigated in robustness analyses for 
the effects that their differences in or variations among models could 
have on the results of the models.  
James Woodward (2006a) distinguishes four notions of 
robustness: inferential, measurement, derivational, and causal 
robustness. The problem with Woodward‘s taxonomy is in a sense 
the antithesis of that provided by Weisberg and Reisman. Whereas 
the latter two authors concentrate on a narrow sense of robustness 
analysis, Woodward extends the meaning of the term to cover all 
kinds of non-empirical investigations of models without giving much 
justification for this extended use. 
As the name suggests, inferential robustness has to do with the 
sensitivity of an inference from a body of data to a conclusion that is 
reached by using different ―assumptions.‖ For instance, if different 
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models give similar or convergent results, when there is suggestive 
but not conclusive evidence for the results, then robustness is thought 
to give good grounds for believing or inferring that the results are 
likewise true. If, however, different models lead to non-robust results, 
then this is seen as a reason to suspend belief regarding the results.  
Inferential robustness seems to be what Steven Hecht Orzack 
and Elliot Sober (1993) interpreted robustness to be, when they 
accused Levins (1966) of proposing that robustness is a non-
empirical way of confirming or testing models. Levins (1993) 
responded that this was not what he meant by robustness (as is 
discussed in section 6.5) and that confirmation and testing of models 
is different from robustness analysis but used in conjunction with it. 
In addition, Levins had good reasons to make this claim since, as 
Woodward (2006a: 219-231) demonstrates, inferential robustness 
seems to be demanding as a notion and not applicable to most of the 
cases where scientists use robustness analyses. In any event, this 
notion is different from Levins‘ sense of robustness analysis (or 
analyses) discussed here.  
Woodward‘s measurement robustness corresponds partly to 
Wimsatt‘s sense of robustness, which I do not discuss in detail in this 
chapter (see the previous section, however). His causal robustness has 
to do with the size or range of invariance conditions of models. 
Rather than thinking of this as an instance of robustness analysis (or 
sensitivity analysis), I suggest that we view his causal robustness as an 
instance of non-empirical investigation of the invariance conditions 
of a model. In other words, Woodward has confused  robustness 
analyses with other non-empirical investigations or manipulations of 
models.  
The idea of his fourth notion of robustness, derivational 
robustness, corresponds to my derivational robustness. However, 
Woodward‘s example of this robustness could be interpreted to 
correspond to my sensitivity analysis, which suggests that Woodward 
has confused robustness and sensitivity analyses with one another; or 
alternatively failed to provide criteria for how we are to distinguish 
the two. As an example of derivational robustness, Woodward 
discusses the case in which the value of a parameter of a regression 
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model is varied to see what implications this has for the results of 
that model. 
 
 
6.5 Sensitivity and Derivational Robustness Analyses of a 
Lotka–Volterra Competition Model and Exceptions to Gause’s 
Rule 
 
The purpose of derivational robustness analysis is to investigate 
whether a model‘s tractability assumptions (do not) make a difference 
for the results of that model. Although modelers introduce 
falsehoods, inaccuracies, omissions, and so on into models in their 
modeling tractability assumptions in order to make models more 
tractable mathematically, analytically, computationally, and so on, it 
can be shown that these do not bias or affect the results of the 
models if there are similar models using different modeling 
assumptions that have similar or convergent results. Unless otherwise 
stated, the term modeling assumptions in this section refers to 
tractability assumptions. 
However, demonstrating that a result is not derivationally 
robust is an important achievement as well. Such a demonstration has 
the potential to show which specific modeling assumption(s) that 
result depends on. This is important, since it is difficult to test and 
investigate each and every modeling assumption of models separately 
and individually to see how they affect the results. The same is true 
when results are robust: one can say that results appear not to be 
dependent on the different modeling assumptions of models but 
follow from their common causal or explanatory core without testing 
and investigating each and every assumption separately and 
individually. This shows how derivational robustness analyses can 
help in the context of testing of models. If results are not similar or 
convergent, one needs to isolate the assumptions of models that are 
responsible for non-convergence. With a non-robust result, testing of 
models becomes easier since individual assumptions of models can 
sometimes be tested and studied empirically. 
The point of derivational robustness is not to show that 
models with robust results are more trustworthy, realistic, valid, or 
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true given only the robustness of their results. Levins (1993: 554) 
himself wanted to distance robustness from such implications:  
Orzack and Sober [1993] are worried that the robustness 
strategy seems to propose a way to truth independent of 
observation. This is not the case. Observation enters first in 
the choice of the core model and the selection of plausible 
variable parts, and later in the testing of the predictions that 
follow from the core model. Multiple models sharing that same 
core [C] help to find the consequences of that core when we 
are unable to offer a general proof that C implies R [where R is 
a robust theorem of C]. Thus the search for robustness as 
understood here is a valid strategy for separating conclusions 
that depend on the common biological core of a model from 
simple simplifications, distortion and omissions introduced to 
facilitate the analysis, and for arriving at the implications of 
partial truths. The use of multiple models is a common 
practice for this reason, either to strengthen the conclusion or 
to guide us in looking for a general result.  
 
Derivational robustness analyses show which modeling assumptions 
certain results of different models (do not) depend on. It does not 
furnish models or their results with truth values or confirmation, 
however (see also Forber 2010: 37-39).  
As an example of how sensitivity and derivational robustness 
analyses function together, I will take up the classical model of 
interspecific competition and some results it suggests. My purpose is 
to show that some central and traditional results of this model are 
both sensitive and non-robust.  
One central task of ecology is to account for the diversity of 
life. According to Gause’s rule, there should not coexist in the same 
habitat or community many species that are in intense competition 
with their limiting resources, such as food, space, and nesting site. 
That is, species that have similar, let alone identical, niches cannot 
coexist at the same place for long periods of time. The classical model 
of interspecific competition is the Lotka–Volterra model. Gause‘s 
rule can be viewed as a theorem or a mathematical consequence of 
this model. The traditional idea and result of the classical Lotka–
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Volterra model of interspecific competition is that the number of 
species competing for a set of limiting resources should not exceed 
the number of resources in that set – in equilibrium n sympatric 
species cannot coexist indefinitely on fewer than n resources. The 
converse is also thought to be true: n sympatric species that coexist 
indefinitely with fewer than n resources must have (evolved) different 
(realized) niches (cf. limiting similarity). Laboratory experiments 
apparently confirmed the mathematical and analytical results of the 
classical model of interspecific competition on which Gause‘s rule is 
based (see Park 1948, 1954, 1957, Leslie et al. 1968).  
There are striking exceptions to the above idea, however. That 
is, there are ecologically similar species co-existing for long periods of 
time with few resources. For instance, many co-existing 
phytoplankton species live in bodies of waters and share a low 
number of resources; these resources are likewise very limiting as a 
result of their scarcity (see Hutchinson 1961). In such a situation, one 
would expect to find intense competition among phytoplankton 
species and local extinctions of all but one or very few of the species. 
The explanation that G. Evelyn Hutchinson gave to this 
famous ―paradox of the plankton‖ was that owing to their fluctuating 
environment, the competitive systems of the species do not reach 
their (point) equilibrium. I will return to this explanation below in the 
context of sufficient parameter robustness. In any case, exceptions to 
Gause‘s rule, such as the findings mentioned, inspired theoretical and 
mathematical ecologists to investigate conditions under which 
Gause‘s rule does not hold. I will limit my discussion to a few 
theoretical and mathematical studies that exhibit how derivational 
robustness and sensitivity analyses are used to provide, first, 
conditions under which such exceptions can occur and, second, 
demonstrations of parameter values or modeling assumptions, that 
these exceptions depend on.  
It has been demonstrated by mathematical and theoretical 
ecologists that coexistence of n species with fewer than n resources is 
possible given certain parameter values of the classical competition 
model and/or given that some of the classical modeling assumptions 
of the Lotka–Volterra model are relaxed or replaced with other 
assumptions. Thus, ―no coexistence of n species with fewer than n 
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resources,‖ that is, Gause‘s rule, is as a result sensitive to certain 
parameter values of the classical interspecific competition model, 
such as the values of intrinsic growth rates and/or competition 
coefficients (cf. Koch 1974a, 1974b, and Vandermeer et al. 2002). In 
addition, Gause‘s rule is a non-robust result of this model:  coexistence 
of n species with fewer than n resources seems impossible owing to 
certain tractability assumptions of the classical model.  
The idea codified in Gause‘s rule, which was suggested by the 
classical Lotka–Volterra interspecific competition model, depended 
on two general factors. First, it depended on certain (unrealistic) 
modeling assumptions of the Lotka–Volterra model, for instance, 
that there is a linearity assumption in species‘ intrinsic growth rates 
with the amount of resource(s) and that all the life history 
characteristics of species are described adequately by this coefficient; 
no time lags are allowed; environment is supposed to be spatially and 
temporally homogenous; there are no higher order interactions 
between species; migration is unimportant; and competition is the 
only important syn-ecological force that affects the system. All the 
assumptions just outlined are such that when some or one of them 
are relaxed, co-existence of competitors becomes possible especially 
if they are accompanied by the following factor. Second, in the 
classical model only certain stabilities – namely,  point equilibrium of 
fixed population densities – of results were thought to exhibit 
coexistence, whereas today it is presumed that at their coexistence 
equilibrium competitive systems can and do exhibit other stabilities, 
especially cyclical stability (see Armstrong & McGehee 1980 and 
Chesson & Case 1986; cf. also Cuddington 2001). 
Accordingly, it can be proposed that Gause‘s rule holds only 
for a certain range of parameter values and/or with certain tractability 
assumptions.79 However, the classical model of interspecific 
                                                 
79 Interestingly, Arthur L. Koch (1974a) showed that his demonstration of 
co-existence of two competitors with one resource in a seasonally varying 
environment was a robust result of non-classical interspecific competition 
models. Another interesting case of robustness analysis is the Volterra rule 
(see appendix), which evidently is robust with regard to different Lotka–
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competition can be helpful despite its being false or inapplicable: one 
can use this model – when its robustness and sensitivity are being 
analyzed – to point out reasons why the model fails to hold. 
Hutchinson (1961: 143) apparently held a similar view:  
[M]y main purpose has been to show how a certain theory, 
namely, that of competitive exclusion, can be used to examine 
a situation where its main conclusions seem to be empirically 
false. Just because the theory is analytically true and in a certain 
sense tautological, we can trust it in the work of trying to find 
out what has happened to cause its empirical falsification.  
 
In the above analyses one has moved towards an explanation of why 
some models did not hold and why there were exceptions to them: 
Robustness and sensitivity analyses are powerful tools for studying 
the conditions and assumptions where models break down – and they 
are especially powerful in pointing out reasons as to why they do this. 
They show which conditions or assumptions the results of models 
depend on. For instance, when one has a non-robust result, it is 
sometimes possible to pinpoint the modeling assumptions that are 
responsible for this result or that are responsible for the non-
robustness of this result. If the result is in conflict with the data, one 
can replace the corresponding modeling assumption(s) to resolve the 
conflict. In this sense, as William C. Wimsatt (1987) would put it, this 
process allows one to move toward truer or realistic models and 
theories.80  
 
 
 
                                                                                                    
Volterra prey–predator models (see Weisberg 2006a: 642-643, 2006b; 
Weisberg & Reisman 2008). 
80 This does not imply that robustness (or sensitivity) analysis is a non-
empirical way to confirm models, as was discussed above. The point here is 
that robustness and sensitivity analyses can be used in confirming, testing, 
and developing models, since these analyses can be used to show in which 
conditions and/or on what assumptions the results of the models do or do 
not depend. 
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6.6 Sufficient Parameters and Robustness Analyses 
 
I have discussed robustness that dealt with models and results that 
had a common or similar causal core, but that made different 
tractability assumptions about this core. There appears to be another 
type of robustness analysis that has to do with investigations of 
dissimilar models, namely, models that differ in substantial 
assumptions. I will call this sufficient parameter robustness, since 
Richard Levins and William C. Wimsatt speak of sufficient 
parameters in the context of robustness analyses.  
I will show how sufficient parameters, robustness, and the use 
of simple and abstract models of complex phenomena – themes that 
were and are still defended by Levins (1966, 1993, 1998, 2006; Levins 
& Lewontin 1980; see also Odenbaugh 2003, 2006) – are connected 
to one another.81 Unless otherwise stated, the term modeling 
assumptions in this section refers to substantial assumptions. 
One pervasive problem of the biological sciences is that there 
appear to be many different causes or mechanisms (at lower levels) 
that have similar or convergent results, and that we often do not 
know which of them is the actual cause or mechanism of a 
phenomenon – or which contribute or interact to produce it. One 
advantage of having sufficient parameter robust results of dissimilar 
models is that their robustness counts as a warrant to use unifying, 
                                                 
81 I will not take up the issue of different types of models or modeling. Nor 
will I discuss the related issue of impossibility of simultaneously maximizing 
models‘ generality, realism, and precision. These latter issues of Levins have 
interested many (cf. Orzack & Sober 1993; Odenbaugh 2003, 2006; Orzack 
2005; Weisberg 2006a), whereas sufficient parameters and their connection 
to robustness have not. The only recent paper I know of that discusses 
sufficient parameters in detail is Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2006). His 
ideas have developed from a different angle than mine. Winther discusses 
how Levins‘ ideas of modeling, including his idea of sufficient parameters, 
are connected with the dialectic view of science as defended by Levins. This 
dialectic view of science and Levins‘ related criticism of reifying abstractions 
are not discussed in these pages. 
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abstract, and simple models of complex phenomena.82 In lieu of 
building a model for each and every case where different mechanisms 
or causes are or could be at work, a modeler builds a model that is 
simple and abstract, yet robust or unifying in that it captures the 
common effect(s) of dissimilar models, which model or illustrate 
different causes or mechanisms with similar effects. One way to build 
such models is by constructing a ―sufficient parameter‖ into a model 
(see Levins 1966; Wimsatt 1979: 360-361, 366, 1980a: 303-306, 1981: 
149-151). 
Levins himself clarified this concept first by an analogy:  
The thousand or so variables of our original equations can be 
reduced to manageable proportions by a process of abstraction 
whereby many terms enter into consideration only by way of a 
reduced number of higher-level entities. Thus, all the 
physiological interactions of genes in a genotype enter the 
models of population genetics only as part of ―fitness.‖ 
[…]The multiplicity of species interactions is grouped in the 
vague notions of the ecological niche, niche overlap, niche 
breath, and competition coefficients. It is an essential 
ingredient in the concept of levels of phenomena that there 
exists a set of what, by analogy with the sufficient statistic, we 
can call sufficient parameters defined on a given level (say 
community) which are very much fewer in number of 
parameters on the lower level and which among them contain 
most of the important information about events on that level. 
(Levins 1966: 428.)  
 
Levins (1966: 429) goes on to characterize the concept in a more 
precise way:   
The sufficient parameters may arise from the combination of 
results of more limited studies. In our robust theorem on niche 
                                                 
82 I am not suggesting that the above is the only advantage of having robust 
results of dissimilar models. However, the advantage just mentioned accords 
with Levins‘ ideas of modeling in biology (see Levins 1966 and Odenbaugh 
2003, 2006), which is one of the main topics of this chapter insofar as 
robustness analyses are concerned.  
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breadth [i.e., in an uncertain environment species will evolve 
broad niches and tend toward polymorphism but a certain and 
diverse environment leads to specializations] we found that 
temporal variation, patchiness of the environment, 
productivity of the habitat, and mode of hunting could all have 
similar effects, and they did this by way of their contribution to 
the uncertainty of the environment. Thus uncertainty emerges 
as a sufficient parameter. 
The sufficient parameter is a many-to-one 
transformation of lower-level phenomena. Therein lies its 
power and utility, but also a new source of imprecision. The 
many-to-one nature of ―uncertainty‖ prevents us from going 
backward. If either temporal variation or patchiness or low 
productivity leads to uncertainty, the consequences of 
uncertainty alone cannot tell us whether the environment is 
variable or patchy or unproductive. Therefore we have lost 
information.  
 
William C. Wimsatt (1980a: 304-305) developed the idea from a 
similar angle:  
A sufficient parameter is thus an index which, either for most 
purposes, or merely for the purposes at hand, captures the 
effect of variations in the lower level variables (usually only for 
certain ranges of the values of these variables) and can thus be 
substituted for them in the attempt to build simpler models of 
the upper level phenomena. It is related to the notion of a 
supervenient property widely discussed in the recent 
philosophical literature… except that whereas the latter 
involves a deductive and therefore exact relation between 
lower and upper level properties, the notion of a sufficient 
parameter is broader, involving a relation which is inexact, 
approximate and usually conditional. A sufficient parameter is 
a heuristic tool for dealing with complexity... The notion of 
supervenience … may be regarded as a kind of limiting case of 
a sufficient parameter, but it is I would argue, a relation which 
is seldom is ever found in the models of the science. Sufficient 
parameters, however, are frequent tools of scientists.  
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The characterizations just outlined are still quite non-committal as to 
what exactly a sufficient parameter is. To begin with, the name 
appears to be misleading since a variable as well as a parameter can 
count as a sufficient parameter, as Wimsatt notices. Also, what kind 
of ―levels‖ are sufficient parameters about?83 There are many other 
open questions and issues insofar as the concept and its use in the 
context of models are concerned. For instance, why are we justified 
in using sufficient parameters if we lose information when we use 
them? What is the relation between sufficient parameters and 
supervenient concepts or properties? Do sufficient parameters have 
anything to do with robustness analyses of models?  
As an example of a sufficient parameter, consider 
―environmental heterogeneity.‖ Environmental heterogeneity 
includes different kinds of environmental factors – spatial and/or 
temporal – that can prevent ―ecologically similar‖ species from 
outcompeting one another. In other words, different instances of 
environmental heterogeneity have a robust result: they make 
exception to Gause‘s rule possible. In the high latitudes, for instance, 
there are temporal or seasonal variations of limiting resources of many 
species and guilds: nesting sites, amount of sunlight, minerals, 
nutrients, and so on. Roughly speaking, if temporal variation of these 
resources is faster – yet not too fast – than the time it takes for 
competitive systems to reach their equilibria, then temporal variation 
of resources can prevent competitive systems from reaching their 
competitive equilibria in which one or more species is locally 
outcompeted and displaced by other, ecologically more efficient 
species.84 Spatial environmental heterogeneity works differently. 
                                                 
83 Reference to supervenience in this context is not helpful, because this 
relation is used in different ways in the literature. Moreover, there are doubts 
about the usefulness of supervenience as a determination relation (see 
Horgan 1993).  Furthermore, it is not constitutive determination relations 
that are important in the given context (as reference to supervenience might 
suggest), but rather causal and mechanistic relations, as I argue below.  
84 The above is, in crude terms, the explanation that Hutchinson (1953, 
1959, 1961) gave to his ―paradox of the plankton‖ referred to above. 
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There might be (poor-quality) habitat patches that provide ―refugee 
camps‖ for an inferior competitor species, and from which they re-
colonize the (high-quality) patches where they are being displaced by 
a better competitor. If vagility or the intrinsic growth rate of the 
former species is sufficiently high, and/or its has a broader 
environmental tolerance, this can lead to the co-existence of 
competitor species, despite the fact that the other species is superior 
insofar as competition and use of resources are concerned.  
The point of a sufficient parameter is not that different 
instances of, for instance, environmental heterogeneity are different 
realizations of it. They are different realizations of it, but nothing 
important follows from this non-causal, constitutive fact. The same is 
true for the idea that a sufficient parameter is a supervenient concept 
that has a larger scope than the lower level realizations that it covers, 
and that owing to this larger scope it would furnish us with higher 
level (lawlike) explanations of phenomena. The point is that these 
different realizations are realized by different (lower level) causes or 
mechanisms, and they are modeled by different models. It is robustness 
of results of dissimilar models – which describe specific alternative 
(lower level) causes or mechanisms – that justifies using simple and 
abstract models with sufficient parameters.  
Some mechanisms of environmental heterogeneity work by 
lowering population densities of competing species, which then lower the 
intensity of competition among species; others work by changing the 
competition rankings between the species, and so on. But as a result of 
their robustness, those individual models that describe different 
causes or mechanisms of spatial or temporal environmental 
heterogeneity can be described by an abstract, simple model with a 
sufficient parameter, such as ―environmental heterogeneity‖ in which 
the differences mentioned are abstracted away, and the abstraction is 
―justified‖ as a result of the sufficient parameter robustness of the 
results of dissimilar models. Similarly, ―area‖ in the species–area 
rule‘s model might function as a sufficient parameter in the sense that 
there are different (hypothetical and putative) mechanisms suggested 
in the literature as to how ―area‖ affects ―species diversity‖ (see 
Simberloff 1974, 1976b; Connor & McCoy 1979; Williamson 1989a; 
Lawton 1996).   
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As another instance, consider Levins‘ (1966) example of a 
robust theorem (referred to above): in an uncertain environment 
species will evolve broad niches and tend toward polymorphism, but 
a certain and diverse environment leads to specialization. There are 
different instances of environmental uncertainty, such as the temporal 
variation of the environment and the patchiness of the environment, 
which seem to have similar effects on the niches of species. The 
robustness of the results of different models of environmental 
uncertainty allows us to use ―environmental uncertainty‖ as a 
sufficient parameter in an abstract model of this phenomenon.  
Levins (1966) establishes the above with three models, each of which 
makes different, substantial assumptions about species, their fitness, 
genetics, and so on. Since the three dissimilar models have the 
common result referred to above, this ―justifies‖ using environmental 
uncertainty as a sufficient parameter in an abstract or general model 
of this phenomenon.  
Sufficient parameters are rife in the biological sciences; 
consider, for instance, character displacement, the carrying capacity 
of the environment, K, competition coefficients, α, diversity, fitness, 
environmental uncertainty, intermediate disturbance, the intrinsic 
growth rate of a population, r,  limiting similarity, predation 
efficiency, resources, species packing, and so on. Sufficient 
parameters in models function as abstract or general causal surrogates 
for different (lower level) causes or mechanisms that seem to have 
the same or similar effects in models of certain phenomena.  A model 
with a sufficient parameter shows how modeled causes or 
mechanisms can be presented in a unifying theoretical framework 
which makes abstract the differences between different (modeled) 
causes or mechanisms with similar results.85 In other words, if a result 
is sufficient parameter robust, the job of identifying the actual cause 
                                                 
85 Although it could be claimed that unification is not what makes an 
explanation explanatory, unification can be seen as a serendipitous feature of 
causal explanations owing to the pragmatic and practical advantages that 
unified explanations have. Unification, for instance, facilitates economical 
ways of presenting explanations.  
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or mechanism can be explanatory irrelevant for some modeling 
purposes.86 
In the special sciences the strategy to use a diverse set of simple, 
robust, and abstract models to study complex phenomena is 
widespread (see Levins 1966; Odenbaugh 2003, 2006; and Boyd & 
Richerson 2005). Ecological theories can be seen as collections of 
such models. Simple and abstract models of one and the same 
phenomenon are used in ecology with other such models of other 
phenomena to gain understanding of complex phenomena of which 
the individual models are caricatures. There is one set of simple and 
abstract models that describes the potential effects of interspecific 
competition; another set of models is designed to describe the effects 
of predation, and so on. Theories of competition, niche, diversity, 
and abundance of species and populations form a more or less 
coupled set of simple and abstract theoretical ecological models that 
are developed and elaborated when new models for phenomena get 
proposed and when the previous models and their results are studied 
via robustness and sensitivity analyses.  
 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
 
Recent philosophical discussion has focused on Richard Levins‘ ideas 
of scientific modeling in biology and robustness analysis that date 
back to the 1960s. This chapter has contributed to this discussion by 
providing a sense of robustness analysis, called sufficient parameter 
robustness, a concept that so far has been neglected in the literature.   
Robustness and sensitivity analyses were argued to be powerful 
tools for analyzing which conditions or assumptions the results of 
                                                 
86 Nothing in the above presupposes that for genuine or true explanations 
the identification of the actual cause or mechanism has become redundant 
owing to sufficient parameter robustness of the results of models. Besides 
hiding information about the actual cause or mechanism of the 
phenomenon in a model, information about alternative causes‘ and 
mechanisms‘ stability and invariance conditions is something that the use of 
sufficient parameters hides. 
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models depend on. Although robustness and sensitivity analyses are 
non-empirical investigations of models, they could help in testing and 
confirming models, since they have the potential to show which 
stability conditions and/or modeling assumptions the results of 
models depend on. In this sense, robustness and sensitivity analyses 
allow one to move toward truer or realistic ecological models and 
theories. 
Robustness and sensitivity analyses are called by a variety of 
names. For instance, some modelers call the variation in the 
parameter values of a model robustness analysis rather than 
sensitivity analysis as I do. The point of this chapter was not how 
these terms are used in the sciences. Rather, the point was to develop 
definitions of non-empirical investigations of the models that I called 
robustness and sensitivity analyses and to facilitate a better 
understanding of these concepts. Providing better definitions and 
understanding of robustness and sensitivity analyses is important, as 
previous authors have concentrated on a narrow sense of robustness 
analysis, which they have inadequately distinguished from other non-
empirical investigations of models, such as sensitivity analysis. 
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SUMMARY 
 
 In chapter 1, I suggested that two important issues prior to the 
ecological laws debate have been treated carelessly: the definitions of 
laws and the justifications of them. The covering law account 
suggested an important justification for the ecological laws debate, 
namely, that the proprietary function of laws is to furnish us with 
scientific explanations. Thus, there is one (historically) influential 
justification for the laws debate, which is also strong enough, given 
the apparent paucity of ecological laws, to justify such a debate. This 
justification has practical relevance for ecologists as well.  
 In chapter 2, I analyzed nine arguments for the absence of 
biological laws based on  the alleged distinctive features of biological 
generalizations and phenomena. I claimed that the evolutionary 
contingency thesis by John Beatty (1995) presents a serious threat to 
the existence of biological laws, whereas other arguments were argued  
not to present serious problems for the lawlike status of biological 
generalizations.  
 In chapter 3, I criticized several (non-traditional) accounts of 
laws as being insufficient to redeem the lawlike status of (strongly and 
weakly contingent) biological generalizations. I also suggested that 
ecological generalizations are distinctively ecological and autonomous 
insofar as their explanations of exceptions are concerned. 
 In chapter 4, I presented and defended an account of scientific 
explanation in which generalizations are explanatory if they are 
invariant. This interventionist account of causal scientific explanation 
showed that reference to lawlikeness is not a necessary condition for 
scientific explanations. It also showed why the debate about 
ecological laws is a red herring, namely, because there is no 
justification for this debate in ecology. In other words, there are 
invariant ecological generalizations that are capable of functioning in 
the role of laws despite the fact that they need not be lawlike as 
generalizations.  
 In chapter 5, I discussed the different functions that stability and 
scope have in the context of ―generalizing‖ scientific explanations. I 
argued that stability is an important property of generalizations 
Generalizations and Models in Ecology 
 
 
205 
insofar as their extrapolability and reliability are concerned. I argued that 
scope has a different, yet related function: it provides unification and 
systematization of (causal) knowledge. I also suggested that stability is 
not a monolithic property of generalizations, but that there are 
different, yet related concepts or meanings for stability. This was used 
as the basis for criticizing the idea that stability should be identified 
with lawlikeness.  
 In chapter 6, I discussed non-empirical investigations of models 
that I called robustness and sensitivity analyses. I also suggested a 
new taxonomy of robustness and criticized some previous 
taxonomies of robustness vis-à-vis my taxonomy of robustness and 
sensitivity analyses. I showed that robustness and sensitivity analyses 
are powerful tools for studying where models break down. They are 
especially powerful in pointing out reasons for this breakdown, 
because they show on which stability conditions or modeling 
assumptions the results of models depend. 
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APPENDIX: BIOLOGICAL 
GENERALIZATIONS AND MODELS 
 
Below, I have assembled a list of paleobiological, evolutionary, and 
ecological generalizations and models. The list is not representative of 
the biological disciplines mentioned. Yet, as a sample of what 
philosophers have taken to be examples of biological (lawlike) 
generalizations and models, it is a representative list. For the 
generalizations given here, I have used the word ―rule‖ in the names 
to avoid the confusing terminological plurality that prevails in the 
literature. For instance, Gause‘s rule is called by a variety of names, 
such as Gause‘s (or Grinnell‘s) axiom, law, principle, and so on.  The 
curves and graphs presented here are not based on any data; they are 
presented for illustrative purposes only. I have listed these 
generalizations and models in alphabetical order according to the 
parts of their names in bold.  
 
The intraspecific pattern of abundance and distribution: abundance is 
highest at the center of each species‘ range and declines gradually and 
usually symmetrically toward the boundaries.  Biologists: Brown 
(1995: 50-61) 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The intraspecific pattern of abundance and distribution is a 
pattern of variation in the abundance of species across their geographic 
range within a latitudinal gradient.  
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The interspecific pattern of abundance and distribution: the abundant 
species tend to be widely distributed, while the rare species tend to 
have restricted ranges.  Biologists: Brown (1995: 61-71); Lawton 
(1999: 188) 
 
 
 
 
Allen’s rule is a geographical or latitudinal gradient in body parts 
according to which the extremities (e.g., feet, tail, ears, bill, and other 
protruding body parts) of the members of a species of endothermic 
animals tend to be smaller in colder regions or at higher latitudes than 
members of the same species in warmer regions or at lower latitudes.  
See Bergmann’s rule. Philosophers & biologists: Dale (1940); Mayr 
(1942: 90, 1956); Snow (1954); Scholander (1955, 1956); Irving 
(1959); Rensch (1959: 43, 1960: 109); Ray (1960); Barth (1966); 
Weaver & Ingram (1969); Peters (1991: 190); Beatty (1995: 57) 
 
The area rule of the equilibrium theory of (see also) island 
biogeography: an island‘s extinction or turnover rates depend on the 
island‘s size. When an area of an island is decreased (or increased), its 
species extinction rate is increased (or decreased). The area rule 
should not be confused with the species–area rule. Philosophers & 
biologists: MacArthur & Wilson (1963, 1967: 19-67); Simberloff 
(1976b); Williamson (1989b) 
Fig. 3. The interspecific pattern of abundance and distribution is a 
pattern of a positive correlation between local abundance and the 
spatial distribution of species.  
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Bergmann’s rule is a geographical or latitudinal gradient in body 
size, according which the members of a species of endothermic 
animals are larger in their body size in colder regions or at higher 
latitudes than members of the same species in warmer regions or at 
lower latitudes. The traditional explanation for Bergmann‘s rule is 
that the increase of body size is due to selection for heat or energy 
conservation in cold climates. This follows from the reduction in 
―surface area to mass ratio‖ in animals that have larger body size, 
which is hypothesized to reduce their heat dissipation. A similar kind 
of reasoning applies also to Allen’s rule. There are other versions of 
Bergmann‘s rule. For instance, some versions deal with variation in 
body size among species and/or in ectotherms. Philosophers: Ruse 
(1973: 59-61); Rosenberg (1985: 207-208, 215-216, 1987: 196); Giere 
(1988: 42-43); Ghiselin (1989: 61); Beatty (1995: 57-59); Carrier (1995: 
87-88, 90). Biologists: Davis (1938); Dale (1940); Mayr (1942: 90, 
1956); Newell (1949); Snow (1954); Scholander (1955, 1956); Irving 
(1959); Rensch (1959: 39-41, 43-46, 1960: 109); Ray (1960); Hagmeier 
& Stults (1964); Barth (1966);  Lindsey (1966); Herreid & Kessel 
(1967); Bonner (1968); Rosenzweig (1968); Brown & Lee (1969); 
Kendeigh (1969); Weaver & Ingram (1969); James (1970); McNab 
(1971); Boyce (1979); Coleman (1979); Lindstedt & Boyce (1985); 
Ralls & Harvey (1985); Langvatn & Albon (1986); Geist (1987,1988); 
Paterson (1988); Dayan et al. (1991); Peters (1991: 190); Rhymer 
(1992); Steudel et al. (1994); Smith et al. (1995); Blackburn & Gaston 
(1996); Van Voorhies (1996, 1997); Mousseau (1997); Partridge & 
Coyne (1997); Blackburn et al. (1999); Gaston & Loder (1999); 
Ashton et al. (2000); Ashton (2001); Blackburn & Ruggiero (2001); 
Freckleton et al. (2003); Murray (2003) 
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The biogenetic rule (also known as the rule of recapitulation and 
von Baer‘s rule): ontogeny shows recapitulation of phylogeny. 
Philosophers & biologists: Rensch (1960: 96, 103); Ghiselin (1989); 
Beatty (1995: 67); Sterelny & Griffiths (1999: 365, 368)  
 
The canonical distribution of abundances of species (also known as 
the approximately lognormal distribution of abundances of coexisting 
species, the canonical distribution of commonness and rarity, the 
distribution of abundance among species, and Preston‘s lognormal 
distribution): there are more moderately rare species than moderately 
common ones. In other words, ecological communities contain many 
relatively rare species and only a few very abundant ones. Biologists: 
Preston (1962a); Peters (1991: 19); Brown (1995: 88-89); Lawton 
(1999: 183, 187) 
 
The Caspar–Klug theory is a hypothesis concerning the structure 
and organization of capsids in (simple) viruses. Philosophers: Morgan 
(2009)  
 
The central dogma of molecular genetics: DNA is transcribed to 
RNA; and RNA is translated to proteins. Philosophers: Rosenberg 
(1985: 30, 2001b: 141-142, 2001c: 740); Darden (1995: 145-154, 1996: 
410, 2002); Beatty (1997: S438) 
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Fig. 4. Bergmann‘s rule is a biogeographic pattern of variation in body 
size.  
Body sizes (within a species) 
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Character displacement: an evolutionary phenomenon whereby 
interspecific competition causes species to become different 
(ecologically, morphologically, behaviorally, and so on) in regions 
where their ranges overlap (that is, where these are sympatric) and 
where they compete as compared to regions where they are not 
sympatric. See the theory of limiting similarity. Philosophers & 
biologists: Diver (1940); Brown & Wilson (1956); Schoener (1965); 
Grant (1966, 1968); Rosenzweig (1966); MacArthur & Levins (1967); 
Ashmole (1968); Holmes & Pitelka (1968); Schoener & Gorman 
(1968); Grant (1972); Pianka (1972); Lawlor & Maynard Smith (1976); 
Connell (1980); Hendrickson (1981); Strong & Simberloff (1981); 
Ralls & Harvey (1985); Cooper (1993: 364, 1998: 560-562, 580) 
 
The clutch size rule (also known as the egg rule) is a geographical or 
latitudinal gradient in clutch size in birds, according to which the 
average clutch size of the members of a species increases with an 
increase in latitude. See also the litter size rule. Biologists: Mayr 
(1942); Lack (1947, 1948a, 1948b); Skutch (1949); Rensch (1959: 40, 
43, 1960: 109-110); Ray (1960: 85); Cody (1966); Haartman (1971); 
Owen (1977); Boyce (1979); Brown (1995: 130); Murray (2001: 276-
290) 
 
Cope’s rule (also known as Cope‘s first rule): there is a general 
evolutionary trend toward larger body size in many taxa. According 
to the traditional explanations of this rule, there are adaptive 
advantages conferred by a large body size. Philosophers: Ruse (1973: 
158-159); Hull (1974: 81-82, 100, 1975: 265).  Biologists: Mayr (1942: 
293-294); Newell (1949); Rensch (1959: 206, 1960: 107-108); Gould 
(1966, 1970, 1980, 1988, 1997); Bonner (1968); Stanley (1973); Van 
Valen (1973a); Southwood et al. (1974); Dawkins & Krebs (1979: 502-
503); Peters (1983: 184-196, 1991: 152-153); Brown & Maurer (1986); 
MacFadden (1986); McKinney (1990); Maurer et al. (1992); Damuth 
(1993); Arnold et al. (1995); Jablonski (1997); Alroy (1998); Ashton 
(2001); Knouft & Page (2003); Van Valkenburgh et al. (2004)   
 
The distance rule of the equilibrium theory of (see also) island 
biogeography: the immigration rates of islands depend on their 
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distance from the continental source of the immigrant species. When 
the degree of isolation from the source region(s) of an island is 
increased (or decreased), its immigration rate is reduced (or 
increased). Philosophers & biologists: MacArthur & Wilson (1963, 
1967: 19-67); Cook (1974); Lloyd (1987); Castle (2001b: 556-569); 
Lange (2002: 419, 2005); Shrader-Frechette (2001: 514-515); 
Mikkelson (2001) 
 
The diversity–stability rule (also known as the complexity–stability 
rule): increased (alpha, beta, and/or gamma) diversity enhances 
(population, community, and/or ecosystem) stability. Philosophers: 
McCoy & Shrader-Frechette (1992: 187-188); Shrader-Frechette & 
McCoy (1993: 3-5, 38-41, 48-51, 110, 175, 187, 188); Mikkelson 
(1997, 2004); Odenbaugh (2001, 2005); Sterelny (2006: 220-224); 
Justus (2008: 429-430). Biologists: MacArthur (1955); Hutchinson 
(1959); Connell & Orians (1964); Paine (1966); May (1975); Orians 
(1975); Connell (1978); Rabenold (1979); Simberloff (1980: 22); 
Pimm (1984); Peters (1991:  96-97, 161, 288); Lehman & Tilman 
(2000) 
 
Dollo’s rule (also known as the rule of irreversibility of evolution and 
the rule of phylogenetic irreversibility) is the idea that evolution 
cannot be reversed. Philosophers: Ruse (1973: 59, 61); Hull (1974: 81-
82, 100); Rosenberg (1985: 207-208, 215-216). Biologists: Gregory 
(1936); Muller (1939); Mayr (1942: 295); Rensch (1959: 123-126); 
Gould (1970, 1980: 100-101); Ghiselin (1989); Peters (1991: 155); Lee 
& Shine (1998) 
 
The endemicity rule of the equilibrium theory of (see also) island 
biogeography: the percentage of endemic species – that is, species 
that are indigenous only to a specific area – increases with the size of 
the island, which apparently follows from the area rule. Biologists: 
MacArthur & Wilson (1967: 173-174) 
 
Individuals total energy consumption varies as about the three-
fourths power of body size W, aW0.75.  Biologists: Van Valen (1973a); 
Brown (1995: 83); Marquet et al. (2005: 1752-1753) 
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The energy equivalence rule (also known as EER): energy use is 
unaffected by body size, that is, the energy use of all species 
(populations) in each size class tends to be equal, scales as aW0. In 
other words, the energy used by different species is roughly equal and 
independent of their body masses. It has been suggested that since 
species' basal metabolic rate (cf. Kleiber’s rule) and local density (cf. 
the inverse scaling rule) vary in directions opposite to body size, then 
it would follow that the energy used by the local population of a 
species could be independent of its body size. Biologists: Damuth 
(1981, 1991); Peters (1983: 164-183); Peters & Raelson (1984); Russo 
et al. (1993); Brown (1995: 95-99); Marquet (2000); Marquet et al. 
(2005) 
 
According to the exponential population growth model, population 
growth is density independent, and it can be described by the 
equation  
Nt = N0ert,  
where Nt is the population size at time t, N0 is the initial size of the 
population, and r is the growth rate of the population, called the 
intrinsic rate of increase. There is a differential equation version of 
this model, which is not presented here. Philosophers & biologists: 
Smith (1952); Mikkelson (1997: 492); Turchin (2001: 18-19); 
Berryman (2003); Owen-Smith (2005) 
 
 
 
Time, t 
Fig. 5. Exponential growth model and the classical curve of the model.  
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Fasting endurance scales as aW0.44 in mammals and between aW0.40 
and aW0.60 in birds, where W is body size of a taxon. Biologists:  
Peters (1983: 41-34); Lindstedt & Boyce (1985) 
 
The founder rule: a biased sample of a parent species‘ gene pool can 
lead to rapid changes in allele frequencies in a colonizing population 
and consequently to genotypic and phenotypic divergence from the 
parent population. The founder rule is supposed to be the 
mechanism of allopatric speciation; see Mayr’s rule. Philosophers & 
biologists: Ruse (1973: 56-56, 1977: 645-646, 1988: 35); Hull (1974: 
62-63); Sober (1984: 112); Rosenberg (1985: 149, 216); Ghiselin 
(1989: 57); Brandon (1990: 41); Plutynski (2001: 231)  
  
The body size frequency distribution of a taxon (also known as the 
frequency distribution of body sizes among the species): species 
number declines with body size. In other words, there are more 
species that have small body sizes than species that have large body 
sizes. Biologists: Hutchinson & MacArthur (1959); Van Valen 
(1973a); McKinney (1990: 88-89); Maurer et al. (1992); Brown (1995: 
77-88); Lawton (1999: 187); Knouft & Page (2003) 
 
 
 
According to Gause’s rule (also known as the competitive exclusion 
rule and Grinnell‘s rule), species that have similar, let alone identical, 
niches cannot coexist at the same place for long periods of time. In 
equilibrium, the number of species competing for limited set of 
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Body sizes   
Fig. 6. The frequency distribution of body sizes among the species is 
positively skewed.  
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resources should not exceed the number of resources in that set; in 
other words, in equilibrium n sympatric species cannot coexist 
indefinitely on fewer than n resources. The magnitude or intensity of 
competition between ecologically similar species is thought to be 
proportional to the degree of overlap in their niches or use of 
resources. Species that co-exist do so because there are ―adequate‖ 
differences in their niches or use of resources (see the theory of 
limiting similarity and Lotka–Volterra models). Philosophers: Mertz 
& McCauley (1980); Thompson (1989: 292); Cooper (1990, 1993: 
364, 1998: 560); Kincaid (1990: 77); Shrader-Frechette (1990a); Steen 
& Kamminga (1991: 450); Sterelny & Griffiths (1999: 256, 266); 
Weber (1999); Sterelny (2001: 449). Biologists: Beauchamp & Ullyott 
(1932); Gause (1934a, 1934b, 1936: 329, 1937); Lack (1945, 1946); 
Crombie (1947); Park (1948, 1954, 1957, 1962); Park & Frank (1950); 
Birch et al. (1951); Gilbert et al. (1952); Hutchinson (1953, 1959, 
1961); Utida (1953); Neyman et al. (1956); Ross (1957, 1958); Savage 
(1958); Udvardy (1959); Cole (1960); Hardin (1960); Savile (1960); 
Connell (1961, 1983); Slobodkin (1964); MacArthur & Levins (1964); 
Heatwole & Davis (1965); Paine (1966); Birch & Ehrlich (1967); 
Leslie et al. (1968); McCown & Williams (1968); Taylor (1968); 
Vandermeer (1969); Paine & Vadas (1969); Park et al. (1970); Levin 
(1970, 1976); Dayton (1971); Jaeger (1971); Ayala (1972); Pianka 
(1972); Strobeck (1973); Koch (1974a, 1974b); Schoener (1974, 1989); 
Slatkin (1974); Means (1975); Menge & Sutherland (1976); Kaplan & 
Yorke (1977); Wiens (1977); Levins (1979); Armstong & McGehee 
(1980); Pielou (1981: 20-22); Simberloff (1982); Haila (1982); Hanski 
(1983); Shorrocks et al. (1984); Chesson (1985); Chesson & Case 
(1986); Durán & Castilla (1989); Peters (1991: 97); Namba & 
Takahashi (1993); Huisman & Weissing (2001); Vandermeer et al. 
(2002); Edmunds et al. (2003)   
 
Gloger’s rule: a color variation within an animal species that seems to 
follow differences in temperature and/or humidity of their climate. 
Biologists: Dobzhansky (1933); Dale (1940); Mayr (1942: 88-90); 
Snow (1954); Cowles (1958, 1959); Rensch (1959: 40, 43; 1960: 109)   
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The Hardy–Weinberg rule describes what will happen to gene and 
genotype frequencies in a population unaffected by evolutionary 
forces according to which both gene frequencies and genotype 
frequencies will remain constant in successive generations. 
Philosophers & biologists: Ruse (1970: 239-243, 1973: 33-38, 44-45, 
1988: 18-19); Hull (1974: 57-58, 66); Ayala (1978: 135);  Mills & 
Beatty (1979: 49-51); Sober (1980: 360, 381, 1984: 34-42, 1993: 71-
72); Beatty (1981, 1995: 51-56); Rosenberg (1985: 132-133, 176); 
Ereshefsky (1991: 72-73); Cooper (1993: 372);  Carrier (1995: 87-90); 
Brandon (1997: S454); Murray (2000: 405, 2001: 273, 278); 
Woodward (2001: 7-8, 11-13, 2003: 303-307); Elgin & Sober (2002: 
443-444); Elgin (2003); Brandon (2006: 322-331); Hamilton (2007: 
594) 
 
The hollow curve (also known as the distribution of range sizes 
among species): there is a right-skewed species range size distribution, 
that is, most species have moderate to small range sizes and only a 
few have large range sizes. The curve was originally called hollow 
because its shape on linear axes is ―hollow.‖ Biologists: Brown (1995: 
102-108); Gaston (1996a); Hecnar (1999); Lawton (1999: 187) 
 
The size of the home range (of herbivorous mammals) varies 
positively with body size, aW1, where W is body size. Biologists: Van 
Valen (1973a); Peters (1983: 164-183); Brown (1995: 122); Marquet et 
al. (2005)  
 
Hutchinson’s rule (also known as the 1.3 rule): a (hypothesized) 
constant of trophic or feeding structures between competing species. 
It has been suggested that a constant difference of approximately 1.3 
in linear dimensions in trophic or feeding structures is sufficient to 
the permit coexistence of species. See also limiting similarity.  
Biologists: Hutchinson (1959); Klopfer & MacArthur (1961); 
Schoener (1965); Grant (1968); Holmes & Pitelka (1968); Schoener & 
Gorman (1968); Fenchel (1975); Pulliam (1975); Wilson (1975); Horn 
& May (1977); Maiorana (1978); Pearson & Mury (1979); Strong et al. 
(1979); Strong (1980); Simberloff & Boecklen (1981); Schoener 
(1989); Peters (1991: 217, 226)  
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According to the intermediate disturbance rule, intermediate levels 
of abiotic or biotic disturbances are capable of mediating the 
coexistence of competitor species and thus maintaining the local 
diversity of a community at a relatively high level. Too small or 
infrequent disturbances lead to local extinctions of competitively 
inferior species by competitively dominant ones, whereas too intense 
or too frequent disturbances allow for the few species that are the 
most stress-tolerant to exclude other species from a habitat. See also 
Gause’s rule and Lotka–Volterra. Philosophers & biologists: Paine 
(1966); Paine & Vadas (1969); Dayton (1971); Connell (1978); Durán 
& Castilla (1989); Cooper (1998: 567-568, 578); Sterelny & Griffiths 
(1999: 267-268); Sterelny (2006: 217) 
The inverse scaling rule (also known the distribution of population 
density as a function of body mass and size-abundance/density rule): 
the maximum density, D, of herbivorous mammals declines as their 
body size increases, D = aW-0.75, where W is body size.  In other 
words, small organisms typically attain greater population densities 
than larger ones. Biologists: Damuth (1981, 1991, 1993); Peters (1983: 
164-183, 1991: 19-20, 26, 27, 29, 31- 33, 142, 190, 275); Peters & 
Raelson (1984); Juanes (1986); Marquet et al. (1990); Russo et al. 
(1993); Bohlin et al. (1994); Brown (1995: 91-95); Blackburn & 
Gaston (1997); Marquet (2000); Marquet et al. (2005)  
The island rule (also known as Foster‘s rule): there are two versions 
of this rule. The taxonomic version claims that there is a tendency 
toward gigantism in insular rodents and marsupials, while there is a 
tendency for dwarfism in insular carnivores, lagomorphs, and 
artiodactyls. Insectivores, however, do not exhibit any clear pattern of 
insular body size. The ataxonomic version of the rule states that there 
is a trend toward gigantism in the smaller species and dwarfism in the 
larger species. Biologists: Foster (1964); Bonner (1968: 4-5); 
Wassersug et al. (1979); Angerbjorn (1985); Lomolino (1985); Maurer 
et al. (1992); Damuth (1993); Brown (1995) 
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The equilibrium theory of island biogeography is a model of insular 
biogeography. It represents the equilibrium number of species, Ŝ, 
inhabiting an island at an intersection point between extinction (E) 
and immigration (I) curves of that island. The curves are 
hypothesized to be functions of the size of the island (extinction) and 
its distance from a source of dispersing species (immigration). See 
also the area, distance, and endemicity rules. Philosophers: Cooper 
(1990); Shrader-Frechette (1990b, 2001: 514-515); Shrader-Frechette 
& McCoy (1993: 69-79, 86-92, 99); Mikkelson (1997: 492); Sterelny & 
Griffiths (1999: 259-266); Sismondo (2000); Castle (2001a). 
Biologists: MacArthur & Wilson (1963, 1967); Hagmeier & Stults 
(1964); Simberloff (1969, 1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1976c); Brown (1971); 
Simberloff & Wilson (1969, 1970); Heatwole & Levins (1972); Cook 
(1974); Brown & Kodric-Brown (1977); Gilbert (1980); Peters (1991: 
205-206); Williamson (1989a, 1989b); Haila (1990); Lawton (1999: 
188) 
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E, Species Extinction   
Fig. 7. An equilibrium model of an island. The equilibrium number of 
species, Ŝ, is reached at the intersection point between the curve of the 
immigration of the new species and the curve of the extinction of the species 
from the island. P is the number of species in the ―species pool.‖ The point at 
which immigration and extinction curves intersect is a globally stable 
equilibrium.  Note that, although the number of species is at equilibrium in the 
intersection, the identity or composition of the species in it is not constant.  
Near 
Far 
Small 
Large 
  Number of Species Present, N 
Fig. 8. An equilibrium model of islands at varying distances from the source 
area of immigrant species and of varying size. An increase in distance (near to 
far) lowers the immigration curve, I, while an increase in island size (small to 
large) lowers the extinction curve, E. Manipulation of ―size‖ or ―distance‖ of 
an island thus has an effect on what the equilibrium number of the species, Ŝ, 
of that island will be.  
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Kleiber’s rule: basal metabolism, an estimate of the energy required 
by an individual for the basic processes of living, varies as aW0.75, 
where W is its body size. Philosophers & biologists: Gould (1966: 
613); Van Valen (1973a); Peters (1983: 24-46); Mitchell (2000: 242); 
Colyvan & Ginzburg (2003: 651); Marquet et al. (2005); Elgin (2006); 
Hamilton (2007: 604) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The latitudinal diversity gradient: a geographical or latitudinal 
gradient in species richness or diversity, according to which the 
number of species within a taxonomic group tends to increase with 
decreasing latitudes, i.e., diversity increases towards the equator and 
decreases towards the poles. Philosophers: Sterelny & Griffiths (1999: 
272-273); Lange (2005). Biologists: Dobzhansky (1950); Fischer 
(1960); Klopfer & MacArthur (1960, 1961); Rensch (1960: 108-109); 
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Unicells, a = 0.018 
Ectotherms, a = 0.14 
Endotherms, a = 4.1 
Fig. 9. Kleiber‘s rule: in organisms the basal metabolic rate is 
proportional to three-fourths the power of body size or weight. Note 
that although all three different major ―metabolic groups‖ depicted here, 
endotherms, ectotherms and unicells, generally and approximately obey 
the rule, there are differences between them in the ―elevation‖ of the 
allometric equation, that is, in the value of a constant a. These differences 
might be ecologically and evolutionarily important. 
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Connell & Orias (1964); Hagmeier & Stults (1964); MacArthur 
(1964); Paine (1966); Pianka (1966); Menge & Sutherland (1976); 
Parsons & Bock (1979); Rabenold (1979); Stevens (1989); Rohde 
(1992, 1996, 1997, 1998); Blackburn & Gaston (1996); Gaston 
(1996b); Rosenzweig & Sandlin (1997); Santelices & Marquet (1998); 
Lawton (1999: 183, 188); Ashton (2001); Willig & Bloch (2006) 
 
(von) Liebig’s rule of the minimum: in plants and in some other 
groups, the growth of an individual or a population is controlled by 
the resource that is the scarcest, not by all of the available ones. 
Philosophers & biologists: Shrader-Frechette (1994: 34); Berryman 
(2003)  
 
Under the umbrella of the theory of limiting similarity there are 
different but related ideas, such as Hutchinson’s rule and character 
displacement. These ideas are related to one another via the notion 
that sufficient dissimilarities between competing species in niches or 
resource use could allow and permit for their coexistence; see 
Gause’s rule.  
 
The litter size rule: a geographical or latitudinal gradient in litter size 
in the members of mammal species similar to the clutch size rule. 
Biologists: Mayr (1942); Lack (1948b); Lord (1960); Cody (1966)  
 
According to the logistic population growth model (also known as 
the density-dependent population growth model and the Verhulst(–
Pearl) model), population growth rate is density dependent, that is, 
growth rate declines with population numbers, N, and reaches zero 
when the population numbers are at its environment‘s carrying 
capacity, K. The logistic growth model models intraspecific 
competition. The difference equation of the logistic population 
growth model has the form 
Nt+1 = Nt + Ntr(1-(Nt/ K)), 
where K represents the upper limit of the number of individuals of a 
population that an environment can support and r is the growth rate 
of the population, also called the intrinsic rate of increase. If 
population numbers, N, exceed K, then the growth rate of the 
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population becomes negative. The differential equation version of 
this model is not presented here. Philosophers: Wimsatt (1980a); 
Cooper (1993: 361-362); Shrader-Frechette (1994); Mikkelson (1997: 
492); Weisberg (2006a: 638). Biologists: Gause (1934b); Smith (1952); 
May (1972: 645, 1976); Pielou (1981: 25-25); Hall (1988); Peters 
(1991: 52, 54-56); Murray (2000: 405); Turchin (2001: 20-21); 
Berryman (2003); Owen-Smith (2005) 
 
 
 
In Lotka–Volterra models, one have coupled differential equations. 
Different Lotka–Volterra equations are used to describe interactions 
between species belonging to different trophic levels (the predator—
prey interaction model) and interactions between species belonging to 
the same trophic level (the interspecific competition model). The 
Lotka–Volterra interspecific competition model‘s equations are the 
following. The equation for the population growth of competitor 
species 1 is  
dN1/ dt = r1N1 ((K1 - (N1 - 12N2))/ K1).  
The equation for the population growth of competitor species 2 is  
dN2/ dt = r2N2 ((K2 - (N2 - 21N1))/ K2).  
In the equations, N1 is the number of individuals of species 1 at time 
t, N2 is the number of individuals of species 2 at time t, K1 is the 
carrying capacity of species 1, K2 is the carrying capacity of species 2, 
Time, t 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 s
iz
e,
 N
 
Carrying capacity, K  
Fig. 10. The classical sigmoid or S-shaped curve of the logistic growth 
model 
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r1 is the intrinsic growth rate of species 1 (in absence of competition), 
r2 is the intrinsic growth rate of species 2 (in absence of competition), 
and ‘s are competition coefficients, where 12 is the negative effect 
of species 1 on species 2 and 21 is the negative effect of species 2 on 
species 1. 
 
 
 
The classical Lotka–Volterra prey–predator model‘s equations are 
the following. Prey‘s growth equation is  
dN1/ dt = rN1 – bN1N2 
Predator‘s growth equation is  
dN2/ dt = ebN1N2 – cN2 
In the equations, r is the intrinsic growth rate of prey (in the absence 
of predation), c is the intrinsic death rate of predator (in the absence 
of their prey), b is the predation rate coefficient, e is predation 
efficiency, N1 is the population size of prey at time t, and N2 is the 
population size of predators at time t. These equations describe the 
dynamics in which populations of both prey and predators exhibit 
periodic oscillations.  
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Species 2  
Species 1  
Fig. 11. The Lotka-Volterra interspecific competition model between 
two species. Species 2 is being locally outcompeted or excluded by 
species 1, for example, because species 1 out-harvested their common 
resource. 
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Philosophers: Rosenberg (1985: 214); Shrader-Frechette (1990a); 
Cooper (1993: 361-364); Sober (1993: 76-77); Carrier (1995); 
Mikkelson (1997: 492); Cuddington (2001); Odenbaugh (2005: 240-
245); Weisberg (2006a: 638, 2006b); Justus (2008: 427-428); Weisberg 
& Reisman (2008). Biologists: Gause (1934a, 1934b); Smith (1952); 
Philip (1955); Strobeck (1973); May (1973: 646-647); Smale (1976); 
Peters (1976, 1991:  52, 164); Armstrong & McGehee (1980); 
Simberloff (1980: 18-19, 23-24); Pielou (1981: 18-22); Hall (1988); 
Namba & Takahashi (1993); Levins (1998: 575-576); Turchin (2001: 
21-22); Owen-Smith (2005) 
 
Mayr’s rule (also known as allopatric speciation): new species evolve 
when a population is separated by geographic isolation from its 
parent population versus polyploidy and sympatric speciation. See the 
founder rule. Philosophers and biologists: Hull (1974: 50-51, 95); 
Ruse (1977: 645-646); Ghiselin (1987a: 129, 1989: 58); Sober (1993: 
147); Beatty (1995: 67, 1997: S435-S436); Weber (1999: 88); Hamilton 
(2007: 594) 
 
Mendel’s first rule (also known as the rule of segregation): in 
sexually reproducing organisms the members of a pair of alleles of 
every gene segregate into different gametes during meiosis. Meiosis is 
Time, t 
Prey 
Fig. 12. The Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model: classical curves 
between predator and prey species whose cyclic populations oscillate in 
tandem 
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the process by which diploid parents produce haploid gametes. Well-
known exceptions to this rule are meiotic drive and non-disjunction. 
Philosophers & biologists: Sandler & Novitski (1957); Smart (1963); 
Ruse (1970: 243, 1973: 13-14, 24-26, 29-31); Darden & Maull (1977: 
47 , 51-54); Ayala (1978: 134); Crow (1979); Beatty (1980: 555, 1981: 
403-409, 1982: 209-213, 1995: 50-51, 54-56, 59-62); Rosenberg (1985: 
31, 93, 108-109, 132-136, 212, 1997: S435, S440); Thompson (1989: 
290); Ereshefsky (1991: 65-67);  Steen & Kamminga (1991); Sober 
(1993: 107-108, 1997); Carrier (1995: 83-84); Mitchell (1997, 2000: 
242,  260, 2002: 331); Waters (1998: 5); Sterelny & Griffiths (1999: 
115, 117, 121-124, 365-366); Woodward (2000: 232, 2001: 7-8, 11-13, 
2003a: 275-276, 303-307) 
 
Mendel’s second rule (also known as the rule of independent 
assortment): genes on different chromosomes assort independently 
of one another. In other words, non-allelic genes assort 
independently of one another in the offspring. A well-know 
exception to this rule is linkage. In linkage, different genes are located 
on the same chromosome, whereas Mendel‘s second rule applies only 
to genes at the same locus, i.e., to genes that are on different 
homologous chromosomes. Philosophers & biologists: Ruse (1970: 
243, 1973: 13-14, 24-26, 29-31); Darden & Maull (1977: 47, 51  53-
54); Rosenberg (1985: 31, 93, 108-109, 132-136, 212); Thompson 
(1989: 290); Darden (1995); Glennan (1996: 62); Beatty (1997: S435); 
Sterelny &  Griffiths (1999: 115, 117, 121-124, 365-366); Waters 
(1998); Murray (2001); Hamilton (2007: 599) 
 
The miniaturization rule: evolution of extremely small adult body 
sizes in some taxa. Biologists: Wassersug et al. (1979); Hanken & 
Wake (1993) 
 
The rule of natural selection: ―the survival and/or reproduction of 
the fittest.‖ The problem with this formulation of the rule is related 
to how we define fitness in a way that does not turn the 
generalization into a circular or meaningless truism. There are many 
replies to this tautology charge of the rule. Philosophers & biologists: 
Scriven (1959); Smart (1963: 59); Williams (1970: 362, 1973a, 1973b); 
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Lewontin (1972); Ruse (1973: 38-41, 1977: 646-649, 1988: 19-21, 
1989); Hull (1974: 65-69); Popper (1974: 137); Ferguson (1976); 
Peters (1976, 1978, 1991: 60-73); Caplan (1977); Castrodeza (1977); 
Stebbing (1977); Brandon (1978, 1990: 9-11, 140, 158, 1997: S454); 
Mills & Beatty (1979); Beatty (1980: 555, 1981); Reed (1981); 
Rosenberg (1982, 1985: 126-129, 154-169, 211, 212-216, 219-225, 
239-243, 1987, 2001b); Byerly (1983); Sober (1984: 61-85, 1987: 222-
223); Cooper (1988); Shrader-Frechette (1990a); Carrier (1995: 93-96); 
Lawton (1999: 178); Murray (2000: 403-405, 2001: 274-278); 
Rosenberg & Kaplan (2005) 
 
The relation between range size and body size: there are few 
species of large (and possibly of very small) size with small 
geographical ranges. In other words, large (and possibly very small) 
sized species‘ geographical ranges tend to be large. Biologists: Brown 
(1995: 105-108)  
 
Rapoport’s rule: a latitudinal gradient of decreasing size of species 
ranges with decreasing latitude. In other words, the tendency is for 
latitudinal ranges of species to become smaller with decreasing 
latitude. It is hypothesized that species at high latitudes (and/or at 
cold climates) have adapted to more varied environmental conditions, 
which makes it possible for them to occupy wider ranges. Biologists: 
Pianka (1989); Stevens (1989, 1992); Brown (1995: 112-116); 
Blackburn & Gaston (1996); Rohde (1996); Gaston et al. (1998); 
Santelices & Marquet (1998); Hecnar (1999); Ashton (2001)  
 
The Red Queen rule: the idea that the evolutionary progress of 
species (or taxa) is relative and temporary, owing to the fact that their 
biotic and abiotic environments are constantly changing and 
deteriorating. Examples of this rule are the arms race between 
species. Evidence for this rule is supposed to come from the pattern 
of Van Valen’s rule of extinction. The rule tries to establish that 
evolution by natural selection is not an ―improver,‖ but that organism 
and species are only capable of maintaining their current states of 
adaptation and fitness by natural selection, which in turn implies that 
their extinction rates should be constant. Philosophers: Dawkins & 
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Krebs (1979); Sober (1984: 174); Wimsatt (1994: 254); Beatty (1995: 
67); Sterelny (2001: 446, 450). Biologists: Van Valen (1973b); Raup 
(1975); Lewontin (1978: 159-160);  
 
The relation between specialization and diversity: animals become 
more specialized as they become more diverse.  Biologists: Simpson 
(1953); Cisne (1974)  
 
The species–area rule (also known as the area–diversity rule):  the 
number of species on an island or a habitat varies with the area of 
that island or habitat, where this relation can be presented as a power 
equation,  
S=cAz,  
in which S is the number of species of a given taxonomic group, A is 
the area of the island or habitat, and c and z are (fitted) constants. The 
parameter z has some ―canonical‖ values in the range 0.15 and 0.35. 
The value of z depends on several factors. The constant c is said to 
represent, among other things, the biotic richness of the archipelago 
in question or some larger region; see the latitudinal diversity 
gradient. The curve of this rule is often given in a log-log plot, so that 
z can be approximated as the slope of the curve. Philosophers: 
Cooper (1990, 1998); Shrader-Frechette (1990b, 2001: 514-515); 
Shrader-Frechette & McCoy (1993: 70, 72-73, 75, 89-92, 100, 285-
287); Castle (2001a, 2001b: 556-569); Mikkelson (2001); Lange 
(2005a). Biologists: Preston (1962a, 1962b); MacArthur & Wilson 
(1967: 8-18); Brown (1971); Cook (1974); Simberloff (1974, 1976b); 
Diamond (1975); Connor & McCoy (1979); Gilbert (1980); 
Williamson (1989a, 1989b); Peters (1991: 188-189, 289, 294); Lawton 
(1996, 1999: 178, 188-189); Pounds & Puschendorf (2004) 
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On islands the species–genus ratio is lower than on the mainland 
from which the species was colonized. In other words, there are 
fewer sympatric congeneric species on an island than in the mainland 
areas of similar size. This decrease of the species–genus ratio on 
islands has been explained as an effect of interspecific competition 
that is supposed to be more intense on islands than on the mainland. 
See Gause’s rule and the theory of limiting similarity. Philosophers: 
Sloep (1993). Biologists: Elton (1946); Hagmeier & Stults (1964); 
Grant (1966); Simberloff (1970, 1984); Van Valen (1973a); Strong 
(1980); Diamond & Gilpin (1982)   
 
The thinning rule for plants is W = aD-1.33, where D is density and 
where W is body size. In other words, in plants and some other 
sessile organisms, it is the density of populations that is treated as the 
independent variable affecting body size. See the inverse scaling rule. 
Biologists: Peters (1991: 45); Marquet (2000); Shrader-Frechette & 
McCoy (1993: 123); Marquet et al. (2005)  
Area km2 (A) 
Non-isolated areas  
Isolated areas  
Fig. 13. The species–area rule (S = cAz) plotted on logarithmic axes for 
isolated and non-isolated habitats. Isolated habitats have higher z values 
than non-isolated habitats, and thus steeper slopes in the species–area 
curve, since z determines the slope of the curve. Isolated habitats, such as 
islands, support fewer species than non-isolated areas of similar size.  
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The rule of the unspecialized (also known as Cope‘s second rule): 
unspecialized species (i.e., generalists) tend to avoid extinction longer 
than specialized species. Philosophers: Hull (1974: 81-82, 100); 
Rosenberg (1985: 207-208, 215-216, 1987: 196). Biologists: Mayr 
(1942: 294-295); Rensch (1959: 236-237, 284, 1960: 108); Stanley 
(1973); Southwood et al. (1974); Flessa et al. (1975); Holmes (1977); 
van Valkenburgh et al. (2004)  
 
Van Valen’s rule of extinction: extinction rates for taxa are both 
constant and taxon specific. See the Red Queen rule. Biologists: Van 
Valen (1973b); Raup (1975) 
 
The Volterra rule: any biotic or abiotic factor that both increase the 
death rate of predators and decrease the growth rate of their prey has 
the effect of decreasing the predator population size, whereas the 
population size of its prey increases. Philosophers & biologists: 
Odenbaugh (2005: 242); Levins (2006: 747); Weisberg (2006a: 642-
643, 2006b); Weisberg & Reisman (2008) 
 
Williston’s rule (also known as the rule of anisomerism): a 
phylogenetic trend in which serial, repetitive, similar, or unspecialized 
traits, parts, or limbs in organisms evolve toward fewer numbers and 
more specialized functions. Philosophers & biologists: Gregory 
(1935); Rensch (1959: 291); Gould (1970: 207, 209, 1980); Cisne 
(1974); Ruse (1973: 58); Hull (1974: 81-82, 100); Waters (1998: 15); 
Sidor (2001)  
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